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**TWO ESSAYS ON
ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY**

TWO ESSAYS ON ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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AUTHORIZED TRANSLATION
BY
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- I. The Unconscious in the Normal and Pathological Mind
II. The Relation of the Ego to the Unconscious



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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

It will come as a surprise to most readers to learn that the two works comprising this volume are examples of the possibility of putting new wine into old bottles. The original versions of both papers appeared some years ago, and they were published in English, under different titles, in the volume of *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* edited by Constance Long (Second Edition, Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1920).

Of the first essay only the framework of its earlier form can be recognized, and so much new material has been added to the second essay that both works start afresh, so to speak, full of the amazing vitality of Jung's mind.

So many people still cling tenaciously to the conception of Jung as a writer and investigator in the realm of psychological therapy, that only a comparatively few readers are liable to make the discovery that in the second essay he is providing a fairly circumstantial description of a technique of relation to the unconscious which adds an entirely new dimension to the frame of normal human experience. In this work he has not contented himself with a discussion of the anima and animus as psychological conceptions, but has also outlined the way in which the autonomy of these psychical personalities can be transformed into conscious relations.

Anyone who is relatively familiar with the possibilities of the physical world could prophesy the changes that would overtake civilized life if, let us say, the secret of the release of atomic energy were placed in the hands of mankind. The ideas in the latter part of the second essay are psychological

explosives which could affect human life as profoundly as the release of atomic energy. Jung has found a way of handling these potentialities, and all who realize the immense irrationality of human fate will see that this way, or technique, which Jung has discovered could have incalculable effect on the course and character of individual destiny.

The importance of this discovery will escape the collectively orientated mind in exactly the same way as great discoveries have always done. But the single eye that is able to appraise possibilities in the spiritual world will recognize that this remarkable extension and intensification of consciousness, to which Jung here points the way, is a world-event of no ordinary importance.

That this technique, and the problems it brings to light, go far beyond the specialized requirements of medical therapy might reasonably go without saying. But nevertheless, so firmly has Jung's name become bracketed with Freud's, that it has to be said. Freud himself would be the first to welcome any attempt at an accurate discrimination of his own achievement from that of Jung.

Freud discovered the personal subconscious and elaborated the psychoanalytic method of treating neurotic disorders; Jung discovered the collective unconscious. This does not mean to say that either Freud or Jung was the first to apprehend the existence of the unconscious, but they were undoubtedly the first occidental scientists to discover it in the sense of valuing and understanding its significance. Freud sticks to the conception of the unconscious as a pathological or infantile activity of the mind which he gained from his clinical observation. Jung's conception distinguishes the personal from the collective unconscious; and it is the discovery of the illimitable vista of the racial mind and the super-personal content of the

unconscious events are in the key of this discovery, and can never be understood if read in the key of a specific pathological viewpoint. In fact, only by detaching his mind from the specifically morbid conception of the unconscious, which had hitherto prevailed, was he in a position to discover the realm of the unconscious in all its terror, immensity, and grandeur.

The bias and resistance which, in every normal mind, guard the door against every extension of consciousness will doubtless continue to supply reinforced concrete against the disturbing ideas which this volume contains, and against their immense implications, still more; but when once America had been discovered no amount of naïve suspicion and indignant refusal could keep it off the map of the world.

The unconscious is no longer something about the existence of which one is entitled to have opinions. A new continent has been discovered, and, in spite of every inducement to believe that 'nothing has happened,' certain adventurous or unfortunate ones will not be prevented from seeking it.

It is a fact of the greatest interest that it was the increasing urgency of the problem of mental and nervous disorders, and the complete inadequacy of physical medicine to handle it, which have added yet another star to the constellation of major discoveries. Only rarely does consciousness entertain nobly a new idea, but now, once again a great mind is spurred to its finest daring by the eternal motive of human suffering.

Physicians in this country have been heard to inquire, 'Where, then, does Jung stand in relation to the medical profession?' It seems to me, and I believe that those who read Jung's works with their hearts as well as with their heads will agree with me, that the question should rather run, 'Where does the medical profession stand in relation to Jung?' We know that neurotic and psychotic disorders are rooted in the unconscious. Jung's discovery of the

unconscious embraces not the personal aspect alone, but also its universal significance. The exclusively personal interpretation of unconscious contents is exactly equivalent to the miser's interpretation of the value of gold currency. The reason he dies starved of the pith and courage of life is because he has mistaken a general for a personal value, and has thus cut himself off from the human brotherhood. The neurotic commits the same mistake in the spiritual world. Consequently Jung's psychological method, which is based upon the general significance of the unconscious, provides a more valid explanation and a more effective cure for these disabilities than the various 'psychoanalytic' theories which leave the collective psyche and the collective unconscious entirely out of account.

The medical world in general has apparently decided to remain unconscious of the discovery of the unconscious. This obtuseness has a particular historical ground. Medical knowledge and equipment are, like every other part and organ of culture, very largely an inherited system. That system was built up on the assumption of the physical basis of disease. The magnificent successes in the realm of medical research are in great part dependent upon the narrowing of the field which this definite hypothesis provides. It would be an almost unnatural disloyalty if the profession were not wedded to a viewpoint that is not only rooted in tradition, but also generously favoured by success. The psychoanalytic method of Freud or Adler can be grafted upon the parental stem without too great difficulty, since they offer no fundamental opposition to the materialistic viewpoint. Psychoanalysis has in fact been more or less assimilated by the profession as another item in that voluminous list of specialized claims which medical prospectors have pegged out upon the inexhaustible gold-field of human fears and ailments. But, by thus assimilating psychoanalysis, medicine has merely digested a heretic in exactly the same way that the Church of

Rome digested Francis of Assisi, and with no more attention to the point of view of the digested party. The acceptance of the unconscious, however, in the meaning which Jung has given it, involves more than a grudging admission of the existence of a 'psychic factor' in certain diseases. It means accepting the principle of psychic causation as an absolutely equivalent hypothesis to that of the physical. For the psychological or spiritual basis of disease is no longer an assumption, but a fact for which the evidence is just as real and convincing as it is for the physical basis. It cannot, however, be claimed that the quantity of evidence is as imposing, for the obvious reason that the number of workers in the one field is a host, in the other a handful.

Materialism and mysticism are, as Jung points out in the present volume, a pair of opposites; and the physical and psychological viewpoints are similarly opposed. This does not mean that they cannot coexist in comparative harmony. They can and do. It is perfectly possible for a doctor in one interview to make an adequate physical examination of a patient, and in the next to attempt a psychological survey; but none the less they are opposite viewpoints and require entirely different operations of the mind. The one hypothesis always tends to exclude the other. But because they are a pair of opposites, it must necessarily follow that neither can be wholly true. Therefore, if organized medicine remains solely preoccupied with the one half of the human organism, this must have the effect of inciting a one-sided fanaticism in the ranks of the opposite viewpoint. This leads to the proliferation of isolated mystical cults, and pseudo-scientific bands of amateurs which range the territories of the neglected world of the unconscious with a lawless, pettifogging activity.

Into the midst of this disorganized welter of prejudice, fanaticism, and credulity, where fake-prophets, sharks, and psychological beachcombers practise their cunning and grow fat, Jung has penetrated with the testing, cautious objectivity

of the scientific mind. For many years he sought a method of approach and an open attitude that could do justice to the phenomena of this vast psychological hinterland, and what he has discovered will be appraised at its true value only by the man who has achieved the same kind of freedom from inherited fears and prejudices.

This new psychological orientation to the problems of life and disease is no longer, therefore, in the hands of undisciplined cranks and freebooters, nor can it be brushed aside as 'mere mysticism.' Jung is fundamentally an investigator and scientific thinker, and what he lays before the serious modern mind is a science of the unconscious. Upon the manner in which the science of medicine, as it now is, relates to the organized knowledge which Jung offers, a vital issue hangs. For, on the one hand, the art of healing needs to heal the whole man and not a certain selected aspect of him; and on the other, the tremendous stream of human interest that is moving over towards the psychological field has no greater need than the modesty, discipline, and solidarity of organized science.

H. G. BAYNES.

LONDON,
July, 1928.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST GERMAN EDITION

THIS essay is the result of my attempt to revise, at the request of the publisher for a second edition, the paper which appeared in 1912 in the year-book of Rascher and Co., under the title, *Neue Bahnen der Psychologie*. The present work, then, is the subject matter of the earlier essay in an altered form and in greater compass. In my earlier paper I confined myself to the exposition of an essential part of the psychological point of view introduced by Freud. The manifold and important changes which recent years have brought in the psychology of the unconscious have compelled me to enlarge considerably the framework of my earlier paper. Several passages concerning Freud were shortened, while Adler's psychology, on the other hand, was taken into account; and, so far as was possible within the limits of this paper, a certain general survey of my own views was given.

I must warn the reader at the outset that he will not have an easy, 'popular science' essay to deal with, as in the case of my earlier paper, but an exposition which, in view of its exceedingly complicated material, makes the greatest demands upon his patience and attention. Yet by no means can I regard this as a final or adequate statement. This requirement could be attained only if each separate problem touched upon in this essay were given full scientific treatment. I should therefore refer any one intent upon a deeper probing of the questions at issue to the specialized literature of the subject. My intention is simply to give a certain kind of orientation toward the newest conceptions of the

psychology of the unconscious. I regard the problem of the unconscious as so important and so entirely opportune that, in my view, it would be a great loss if this problem, which touches every man so closely, were to disappear from the horizon of the cultured layman, and be banished to a shadow-life on the shelves of a library in the pages of inaccessible technical journals.

The psychological manifestations which accompany the present war—the incredible havoc made of universally accepted standards of judgment, the mutual slanderings, the unprecedented destructiveness, the unheard-of lying, and the inability of men to stop the ravages of the bloody demon—all combine in a unique way to force upon the vision of the thinking man the problem of the unconscious, the slumbering tumultuous chaos which lies beneath the ordered world of consciousness

This war has thrown out the unanswerable accusation to civilized man that he is still a barbarian, and at the same time it has shown what inflexible retribution lies in store for him whenever he is tempted to make his neighbour responsible for his own bad qualities. Yet the psychology of the individual corresponds to the psychology of the nations. What the nations do each individual does, and as is the individual, so is the nation. Only in the change of attitude of the individual can begin the change in the psychology of the nation. The great problems of humanity have never yet been solved through general laws, but only through renewal of the attitude of individuals. If there ever was a time when individual consciousness was the absolutely indispensable and only right thing, it is now, in our present catastrophic epoch. Yet whoever attains to individual consciousness must necessarily break through the frontiers of the unconscious, for this contains what, above all else, he needs to know.

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION

I AM glad that it has been the lot of this little book to pass into a second edition in so short a time, notwithstanding the difficulty that its contents must have presented to many readers. I am allowing the second edition to appear unchanged in essentials, with the exception of minor alterations and improvements, though I am aware that, in view of the difficulty and novelty of the subject matter, the last chapter needs a much fuller discussion before it can be made easily intelligible to all.

However, an ample treatment of the basic theories there touched upon would seriously overstep the limits of a more or less popular exposition, so that I prefer to discuss these matters with the degree of detail which rightly belongs to them in another volume already in preparation.

I have discovered from the many communications I received after the publication of the first edition that, even in a fairly wide public, interest in the problems of the human mind is very much keener than I had anticipated. This interest should not be lightly explained away as a result of the profound shock which our consciousness sustained through the world war. The spectacle of this catastrophe threw man back upon himself by reminding him of his complete impotence. There was a movement inwards, and, since everything rocked, he must needs find something which could remain unshaken. Too many still look outwards, some believing in the illusion of victory and of victorious power, others in institutions and laws, and yet again others in the

destruction of the existing order. But too few look inwards upon themselves, and all too few confront themselves with this question : whether the best ends of human society would not be served were every man, instead of distracting his fellow-men with his counsels, first of all in his own person and within the frontiers of his own realm to test out that abolition of the hitherto existing order, that denial of its laws and victories which he is fain to preach in every by-street.

Because each individual needs upheaval, inner discord, the break-up of the existing order, and renewal, this does not mean that he should force these things upon his fellow-men under the hypocritical cloak of Christian love, or sense of social responsibility, or any other beautiful synonym for the unconscious urge to personal power.

Individual consciousness, the return of the individual to fundamental human nature, to his own being with its individual and social destiny—it is here that the process of healing can begin for that blindness which reigns at the present time.

Interest in the problem of the human mind is a symptom of this instinctive return to the self. It is to serve this interest that my work is written.

THE AUTHOR.

KÜSNACHT (ZÜRICH),
October, 1918.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD GERMAN EDITION

THIS work came into being during the war and owes its origin essentially to the psychological reverberations of that great event. Now the war is over and the waves begin slowly to subside. But the great problems of the mind aroused by the challenge of the war still engage heart and brain in all thinking and inquiring men. Thanks to this circumstance, this little work has survived the period after the war and now appears in the third edition. In view of the fact that since the publication of the second edition seven years have elapsed, I have deemed it necessary to make rather extensive alterations and improvements, especially in the chapters on types and on the unconscious. The chapter on *Development of Types in the Analytical Process* I have omitted entirely as this question has since received a comprehensive study in my book, *Psychological Types*, to which it must therefore be relegated.

Every one who has ever attempted to write a 'popular' treatise upon a very highly complicated subject in the realm of a growing science will grant me that this is no simple task. But the difficulty is still further enhanced through the fact that many of the psychical processes and problems with which I have here to deal are somewhat inaccessible to ordinary experience, and indeed to very many are quite unknown. Prejudice is likely to be aroused and many things may appear arbitrary; but it should be borne in mind that the chief aim of such a work is to give such a general

conception of its subject matter as may stimulate interest, not to embark upon individual niceties of thought and casuistic detail. I am quite content if the present work achieves this purpose.

THE AUTHOR.

KÜSNACHT (ZÜRICH),
April, 1925.

FIRST ESSAY

**THE UNCONSCIOUS IN THE NORMAL AND
PATHOLOGICAL MIND**

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THE UNCONSCIOUS IN THE NORMAL AND PATHOLOGICAL MIND

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

LIKE all sciences, psychology has gone through its epoch of scholasticism, and something of the scholastic spirit has lasted on into the present time. Against this kind of philosophical psychology it must be objected that it makes an *ex cathedra* decision as to how the soul shall be constituted, and what qualities must belong to it in every possible respect. The spirit of modern scientific investigation has to a large extent disposed of these phantasies, and has substituted for them an exact empirical method. Out of this arose the experimental psychology of to-day, or what the French call psycho-physiology. This tendency sprang from the versatile mind of Fechner, who, with his *Psychophysik* in 1860, dared to introduce the physical standpoint into the conception of psychical phenomena. This idea proved extremely valuable. Fechner's younger contemporary, and, we might well say, the perfecter of his work, was Wundt, whose great scholarship, industry, and genius for elaborating methods of experimental research have created the lines of psychological research which rule to-day.

Experimental psychology was until quite recently essentially academic. The first considerable attempt to make the least use of any of its numerous experimental

methods in the field of practical psychology came from the psychiatrists of the former Heidelberg school (Kraepelin, Aeschaffenburg, etc.). For, as may easily be imagined, the mental physician was the first to feel the pressing need for more exact knowledge of psychical processes.

A little later the educationalists brought their demands to psychology. Out of this has recently grown an 'experimental science of education,' in which field, Meumann in Germany and Binet in France have rendered signal service.

The physician, the so-called nerve-specialist, has the most pressing need of psychological knowledge if he is to be of any real help to his nervous patient; for nervous conflict, at least all that is embraced by the term 'nervousness,' viz. hysteria, etc., is of psychic origin and therefore logically requires psychic treatment. Cold water, light, air, electricity, etc., have at best a transitory effect, and for the most part, none at all. Often enough it is a question of disreputable artifice, calculated to work upon suggestibility. But the seat of the patient's suffering is in the mind, moreover, in the highest and most complex of the mind's functions, which can no longer be justly said to belong to the province of medicine. Here the physician must be also a psychologist, one in fact who knows the human mind. The physician may not ignore this necessity. Thus he naturally turns to psychology, since his psychiatric text-books have here nothing to offer him. But the experimental psychology of to-day does not even begin to offer any connected insight into the most important psychic processes: this is not its aim. Its aim is as far as possible to isolate simple and elementary processes which belong essentially to the domain of physiology, and having isolated, to study them. The infinitely variable and changing elements of the individual psychic life are altogether distasteful to it; and for this reason its findings and its facts are essentially detail, lacking organized cohesion. The man therefore who would learn the

human mind will gain almost nothing from experimental psychology. Far better for him to put away his academic gown, to say good-bye to the study, and to wander with human heart through the world. There, in the horrors of the prison, the asylum and the hospital, in the drinking-shops, brothels and gambling hells, in the salons of the elegant, in the exchanges, socialist meetings, churches, religious revivals and sectarian ecstasies, through love and hate, through the experience of passion in every form in his own body, he would reap richer stores of knowledge than text-books a foot thick could give him. Then would he know how to doctor the sick with real knowledge of the human soul. But he may be pardoned if his respect for the 'corner stones' of experimental psychology is no longer excessive. For between what science calls psychology and what the practical needs of daily life demand from 'psychology,' 'there is a great gulf fixed.'

From this lack a new psychology came into being, whose inception was mainly due to Sigmund Freud of Vienna, the brilliant physician and investigator of functional nervous disorders. Bleuler coined the term 'deep psychology' to indicate that the Freudian psychology was concerned with the deeper regions or 'hinterland' of the mind, in a word, the 'unconscious.' Freud himself, however, was content with merely naming the method of his investigation. He called it psycho-analysis.

Before we enter upon a closer presentation of the subject itself, something must be said about its position in relation to hitherto existing science. We here encounter an extraordinary spectacle wherein is proved yet again the truth of the observation of Anatole France: "*Les savants ne sont pas curieux.*" The first work¹ of any magnitude in this domain awakened only the faintest echo, notwithstanding

¹ Breuer and Freud: *Studien über Hysterie*, Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna, 1895.

the fact that it introduced an entirely new conception of the neuroses. A few authors spoke of it appreciatively, and then, on the next page proceeded to explain their hysterical cases in the old way. They behaved very much like a man who having fully subscribed to the idea or fact of the earth's being a sphere, continued to represent it as a disc. Freud's next publications were practically unnoticed, although they contributed findings which were of incalculable importance for this very sphere of psychiatry. When in the year 1900, Freud wrote the first effective psychology of the dream (over this field there had hitherto ruled the darkness of night), people began to laugh, and when, about the middle of the last decade, he began to throw light upon the psychology of sexuality, laughter turned to insult. But when all is said, it was not this storm of learned wrath which gave to the Freudian psychology an unwonted publicity, a notoriety which reached far beyond the limits of scientific interest.

Accordingly we must look more closely into this new psychology. Already in Charcot's time, it was known that the neurotic symptom is 'psychogenetic,' *i.e.* has its origin in the psyche. It was known also, thanks mainly to the work of the Nancy School, that every hysterical symptom can be exactly reproduced by means of suggestion. But how the hysterical symptom originated in the psyche was not known. All the connections of psychic causality were entirely unknown. In the early eighties, Dr. Breuer, an old Viennese doctor, made a discovery which became the actual starting point of the new psychology. He had a young and very intelligent patient (a woman), suffering from hysteria, who manifested the following symptoms among others. She had a spastic (rigid) paralysis of the right arm and occasional disturbances of consciousness, or twilight-states. She had also lost the power of speech to the extent that she could no longer command her mother tongue, but could express herself only in English. This is the so-called systematic aphasia.

The attempt used to be made, and for that matter still is, to explain these disorders by the help of anatomical theories, notwithstanding the fact that the cortical centre for the arm movements exhibits in these cases just as little disorder as in the corresponding centres of normal subjects. The symptomatology of hysteria is full of anatomical impossibilities. A lady, for instance, had completely lost her hearing through an hysterical affection. None the less she used often to sing, and once, when she was singing, her doctor seated himself unobserved at the pianoforte and softly accompanied her. Passing from one verse of the song to another he made a sudden change of key, whereupon the patient, without noticing that she did so, sang her part in the new key. Thus she heard—and yet did not hear.

The different forms of systematic blindness present similar phenomena. A man suffered from total hysterical blindness. In the course of treatment he recovered his power of sight, but at first and for a long time only partially. He could see everything with the exception of people's heads. He saw all the people around him without heads. He saw, yet did not see. From a large number of like experiences it has long been concluded that it is only the patient's consciousness which fails to see and hear, the sense-function being in every other respect unaffected. This state of affairs is in direct contradiction to the nature of an organic disorder, which always involves the actual function itself.

After this digression we can come back to the Breuer case. Since organic causes of the disturbances were not present, the case was evidently to be regarded as hysterical, *i.e.* psychogenetic. Breuer had remarked that when during her 'twilight' states (whether spontaneous or artificially induced) the patient was allowed to relate freely what came up in the form of reminiscences and phantasies, her condition was afterwards improved for several hours. He made systematic use of this discovery in his further treatment

of the case. The patient devised the name 'talking cure' for it, or sometimes in jest, 'chimney sweeping.'

The illness dated from the time when she nursed her father through his fatal illness. Naturally her phantasies were occupied chiefly with this disturbing time. Reminiscences of that time came to the surface during her twilight states with photographic fidelity. Indeed, so vivid were they to the last detail that we can hardly assume waking memory to be capable of such plastic and exact reproduction. The name 'hypermnesia' has been given to this intensification of the powers of memory which not infrequently occurs under conditions of restricted consciousness.

Remarkable things now came to light. From the material narrated the following item stands out. On one occasion she was watching anxiously by the sick man, who was delirious with fever. She sat there waiting for the surgeon, who was expected from Vienna to perform an operation. Her mother had left the room for a little while, and Anna—the patient—sat by the bed with her right arm hanging over the back of her chair. She fell into a sort of waking-dream in which she saw a black snake coming, apparently out of the wall, toward the sick man as though to bite him. (It is quite likely that in the meadow behind the house there actually were snakes, which on more than one occasion had given the girl a fright. Such experiences would be enough to provide material for the hallucination.) She wanted to drive the creature away, but felt paralysed. Her right arm that was hanging over the chairback had 'gone to sleep,' *i.e.* was anæsthetic as well as paretic, and, as she looked at it, the fingers changed into little serpents with death's-heads. Probably she had made an attempt to drive away the snake with the paralysed right hand, thereby bringing its anæsthesia and paralysis into association with the hallucination of the snake. When it had disappeared, in her terror she tried to pray, but all speech failed her; she found she

had no words in any language until finally she remembered an English nursery rhyme ; and after that she was able to think and pray in English.

This was the scene in which the paralysis and the disturbance of speech had originated. With the rehearsing of this scene the disturbance was removed ; and in this manner the case was finally cured.

I must restrict myself to this one instance. In the book by Breuer and Freud there is a wealth of similar examples. It can be readily understood that scenes of this kind make a very strong impression, and consequently there is a tendency to endow them with causal significance as regards the origin of the symptom. The view of hysteria then current, which had sprung from the English theory of the ' nervous shock,' and had been energetically championed by *Charcot*, was well-fitted to explain the discovery of Breuer. Thence arose the so-called trauma-theory, which affirms that the hysterical symptom, and, in so far as symptoms compose maladies, hysteria in general, results from psychic injuries (traumata) of which the impression persists unconsciously for many years.

Freud, who was now a collaborator of Breuer, was able to furnish abundant confirmation of this discovery. It became evident that among the hundreds of hysterical symptoms there was no such thing as haphazard or chance origin ; they could all be shown to spring from psychical occurrences. So far the new conception opened up an extensive field for empirical work. But Freud's spirit of inquiry could not long rest content on this superficial level. Already deeper and more difficult problems began to emerge. It is evident that moments of extreme fear, such as Breuer's patient went through, can leave an enduring impression behind them. But how does it come about that these happenings are already deeply stamped with the mark of morbidity ? Could the strain of nursing bring this about ?

If that be so, similar cases should occur much more frequently, since, unfortunately, there are a vast number of wearing cases to tend, and the nervous condition of the nurse in charge is not always too good. To this problem medicine furnishes its admirable reply: the 'x' in the calculation is predisposition; there is a 'tendency' to these things.

But for Freud the problem was: what constitutes this predisposition? This question drove him by its own logic to an investigation of the previous history of the psychic trauma. It is a matter of common observation that exciting scenes have different effects on the various persons involved. Things which to some are indifferent or even agreeable produce extreme disgust in others. One has in mind frogs, snakes, mice, cats, and so on. There are instances of women who will witness formidable operations undisturbed, while at the touch of a cat they will tremble all over with fear and loathing. The case I shall now introduce is that of a young lady who suffered from acute hysteria following a sudden fright. She had been spending a social evening and was on her way home at midnight in the company of several acquaintances, when suddenly a carriage came up behind them at full speed. The others made way, but she, beside herself with fear, held to the middle of the road, running in front of the horses. The driver cracked his whip and swore. It had no effect; she ran the whole length of the road, which led on to a bridge. Then her strength deserted her, and, in order to escape the horses, in extremity of despair she would have sprung into the river had not passers-by prevented her. This same lady happened to be in St. Petersburg on the bloody 22nd of January, in the very street that was cleared by the volleys of soldiers. All around her men were falling to the ground dead or wounded; she, however, quite calm and clear-headed, espied a gate leading into a yard, over which she made her escape into another street. These dreadful moments caused agitation, neither at the time nor

subsequently. She felt perfectly well afterwards—indeed, better than usual.

Essentially similar reactions can quite often be observed. Hence it follows that the intensity of a trauma has often but little pathogenetic significance, unless it occurs under particular circumstances. This fact gives us a key to the explanation of disposition. We have therefore to consider the question: what are the particular circumstances of the scene with the carriage? The fear began with the sound of the trotting horses. For an instant it seemed to her that this portended some terrible doom—her death, or something as dreadful; the next moment she lost all sense of what she was doing.

The real effect is obviously due in some way to the horses. A predisposition on the part of the patient to react to this commonplace occurrence in so unaccountable a way must depend upon some peculiar significance that horses had for her. We might conjecture that she had once had a dangerous accident with horses. This was actually found to be the case. When a child of about seven, she was driving with the coachman; the horses took fright and at a wild gallop made for the precipitous bank of a deep river-gorge. The coachman jumped down and shouted to her to do the same. In the extremity of her fear this was almost beyond her power, but she just managed to jump in the nick of time as the horses crashed with the carriage into the depths below. That such an event would leave a very deep impression scarcely needs proof. Yet it does not explain why at a later date such an absurdly violent reaction should be made to so inadequate a stimulus. So far we know only that the later symptom had a prelude in childhood, but what its pathological aspect is still remains obscure. In order to penetrate this secret, further material is necessary. The farther our experience goes, the clearer does it become, that in all cases with such traumatic experiences that have been

analysed up to the present, there co-exists a special kind of disturbance which can only be described as a disturbance in the province of love. And, admittedly, love is something infinitely inclusive, extending from heaven to hell, and uniting within itself good and evil, high and low.¹

When Freud recognized this (*i.e.* the connection between the neurosis and a special disturbance in the love-life of the patient), his views underwent considerable change. If at an earlier date, more or less under the influence of Charcot's trauma-theory, he had sought the cause of neurosis rather in actual experiences of a traumatic kind, now the centre of gravity of the problem was shifted to an entirely different point. This is best illustrated through the case under discussion. We understand easily why horses should play an important rôle in the life of the patient; but it is not clear why there should be this later reaction, so exaggerated and inopportune. The morbid peculiarity of this history lies in the fact that it is the horses which cause the terror. Now if we recall the empirical conclusion mentioned above, that, by the side of the traumatic experience, there is usually a disturbance in the province of love, we might inquire whether in the present case, viewed from this angle, there might not be something unsatisfactory.

The lady knows a young man to whom she thinks of becoming engaged. She loves him and hopes to be happy as his wife. At first there was practically nothing else that could be discovered. Yet it would never do to be deterred from investigation because the surface history provides only a negative result. There are indirect ways of reaching a goal when the direct route fails. We therefore return to that singular moment when the lady ran headlong in front of the horses. We inquire about her companions and as to the

¹ We may still apply to love the old mystical saying: "Heaven above, heaven below, ether above, ether below, all things above, all things below—receive all and prosper."

nature of the festivity in which she had just taken part. It had been a farewell party to her best friend on her departure to a foreign health-resort on account of her nervous condition. We are told this friend is happily married and is the mother of one child. We may question the statement that she is happy ; for, were this really the case, she would presumably have no reason to be nervous and needing a cure. Approaching the question from another angle, I learned that the house, to which the patient was brought by her friends as the nearest available refuge after the episode, was the house of her host. There in her exhausted state she was hospitably received. At this point the patient broke off her narrative, became embarrassed and confused, and tried to change the subject. Obviously a disagreeable reminiscence had suddenly appeared. After the most obstinate resistance had been overcome, it appeared that during that night another very significant episode had occurred. The friendly host had made a passionate declaration of love, thus introducing a situation which in the absence of the lady of the house might well be considered both difficult and dangerous. Ostensibly this avowal of love came to her as a bolt from the blue, yet such events always have their history. It was my task in the weeks that followed to dig out piece by piece a long love story, until at last a complete picture was obtained which I will now attempt to outline.

As a child the patient had been a regular tomboy, caring only for boys' games, making mock of her own sex, and avoiding all feminine ways and occupations. After puberty, when the erotic problem could have become imminent, she began to avoid all society and seemed to dislike and despise everything that might remind her even remotely of the biological destiny of man. She lived in a world of phantasy which had nothing in common with brutal reality.

Thus until about her twenty-fourth year she evaded all the little adventures, hopes and expectations which ordinarily

move a girl at this age. With respect to these things women are often amazingly insincere towards themselves and towards the physician. Then she came to know two men who were to break through the thorn hedges which had grown up around her. Mr. A. was her best friend's husband, and Mr. B. was his bachelor friend. She liked them both. Nevertheless it soon began to look as though Mr. B. held an altogether higher place in her estimation. An intimacy quickly arose between them, and there was rumour of the possibility of their engagement. Through her relationship with Mr. B. and through her friendship with the wife, she was also frequently in contact with Mr. A., whose presence disturbed her in an unaccountable way and made her nervous. Just at this time she went to a large party. All her friends were there. During the evening she became lost in thought and was playing dreamily with her ring when it suddenly slipped off her finger and rolled under the table. Both gentlemen looked for it and it fell to the lot of Mr. B. to find it. He placed the ring on her finger and with a significant smile said: "You know what that means!" Overpowered by a strange and irresistible feeling, she tore the ring from her finger and flung it out of the open window. There followed a moment which was naturally painful for all concerned and soon after she withdrew from the party, profoundly depressed.

Not long after that, so-called chance brought it about that she spent the summer holidays in a health resort where Mr. and Mrs. A. were also staying. It was then that Mrs. A. began to suffer from her nervous disorder, so that she frequently remained indoors. Our patient had now the opportunity to go walking alone with Mr. A. On one occasion they went boating. In a burst of exuberant merriment she suddenly fell overboard. She was not a swimmer and Mr. A. rescued her with great difficulty, pulling her into the boat in a semi-conscious state. And then it

happened that he kissed her. Through this romantic event, hidden bonds were established between them. But the patient did not allow the depths of this passion to come to consciousness; obviously because she had long been accustomed to overlook such impressions, or, more exactly, to run away from them. As a pretext to herself, the patient tried all the more energetically to further her engagement to Mr. B., and day by day she did her best to persuade herself that she loved him. Naturally this curious play did not escape the keen glances of wifely jealousy. Mrs. A., her friend, guessed the secret and was so upset by it that her nervous indisposition increased, forcing her eventually to visit a foreign health resort for a cure. It was at the farewell party that a demon whispered in the ear of our patient: 'To-night he is alone. Something must happen that will bring you into his house.' And so it happened indeed. Through her own strange behaviour she found herself in his house, and thus she attained her wish.

After this explanation every one would be inclined to agree that only a devilish subtlety could devise such a chain of circumstances and set it in motion. There is no doubt about the subtlety, but its moral evaluation is by no means so certain. For I am bound to lay special emphasis on the fact that the motives leading to this dramatic behaviour on the part of the patient were in no sense conscious. To her the whole episode seemed to happen of itself, without any conscious motive whatsoever. But the previous history makes it perfectly clear that everything was unconsciously orientated to this goal. While the conscious self was ostensibly engaged in bringing about the engagement with Mr. B., the unconscious drive in the other direction was clearly the stronger.

So once more we must return to our original question, namely, whence comes the pathological (*i.e.* peculiar or exaggerated) nature of the reaction to the trauma. Relying

on a conclusion derived from other analogous experiences, we ventured the conjecture that in the present instance there must be, in addition to the trauma, a disturbance in the sphere of love. This hypothesis has been entirely justified, and we have learned that the trauma, the apparent cause of illness, is merely the occasion on which there begins to appear some factor hitherto unconscious, namely, a serious erotic conflict. Thus the trauma loses its pathogenetic significance, and its place is taken by a much deeper and more comprehensive conception which presents the real pathogenetic factor as an erotic conflict.

One often hears the question: but why should erotic conflict be the cause of neurosis rather than any other form of conflict? There is but one answer: no one asserts that it must necessarily be so, but in point of fact it simply is so. In spite of all vehement protestations to the contrary, the fact remains that love,¹ its problems and its conflicts, is of fundamental significance for human life, and, as careful inquiry consistently shows, is of far greater importance than the individual suspects.

The doctrine of the trauma has therefore been given up as an antiquated theory; for with the discovery, that not the trauma but a concealed erotic conflict is at the root of neurosis, the trauma loses its pathogenetic significance.

¹ 'Love' is here used in the wider meaning which belongs to the word by right, a meaning including more than sexuality. It is not to be understood from this that love and the disturbances connected with it are the only sources of neurosis. The disturbances due to love may be of a secondary nature and conditioned through more deeply lying causes. There are other possible ways of becoming neurotic.

CHAPTER II

THE SEXUAL THEORY

IN the light of this discovery, the question of the trauma ceased to be one of central importance. In its place, however, stood the inquiry into the problem of the erotic conflict, which, as our example shows, contained abundant abnormal elements, and *prima facie*, at all events, would not allow comparison with an ordinary erotic conflict. It is most remarkable, and indeed almost incredible, that what was conscious should be only a kind of pose, while the patient's real passion remained unrecognized. In this case certainly, it is beyond dispute that the real erotic relation remained unilluminated, while the assumed one held complete sway within the field of consciousness. When we formulate these facts theoretically, the resultant generalization runs somewhat as follows: In neurosis there arise two tendencies which stand contraposed in an absolute sense one to the other, and of which one is unconscious. This proposition is purposely given a very general formulation. For I would point out at once that the conflict inducing illness, though certainly a personal affair, is also a conflict of humanity that becomes manifest in the individual. The absence of unity within himself is in general the hall-mark of civilized man. The neurotic is only a special case of civilized man at war with himself.

The development of culture is recognized as consisting in a progressive subjugation of the animal in man. It is a process of domestication which cannot be accomplished

without rebellion on the part of the animal nature that thirsts for liberty. From time to time there passes as it were a wave of frenzy through the ranks of men too long constrained within the limitations of their culture. Antiquity experienced it in the fiery tumult of the Dionysian orgies that came out of the East, and yet became an essential and characteristic part of ancient culture. The spirit of these orgies was largely influential in developing the stoic ideal towards asceticism in the innumerable sects and schools of philosophy of the last century before the Christian era, and produced from the polytheistic chaos of that epoch the twin ascetic religions of Mithras and of Christ.

A second wave of the Dionysian madness for freedom swept over the West at the Renaissance. It is difficult to gauge the spirit of one's own time, but let us observe the way in which the arts are developing, the kind of sensibility in vogue, the tendencies of popular taste. Let us observe what men read, what they write, the societies they found, the 'questions' that are the order of the day. Note also against what the Philistines are up in arms. We shall then find that in the long array of our present social questions by no means the last is the so-called 'sexual question.' Its discussion is carried on by men who challenge the recognized sexual morality and who seek to throw off the burden of guilt which past centuries have heaped upon Eros.

The existence of these movements cannot be simply denied, nor can they be condemned as indefensible. They exist, and have sufficient ground for their existence. It is more interesting and more useful to probe attentively the underlying causes of these characteristic movements of our age than to join in the lamentations of the professional mourners of morality who prophesy the moral downfall of humanity. It is the way of moralists to put little trust in God, as if they thought the fair tree of humanity flourished only by virtue of being propped up and trained on a trellis ;

whereas Father Sun and Mother Earth have allowed it to grow for their delight in accordance with laws of the deepest wisdom.

Serious people know that at the present time there is a very real sexual problem. It is evident that the rapid development of the towns, with the specialization of work brought about through the extraordinary division of labour, the increasing industrialization of the country and the growing security of life deprive humanity of many opportunities of giving rein to its emotional energy. The peasant has a wealth of variety in his work and secures unconscious satisfaction through its symbolical content—a satisfaction which the workers in offices and factories do not know and can never enjoy. What do these know of the peasant's real life with nature, of those beautiful moments when, as lord and fructifier of the earth, he drives his plough through the ground, when with kingly gesture he scatters the seed for the future harvest, of his deep and justifiable fear of the destructive power of the elements, his joy in the fruitfulness of the wife who bears him the daughters—and sons who mean increased working power and prosperity? From all this, we city-dwellers, modern work-machines, are far, far removed.

Is not the fairest and most natural of all satisfactions beginning to fail us, when we can no longer regard with unmixed joy the harvest of our own sowing, the 'blessing' of children? From all this where is satisfaction to come from? Observe too, how men slink to work—watch the faces in the tram-cars at 7.30 in the morning. One makes his little wheel, another writes things that have no interest for him. What wonder if nearly every man belongs to as many societies as there are days in the week; or if, among women, there flourish sects that provide, in the hero of the particular cult, an object on whom they may direct those inarticulate longings which the man assuages at an inn with big talk and beer? To these sources of discontent there is

added a further and graver difficulty. Nature has equipped defenceless man with a great store of energy of such kind as to enable him not only to endure passively the dangers of existence, but also to overcome them. Mother nature has equipped her son for great need. From this immediacy of constraining need civilized man is as a rule protected, and hence he is daily seduced into arrogance. When the hard pressure of need is removed the animal in man becomes rampant. Are we then indeed arrogant? Or in what organic feasts and revels do we release our surfeit of energy? Our moral views forbid this outlet.

But why the moral restriction? Is it a kind of religious harking-back to the fear of an angry God? Altogether apart from the pervading and widespread unbelief, is there any honest believer who could seriously ask the question whether, if he himself were God, he would punish the escapade of Hänsel and Gretel with everlasting damnation? Such ideas can no longer be brought into relation with our reasonable conceptions of God. Our God is necessarily too tolerant to be much disturbed about such a matter. Thus an effective basis is lacking to the somewhat ascetic and definitely hypocritical sexual morality of our time. Or can we say that we are safeguarded from excess through our superior wisdom and discernment of the nothingness of human destiny? Unfortunately, we are very far from this. Man possesses in the unconscious a fine flair for the spirit of his time; he recognizes its possibilities and feels within him the insecure foundations of present-day morality, no longer supported by living religious conviction. It is from this fact that is begotten the greater proportion of the ethical conflicts of our time. It is the impact of the urge to freedom upon the weakening barriers of morality. Men are in a state of temptation; they want and they do not want. And because they want and yet cannot think out what it is they really want, their conflict is largely unconscious, and thence comes

neurosis. Neurosis, therefore, is, as we see, integrally bound up with the problem of our time, and actually demonstrates the unsuccessful effort of the individual to solve in himself what is essentially a universal problem. Neurosis is division within the self. In most men the cause of the division is the fact that consciousness would retain its moral ideal, while the unconscious strives after its unmoral ideal—unmoral at least according to the opinion of our time, and disavowed by consciousness. The character of this type of man is such that he desires to be more respectable than he really is. But the conflict is sometimes of an opposite kind. There are men who to all appearance are very disreputable and put no restraint whatever upon themselves. In reality this attitude is only a pose of immorality, for in the background there exists the moral side, as certainly to be found in the unconscious as the immoral nature in the case of the moral man. Extremes are therefore to be avoided as far as possible, for they invariably awaken suspicion as to their counterparts.

It was necessary to enter into this general discussion in order to elucidate the concept of 'erotic conflict.' We may now proceed with the investigation of psycho-analytic technique, and also the problem of therapy.

Obviously the problem for this technique centres in the question: how can I most quickly and satisfactorily arrive at an understanding of what is happening in the unconscious of the patient? The original method was by hypnotism, the procedure consisting either in questioning the patient under conditions of hypnotic concentration, or in the spontaneous production of phantasies under these conditions. This method is still occasionally employed, but in comparison with present technique it is primitive and often unsatisfactory. A second method emanated from the Zürich psychiatric clinic, the so-called association method,¹

¹ Compare Jung: *Studies in Word Association*, authorized translation by Dr. M. D. Eder. London, Heinemann.

the value of which is chiefly theoretic and experimental. Its results furnished a comprehensive, but somewhat superficial grasp of the unconscious conflict.¹ The more penetrating method is that of dream analysis, which Freud attempted for the first time—at least, in his way.

Of the dream it can indeed be said that “the stone which the builders rejected has become the head stone of the corner.” It is only in modern times that the dream, that fleeting and insignificant product of our minds, has met with such profound disdain. In earlier times it was esteemed as the herald of destiny, a warning and a consolation, the messenger of the gods. Now we employ it as the herald of the unconscious. It reveals to us the secrets that are hidden from consciousness, and the thoroughness with which it does this is amazing.

From the analytic study of the dream it was found that the dream, as it appears to us, is only a façade which conceals the real interior of the house. But if, observing certain technical rules, we let the dreamer talk about the details of his dream, it soon becomes manifest that his associations tend in a particular direction and revolve around particular themes. These appear to be of personal significance, and point to a meaning which could never have been guessed to lie behind the dream. Yet through a careful comparison, their relation to the dream façade can be shown to be both extremely exact and detailed. This special complex of ideas in which all the threads of the dream unite is the conflict of which we are in search, although expressed in a certain specific variation conditioned by the immediate circumstances. The painful and incompatible elements of the conflict are thus, in Freud’s view, so concealed or obliterated,

¹ Jung: *The Psychology of Dementia Præcox*, authorized translation by F. Peterson and A. A. Brill. (Out of print.) By means of the association-experiment the ‘complex’ is found, *i.e.* one or more feeling-toned, complex representations which are related to the opposing tendencies.

that one may speak of a wish-fulfilment. Yet we must immediately add that the wishes fulfilled in the dream are not consciously ours. On the contrary, they are often diametrically opposed to our conscious wishes. For instance, a daughter loves her mother tenderly, but dreams with great distress that her mother is dead. Dreams of this kind are innumerable, in which there is apparently no trace of wish-fulfilment. The conflict wrought out in the dream is unconscious, just as the proposed attempt towards solution is unconscious. Our dreamer has in fact a tendency to put a distance between herself and the mother. Expressed in the language of the unconscious that would be the death of the mother. Now we know that a certain layer of the unconscious contains all that has passed beyond recall of memory, and further, all those infantile instincts that could find no application in adult life. We might say that the bulk of what comes directly from the unconscious is of an infantile character. Thus this wish seems like the simple question of a child: "Papa, when Mama dies you will marry me, won't you?" This infantile expression of a wish is a substitute for a recent desire to be married, a desire in this case painful to the dreamer, for reasons still to be discovered. This thought, or rather the seriousness of its corresponding intention, is, as we say, 'repressed into the unconscious,' and must there necessarily express itself in an infantile fashion; for the material at the disposal of the unconscious consists in great part of infantile reminiscences.

The dream is apparently occupied with extremely silly details. The general impression it produces upon us is consequently absurd, or it is on the surface so unintelligible as to leave us thoroughly perplexed. Hence we have always to overcome a certain resistance before we can seriously set about disentangling the intricate web. But when at last we penetrate to its real meaning, we find ourselves deep in the dreamer's secrets and discover with astonishment that an

apparently quite senseless dream is in the highest degree significant, and that it speaks only of extraordinarily important and serious things of the mind. This discovery compels more respect for the so-called superstition of dream-interpretation, to which the rationalistic temper of our age has hitherto given short shrift.

As Freud says, dream analysis is the *via regia* to the unconscious. Dream analysis leads us into the region of deepest personal secrets, and is, therefore, an invaluable instrument in the hand of the physician and teacher. Psycho-analysis consists principally in numerous analyses of dreams, as in the course of the treatment the contents of the unconscious are brought up in a connected succession of dreams, the aim being to expose these contents to the disinfecting power of daylight ; and in this process much that is valuable and believed to have been lost is found again. It is not surprising that many men, who have adopted a certain pose towards themselves, should feel this process of psycho-analysis as torture. In accordance with the old mystical saying, "Give up what thou hast, then shalt thou receive," they are called upon to abandon their dearest illusions in order to let something deeper, fairer, and more embracing grow up within them. For it is only through the mystery of self-sacrifice that a man may find himself anew. It is a right ancient wisdom that once more sees the light of day in psycho-analytic treatment ; and it is especially curious that this form of education proves to be necessary at the moment when the culture of our time has reached its height. It is a kind of education which can be compared, in more than one respect, with the method of Socrates, though it must be said that psycho-analysis penetrates to far greater depths.

We always find in the patient a conflict which at a certain point is connected with the great problems of society. Hence if analysis is pursued to this point, the apparently individual conflict of the patient is revealed as a universal conflict of

his environment and epoch. Neurosis is thus, strictly speaking, nothing less than an individual attempt, however unsuccessful, at the solution of a universal problem. This must be so, for a universal problem, a 'question,' is not an *ens per se*, but exists only in the hearts and minds of individual men and women.

The Freudian mode of investigation seeks to prove, that an altogether dominant significance attaches to the erotic and sexual factor in the origin of the pathogenetic conflict. It is on this experience that the Freudian sexual theory of neurosis is based. According to this theory a collision takes place between the conscious tendency and the unmoral, incompatible, unconscious wish. The unconscious wish is infantile, that is to say, it is a wish out of the childish past that will no longer fit the present. It is accordingly repressed, particularly for reasons related to present-day morality. For Freud, it is essentially a matter of repressed sexual desires that are in conflict with the sexual morality of our time. The neurotic has within him the soul of a child that bears ill with arbitrary restrictions whose meaning he does not see. He tries indeed to make this morality his own, but thereby falls into a state of profound strife and disharmony with himself. On the one side he wishes to restrain himself, yet, on the other, longs to be free. This struggle goes by the name of neurosis. Were the conflict in all respects clearly conscious, neurotic symptoms would presumably never occur. Such symptoms arise only when we cannot see the other side of our nature and the urgency of its problems. The function of the symptom is to help the unrecognized side of the mind to some kind of expression. The symptoms are therefore, in Freud's view, an indirect expression for unrecognized desires, which, if conscious, would be in violent opposition to our moral views.

As already observed, this shadow side of the mind, being withdrawn from conscious scrutiny, cannot be dealt with by

the patient. He cannot correct it, cannot come to terms with it, nor yet disregard it. He cannot really be said to be in possession of the unconscious impulses. Thrust outside the hierarchy of the conscious mind, they have become autonomous complexes which can only be brought again under authority, and that not without great resistances, through the analysis of the unconscious. There are very many patients who actually boast that for them the erotic conflict does not exist. They are certain that the sexual question is nonsense, since they possess, one might say, no sexuality whatever. These people do not see that other things of unknown origin cumber their path—hysterical whims, underhand tricks which they inflict alike on themselves and on their neighbours. There are pains here and there, nervous catarrh of the stomach, unreasonable irritability, in short, a whole host of neurotic symptoms.

Psycho-analysis has been reproached for liberating man's happily repressed animal instincts and thus bringing about incalculable evil. This apprehension shows how little confidence is felt in the efficacy of the moral principles of to-day. The illusion is cherished that only the morality of precept and principle holds men back from unbridled licence. A much more efficacious regulative principle, however, is necessity, which sets bounds far more real and convincing than any moral principles. It is true that analysis liberates animal instincts, but not in such a way as to give them unbridled power ; rather it renders them available for higher uses, to the extent that this is possible to the individual, and that his case calls for such transformation or 'sublimation,' of instinct. Under all circumstances it is an advantage to be in full possession of one's personality, for otherwise the repressed elements will crop up as a hindrance elsewhere, and this not merely in inessentials, but at the very point where we are most sensitive. If men can be trained to look dispassionately at the lower side of their own natures, it may

be hoped that in this way they may also learn to understand and to love their fellow-men better. To forswear hypocrisy and to adopt an attitude of tolerance towards oneself can only have good results for the just estimation of one's neighbour, since men are all too prone to transfer to their fellow-men the injustice and violence that they do to their own natures.

The Freudian doctrine of repression does indeed seem to apply only to men who are too moral and who suppress their instinctive unmoral natures. The unmoral man who lives his instincts without restraint should accordingly be quite immune from neurosis. This is obviously not the case, as daily experience teaches us. Such a man may be quite as neurotic as the other type. If we analyse him, we discover that in his case it is simply decency that has come under repression. Thus, when an unmoral man is neurotic, he presents, in Nietzsche's striking phrase, the picture of the 'pale felon' who does not stand upon the same level as his deed.

The view may, of course, be taken that in such a case the repressed remnants of decency are only a traditional legacy from infancy which imposes an unnecessary yoke upon the instinctual nature and should therefore be eradicated. With the principle *écrasez l'infâme* we should end by making an absolute claim to live the life of instinct *per se*. But any such free-life theory (*Auslebe-Theorie*) would be quite fantastic and foolish. It can never be forgotten—and of this the Freudian school must be reminded—that morality was not brought down on tables of stone from Sinai and forced upon the people. Rather is morality a function of the human mind, as old as humanity itself. Morality is not forced upon men from without; man has it *a priori* in himself—not the law indeed, but the moral being.

Besides—is there a more moral standpoint than the free-life theory? Is there a more heroic view of morality than

this? That is why the heroic Nietzsche is its especial friend. But at once people will say, out of their natural and innate cowardice: 'God keep me from the free life,' implying, therewith, a highly developed moral sense, yet without perceiving that uncompromising devotion to instinct would be much too costly, too strenuous, too dangerous, nay, in the last resort, too unseemly—for it is rather with taste than with the categorical imperative that most people associate the sense of decency. The unpardonable error in the free-life theory is that it is much too heroic, too ideological. Therefore it thrives best in sick brains.

There is indeed no other alternative but for the unmoral man to accept the moral corrective of his unconscious, just as the moral man must come to terms as best he may with the dæmons of his underworld.

It cannot be gainsaid that the Freudian school is so convinced of the fundamental, and even exclusive, importance of sexuality in neurosis that it has courageously accepted the consequences and heroically challenged the sexual morality of our day. Many different opinions prevail upon this subject. What is significant is that the sexual problem is to-day widely discussed. This is certainly valuable and necessary; for up till now we have had no sexual morality, merely a low barbaric conception, quite inadequately differentiated. Just as in the early middle ages finance was for the most part held in contempt, because at that time the morality of finance was not casuistically differentiated, there was merely a kind of mass-morality. So to-day there is only a sexual morality *en bloc*. A girl who has an illegitimate child is condemned without any inquiry as to whether she is a decent woman or not. Any form of love unsanctioned by law is immoral, whether it exists between people of the highest worth or between scamps. Men are still hypnotized in the most barbaric fashion by the bare fact, and so forget its human significance, just as for men of mediæval times

finance was nothing but glittering gold, fiercely coveted and therefore the devil.

Present-day sexual morality is just as uncultured and barbaric, in so far as scrutiny is directed merely upon sexuality, and not upon the man and his mode of dealing with it. Sexuality is not simply the devil, tolerated and sanctioned in marriage, but, outside marriage, the embodiment of evil. Sexuality admits of and requires a higher evaluation than this when we place it in relation to the moral development of the individual.

Considered in its essentials, the attack made upon the sexual code of to-day has thus the significance of a moral action, forcing us to a differentiated and really ethical conception.

As already stated, Freud envisages the great conflict between the ego and the instinctual nature mainly under its sexual aspect. This aspect is actually present, and yet behind this actuality we must place a large mark of interrogation, the question being whether what presents itself in sexual form must, in its inmost nature, always remain sexuality. For it is conceivable that one instinct may disguise itself under another. Freud himself has furnished many striking observations which demonstrate in the most convincing way that many of the actions and efforts of men are, at bottom, only somewhat figurative expressions used, because of embarrassment, for significant elementary things. This substitution is allowed to pass for reasons of mutual consideration. There is nothing to hinder certain very elementary things being similarly pushed conveniently into the foreground in place of things that are more necessary but less agreeable, under the illusion that the elementary things are the only things that matter.

The sexual theory is entirely correct up to a certain point, but it is one-sided. It would therefore be just as false to repudiate it as to accept it as universally valid.

CHAPTER III

THE OTHER POINT OF VIEW

THE WILL TO POWER

WE have so far considered the problem of our new psychology essentially from the standpoint of Freud. We have thus doubtless seen a very real truth to which perhaps our pride, our cultural consciousness said no, though something in us said yes. For many men there lies in the theory under discussion something extremely irritating that not only arouses contradiction, but even engenders fear. They therefore refuse to recognize the truth in it. There is something terrible in admitting this conflict, for it means a yea-saying to instinct. Has anyone made clear to himself what that means—a yea-saying to instinct? This was what Nietzsche desired and taught, and he was deeply serious about it. He made, with a rare passion, the sacrifice of himself, of his whole life, to the idea of the super-man—to the idea of the man who through obedience to instinct transcends himself. And what was the course of his life? It was as Nietzsche himself prophesied in *Zarathustra*, in that foreboding vision of the fatal fall of the rope-dancer, the man who would not be “surpassed.” To the dying rope-dancer Zarathustra said: “Thy soul will be sooner dead than thy body.” And in a later passage the dwarf says to Zarathustra: “Oh, Zarathustra, thou stone of wisdom! High thou flingest thyself, but every stone that is flung must fall! Condemned of thyself and to thine own stoning: O Zarathustra, far indeed flingest thou the stone—but upon thyself will it

fall." When he cried his '*Ecce Homo*' over himself, it was again too late, as once before when this saying went forth, and the crucifixion of the soul began before the body was dead.

Keen scrutiny must be directed upon the life of one whose teaching was a yea-saying to instinct, in order that we may see the effects of this doctrine in the teacher's own life. But if we look at his life with this aim we shall be compelled to say: Nietzsche lived beyond instinct, in the lofty heights of heroic 'sublimity'—heights that he could maintain only by the help of a most meticulous diet, a carefully selected climate, and many aids to sleep—until the tension of this living shattered his brain. He spoke of yea-saying and lived the nay. His loathing for man, for the animal living by instinct, was too great. He could not swallow the toad, of which he so often dreamed, and which he feared must be swallowed. The roaring of the lion of Zarathustra drove back into the cavern of the unconscious all the 'higher' men who had aspired to live with him. Hence his life does not convince us of his teaching. The 'higher' man would fain be able to sleep without chloral, be able to live in Nuremburg and Basel despite 'fogs and shadows.' He would desire wife and offspring, standing and reputation among his own group, innumerable commonplace realities and not least, those of the philistine. This side of instinct Nietzsche did not see—the animal urge to Life.

But what was it that he lived, if it was not the life of instinct? Could Nietzsche really be accused of having denied his instinct? He would scarcely have agreed to that. Indeed he could even show without difficulty that he lived his instinctual life in the highest sense. But how is it possible, we may well ask in astonishment, that the instinctual nature of man should drive him into separation from his kind, into absolute isolation from humanity, into an aloofness from the herd maintained by loathing? We think of instinct as uniting men, causing them to mate, to beget, to seek pleasure and

well-being, the satisfaction of all sensuous desires. We forget that this is only one of the possible directions of instinct. There exists not only the instinct for the preservation of the species (the sex-instinct), but also the instinct for the preservation of the self.

It is of this last instinct, the will to power, that Nietzsche obviously speaks. Whatever else is instinctual for him only follows in the train of the will to power. Viewed from the standpoint of Freud's sexual-psychology, this is, of course, an error of the most glaring kind, a misconception of biology, a decadent, neurotic mistake. For it would be an easy matter for any adherent of the sexual theory to prove that all that is lofty and heroic in Nietzsche's view of life and of the world is only an effect of repression and a misunderstanding of 'instinct'—of that instinct, namely, which that psychology considers fundamental.

At this point we come to the question of the way in which people see, or more exactly, of the different spectacles through which they look out upon the world. A life like Nietzsche's, lived to its fatal end with rare consistency to the nature of the underlying instinct for power, cannot be simply explained away as inept. So to belittle it would be to fall victim to the same unfair prejudice that caused Nietzsche to say of his polar opposite, Wagner: "Everything in him is false. What is genuine is hidden or else disguised. He is an actor, in every bad and good sense of the word." Why this judgment? It is simply because Wagner is a representative of that other elemental urge which Nietzsche overlooked, and upon which Freud's psychology is built.

If we inquire whether the other main instinct, the urge to power, was unconsidered by Freud in his teaching, we find that he has conceived it under the name of 'ego-instinct.' But these 'ego-instincts' occupy a miserable little corner in his psychology compared with the broad, all-too-broad, development of the sexual factor. In reality human nature

bears the burden of a terrible and almost endless conflict between the principle of the ego and that of formless instinct—the ego all barriers and restraint, the instinct limitless, and both principles of equal might. In a certain sense a man may count himself happy if he is conscious of only one instinct, and therefore it is a shrewd device to guard against knowing the other. But if he does, after all, learn to know the other, it is all up with him. He then enters upon the Faustian conflict. Goethe has shown us in the first part of *Faust* what the acceptance of instinct means, and in the second part what it means to accept the ego, with its weird unconscious world. All that is insignificant, paltry, and cowardly in us cowers and shrinks from this acceptance—and there is an excellent means of avoiding it. The discovery is made that the ‘other’ in us is indeed an ‘Other’—a live man, who actually thinks, does, feels, and desires all the things that are despicable and odious. In this way the bogey is seized and war declared against him to our satisfaction. Thus arise those chronic idiosyncrasies of which the history of morals provides so many examples. A peculiarly transparent example is that already cited—‘Nietzsche *contra* Wagner, *contra* Paulus,’ etc. But daily life abounds with such cases. By this ingenious device a man may save himself from the catastrophe that befell Faust, before which indeed his courage and strength might fail. A true man, however, knows that his most bitter foe, or indeed a whole host of enemies, does not equal that one worst adversary, that ‘other self,’ who ‘bides within his breast.’

Nietzsche had Wagner in himself; and that is why he envied him *Parsifal*. But, what was worse, he, Saul, had also Paul within himself. That is why Nietzsche became stigmatized by the spirit. Like Saul he had to experience Christification, when the ‘other’ presented him with the challenge: ‘*Ecce Homo.*’ Which was it who ‘broke before the cross,’ Wagner or Nietzsche?

Fate willed it that one of Freud's earliest disciples, Adler,¹ should formulate a view of neurosis resting exclusively on the power principle. It is interesting, even fascinating, to observe how totally different the same things may appear viewed in opposite lights. To take the main opposition first, I may mention that Freud conceives everything as following from antecedent circumstances, according to a rigorous causality ; while Adler, on the contrary, sees everything as a plan conditioned by purpose. Let us take a simple example. A young woman begins to have attacks of anxiety. During the night she wakes up from a nightmare with a piercing cry. Calming herself with difficulty she clings to her husband, imploring him not to leave her, and demanding again and again assurances that he really loves her, etc. Gradually a nervous asthma develops, taking the form of attacks during the day.

In such a case, the Freudian investigator begins at once to burrow into the inner causality of the malady and its symptoms. What were the first anxiety dreams about ? Wild animals, lions, tigers, and evil men came into them. What are the patient's associations ? She told a story of something that happened to her when she was still unmarried. It ran as follows : she was at a health resort in the mountains ; there was much tennis-playing, and the usual acquaintances were made. A young Italian was there who played particularly well and who also knew how to handle a guitar in the evening. An innocent flirtation developed, leading once to a moonlight walk. On this occasion the Italian temperament ' unexpectedly ' broke loose, to the extreme terror of the unsuspecting girl. ' He gazed at her with such a look ' that she could never forget it. This look follows her even in her dreams, where the animals that pursue her look at her in just that way. Does this look, in fact, originate exclusively in the Italian ? Another reminiscence is instructive. The

¹ *Ueber den nervösen Charakter*, Wiesbaden, 1912.

patient had lost her father through an accident when she was about fourteen years of age. The father was a man of the world, and travelled a good deal. Not long before his death he took her with him on one occasion to Paris, where, among other places, they visited the *Folies Bergères*. There something happened that made an indelible impression upon her. As they quitted the theatre, a painted woman suddenly jostled her father in an incredibly insolent manner. Looking in alarm to see what he would do, she observed this very look, this animal glare, in his eyes. An inexplicable something clung to her day and night. From this moment her relation to her father was altered. Sometimes she was irritable and subject to venomous moods, sometimes she loved him extravagantly. Fits occurred of causeless hysterical weeping, and for a time, whenever her father was at home, at table, she would be distressed by a horrible, convulsive swallowing with apparent attacks of choking which were followed by loss of voice lasting from one to two days. When the news of the sudden death of her father reached her, she was seized by uncontrollable grief, followed by hysterical fits of laughter. However, she soon calmed down; her condition quickly improved, and the neurotic symptoms practically vanished. A veil of forgetfulness was drawn over the past. Only the episode with the Italian stirred something within of which she was afraid. She then broke off brusquely all connection with the young man. Some years later she married. The first appearance of her present neurosis was after the birth of her second child, at a time, in fact, when she made the discovery that her husband had a certain tender interest in another woman.

This history stimulates many questions, as for example, what of the mother? Concerning the mother the relevant facts are that she was very nervous and spent her time trying every kind of sanatorium and method of cure. She too suffered from nervous asthma and anxiety symptoms. Her

relation with her husband was of a very distant kind as far back as the patient could remember. The mother did not understand the father; the patient always felt that she understood him much better. She was, moreover, confessedly the darling of the father, and was, in her inmost feeling, correspondingly cool towards her mother.

These intimations may be regarded as sufficient for a general survey of the cause of the illness. Behind the actual symptoms there lie phantasies related immediately to the episode with the Italian, but manifestly to be traced back to the father, whose unhappy marriage furnished the little daughter with an early opportunity to secure a place which should properly have been filled by the mother. Behind this conquest there lies, of course, the phantasy of being the really suitable wife for the father. The first attack of the neurosis breaks out at the moment when this phantasy receives a severe shock, probably similar to that which the mother, too, had experienced (though this, of course, was unknown to the child). The symptoms are readily comprehensible as the expression of disillusioned and slighted love. The choking sensations are due to the feeling of contraction in the throat, which is a well-known concomitant of powerful emotions that cannot be entirely 'swallowed down.' (The metaphors of common speech have, we know, abundant reference to physiological phenomena.) When the father died, the daughter consciously experienced what seemed mortal grief, whereas her unconscious laughed, after the fashion of Till Eulenspiegel who was sad when he went downhill, but merry on the toilsome upward way, in anticipation of what lay ahead. When the father was at home, the daughter was low-spirited and ill; when he was away, she felt much better—like the innumerable husbands and wives, who conspire to hide from themselves the secret that they are not altogether indispensable to one another.

That the unconscious had some justification for laughing

at that time is shown in the supervening period of good health. The patient was successful in letting all that had passed sink into oblivion. Only the experience with the Italian threatened to bring up the underworld again; but with neurotic eagerness she shut and barred the door. She remained in health until the dragon of neurosis came crawling back just when she imagined herself safe over the mountain, so to speak, in the consummation of her life as wife and mother.

The sexual theory of psychology says of this case: the cause of the neurosis lies in the patient's fundamental incapacity to free herself from the father. Hence her discovery in the Italian of that secret something is only a recurrence of the episode which previously, in the case of the father, had made such a deep impression upon her. These recollections were naturally revived by the analogous experience with the husband which was the immediate cause of her neurosis. It might therefore be said that the content and ground of her neurosis was the conflict between the fantastic infantile-erotic relation to her father and her love for her husband.

If, however, we now consider the course of the same illness from the standpoint of the other instinctual urge, namely, the will to power, it assumes a quite different aspect. Her parents' unhappy marriage afforded an excellent opportunity for the childish power instinct. The power instinct will have the ego 'on top' under all circumstances, by fair means or foul. The 'integrity of the personality' must at all costs be safeguarded. Every attempt, be it only an apparent attempt, of the environment to obtain the slightest ascendancy over the subject is met by 'the masculine protest,' to use Adler's expression. The disillusionment of the mother and her withdrawal into neurosis created a fine opportunity for the development of power and for gaining the ascendancy. Love and excellence of conduct are admittedly, from the standpoint of the power instinct, a

choice means to this end. Virtuous conduct is not infrequently of service in compelling recognition from others. Already as a child the patient knew how to obtain a privileged position with her father by specially gracious and lovable behaviour, finally getting the better of the mother, not simply from love for the father, but because love was a good method of gaining the ascendancy. The laughing-fit at the time of her father's death is striking proof of this. We are perhaps inclined to regard an explanation of this kind as a horrible depreciation of love, if not, indeed, a malicious insinuation. But let us reflect a moment and look out upon the world as it is. Have we not seen countless examples of those who love and believe in their love—until their purpose is attained, and who then go their way as though they had never loved? And, after all, is not this the way of nature herself? Is 'disinterested' love at all possible? If so, it belongs to the highest virtues, which are, confessedly, rare. Perhaps there is a general disposition to reflect as little as possible upon the aims of love; otherwise men might make discoveries which would show the worth of their own love in a less favourable light. There is an almost mortal danger in detracting from the value of a fundamental instinct, perhaps especially to-day, when we seem to have but a minimum of values left.

The patient, then, had a fit of laughing on the death of her father—she had finally arrived on top. It was a hysterical fit of laughing, a psychogenetic symptom, something that came from unconscious motives, not from those of the conscious ego. That is a difference not to be made light of, and one that reveals whence and how human virtues arise. The contrary of these virtues, to be sure, leads to hell—in modern phrase, into the unconscious—where the opposites of our conscious virtues have for long been accumulating. Hence at the behest of virtue, we seek to know nothing of the unconscious; indeed it is the pinnacle of virtuous shrewdness to maintain that there is no unconscious. But

alas ! it fares with us all as it fared with Brother Medardus in E. T. A. Hoffmann's tale, *The Devil's Elixir* (*Elixieren des Teufels*). There exists somewhere an uncanny, terrible brother, our own counterpart, or our own flesh and blood, who holds and maliciously hoards all that we would so willingly let fall under the table.

The first outbreak of neurosis occurred in our patient at the moment when she realized the fact that there was something in her father which she could not control. Then it flashed upon her what the use of her mother's neurosis had been. When one meets with an obstacle that cannot be overcome by sensible and charming means, there is yet another method which the patient's mother had discovered before her—in brief, neurosis. Hence also it came about that she mimicked her mother's neurosis. Yet one may ask in astonishment : what can be the use of neurosis ? What can it accomplish ? Whoever has a pronounced case of neurosis in his immediate neighbourhood knows how much it can 'accomplish.' On the whole, there is no better means than a neurosis of tyrannizing over an entire household. Such things as heart attacks, fits of choking, spasms of all kinds, achieve unsurpassable effects. Flood-gates of sympathy are opened ; there is the anguish of faithful parents, the running to and fro of servants, the telephone bell, the hasty arrival of doctors, different diagnoses, thorough-going investigations, tedious treatment, considerable expenditure. And there, in the midst of all the hubbub, lies the innocent sufferer, to whom the household is even generously grateful when he at length recovers from his 'spasms.'

This unsurpassable 'arrangement'—to use Adler's term—was discovered by the child, and employed with success so long as her father was there. It became superfluous when her father died, for then her ascendancy was achieved. The Italian was quickly dismissed when he overstressed her femininity by an appropriate reminder of his masculinity.

But when a suitable chance of marriage presented itself, she loved, and resigned herself without more ado to the fate of wife and mother. So long as she was duly worshipped in that rôle all went merrily enough. But when once her husband began to have a little interest outside, she was fain to have recourse once more to the peculiarly efficacious 'arrangement' for the indirect exercise of her power; since she had again encountered the obstacle, this time in her husband, that previously in her father's case had deprived her of the mastery.

This is the aspect which the matter presents from the standpoint of the power-psychology. I fear the reader may feel as did the Khedive who, having heard to the end the advocate of one party in a suit, pronounced: "Thou hast well spoken. I perceive thou art right." But when the advocate of the other side had completed his speech, the Khedive scratched his head and said: "Thou hast well spoken. I perceive that thou also art right." It is unquestionable that the urge to power plays an extraordinary part. It is true that neurotic symptom-complexes are also elaborate 'arrangements' which make inexorably for their goal with incredible obstinacy and cunning. Neurosis is teleologically directed. In establishing this point Adler has won for himself no small credit.

Which of the two points of view is right? That is a question which might lead to much brain-racking. The two explanations cannot simply be laid side by side, for they absolutely contradict each other. In the one, love and its destiny is the chief and decisive fact; in the other, the power of the ego. In the first case the ego is merely a kind of appendage to the passion of love; whereas in the second case love appears merely as a means to the end of gaining ascendancy. Whoever has most at heart the power of the ego will revolt against the first conception, but he who cares most for love will never be reconciled to the second.

CHAPTER IV

THE TWO PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES

THE incompatibility of the two theories outlined in the preceding chapters requires a standpoint superordinate to both, by which they may be reconciled. We are certainly not entitled to discard one in favour of the other, however convenient this solution of the difficulty might be. Looked at without prejudice, both contain significant truths, which, however apparently opposed, should not be taken as mutually exclusive. The Freudian theory is so impressively simple and clear that one almost regrets the necessity of driving in the wedge of a contrary assumption. The same holds good of Adler's theory. That, too, is of illuminating simplicity and clearness, explaining just as much as does the Freudian theory. No wonder, then, if the adherents of both schools cling obstinately and sometimes fanatically to their one-sided truths. For reasons easily understood, they are unwilling to give up a theory so attractively simple, and in its place to accept a paradox, or, worse still, lose themselves in the confusion of opposite points of view.

Now, since both theories are in a large measure correct—since they both, that is to say, adequately explain their material, it follows that neurosis must often present two opposite aspects, one of which is apprehended through the theory of Freud, the other through that of Adler. But whence comes it that each investigator sees only one side, and why does each maintain that he has the only correct view? The reason is that in virtue of his own psychological

peculiarity each investigator sees the neurosis to be ruled by the factor that corresponds to that peculiarity. It cannot be assumed that the cases of neurosis seen by Adler are totally different from those seen by Freud. Both are obviously working with similar material, but because of personal peculiarities each sees things from a different angle, and thus they come to evolve fundamentally different views and theories.

Adler perceives how a subject, feeling suppressed and inferior, tries to secure an illusory superiority by means of 'protests,' 'arrangements' and other apt devices directed indifferently against parents, teachers, regulations, authorities, conditions, and institutions. Even sexuality takes its place among the other artifices. The determining factor of this view is an undue emphasis upon the subject, before which the individuality and significance of objects entirely vanishes. Objects are regarded at best as vehicles of repressive tendencies. One must suppose that, in Adler as in other men, the love relation, and other desires directed upon objects, exist as essential factors, yet in his theory of neurosis they have scarcely greater import than a *sous-entendu*.

Freud, on the other hand, sees his patients in continual dependence upon, and in relation to, significant objects. Father and mother play a large part; whatever significant influences or conditions enter into the life of the patient are carried along the line of a direct causality back to these original sources. The *pièce de résistance* of his theory is the conception of transference, the relation of the patient to the physician. It is always a definitely specified object that is desired, or met by resistance, and this reaction is always of the type established in earliest childhood through the relation to father and mother. What comes from the subject is essentially a blind striving after pleasure and satisfaction; but this striving always derives its qualities from specific objects. In the Freudian view objects are always of the

greatest significance, and exercise an almost exclusively determining power, while the subject remains conspicuously without significance and is indeed nothing but the source of desire. I have already referred to Freud's recognition of the 'ego instinct,' but even this term shows that his idea of the subject differs *toto cælo* from Adler's conception, which assigns to the subject such a definite, strongly marked value.

Certainly both investigators see the subject in relation to the object, but in how different a fashion is this relation seen! By Adler the emphasis is placed upon a subject that, in regard to every kind of object indifferently, seeks its own security and supremacy. With Freud, on the other hand, the emphasis is placed entirely on objects, which, according to their particular character, hinder or further the desire of the subject.

This difference can be nothing else than a clear difference of temperament, an opposition of two types of human mentality, one of which finds the determining factor pre-eminently in the subject, the other in the object. A middle view, perhaps that of common sense, would see human action conditioned as much by the subject as by any specific object. In opposition to this view both investigators urge that their theory intends no psychological elucidation of the normal man, but is simply a theory of neurosis. In that case, however, Freud should explain and treat some of his cases after the fashion of Adler, and Adler should condescend in certain cases to give earnest consideration to his former master's point of view. Such an adjustment, however, has occurred neither on the one side, nor on the other.

This typical opposition I have described as characteristic of the introverted and the extraverted attitudes. The first, if normal, is revealed by a hesitating, reflective, reticent disposition, that does not easily give itself away, that shrinks from objects, always assuming the defensive, and preferring to make its cautious observations as from a hiding-place.

The second type, if normal, is characterized by an accommodating, and apparently open and ready disposition, at ease in any given situation. This type forms attachments quickly, and ventures, unconcerned and confident, into unknown situations, rejecting thoughts of possible contingencies. In the former case, manifestly the subject, in the latter the object, is the decisive factor.

In these observations it is evident that I describe the two types only in their most general outline.¹ Still, even this quite superficial sketch enables us to recognize the type contrast implicit in the two theories. The sexual theory is conceived from the standpoint of the object, the power theory from that of the subject. For the extravert always puts the accent upon the object and his relation to it, the introvert always upon the subject, freed as completely as possible from the object.

The absolute incompatibility of the two theories is thus resolved, since both are the products of a one-sided attitude. We find a like opposition of type in Nietzsche and Wagner. The misunderstanding of each by the other is grounded in the typical opposition of their attitudes. What is of highest value for the one is for the other 'affectation,' and 'untrue to the very core.' Each depreciates the other. If we apply the sexual theory to an extravert, it fits, but if we apply it to an introvert, we simply misinterpret him and offer violence to the peculiar nature of his mentality. A similar statement may be made in the reverse case. From the relative correctness of both antagonistic theories, it is manifest that each has its field of application in those cases which prove the correctness of the theory. As to those cases that cannot be harmonized with it, well—every rule has its exceptions.

From the recognition of these facts came the need to

¹ A complete study of the type-problem will be found in my book : *Psychological Types*, authorized translation by H. G. Baynes, London, Kegan Paul.

overcome the opposition, and evolve a theory which should do justice not merely to one or the other type, but equally to both. If we pursue this purpose a critique of both theories and of their claims becomes inevitable. It may well have occurred to the reader, even though a layman in these matters, that a radically unpleasant character attaches to both theories which does not necessarily belong to science. The sexual theory is æsthetically repellant and intellectually unsatisfying; the power theory is distinctly venomous. Both theories are calculated to give pain by tracing an aspiring ideal, an heroic attitude, nobility of feeling and deep conviction back to a commonplace reality—whenever they are applied to such things as these. On no account should they be so applied, for both theories are properly therapeutic instruments required by the physician, whose knife must be sharp and pitiless for excising what is diseased and injurious. This is what Nietzsche tried to do with his destructive criticism of the ideal, which he regarded as a kind of diseased overgrowth in the mind of humanity (as indeed it often is). In the hand of a good physician—one who really knows the human mind, and applies the treatment only to the diseased part, who has, to use Nietzsche's phrase, 'fingers for the *nuance*'—both theories prove wholesome caustics, of great value when rightly adapted to the individual case. They are hurtful and dangerous in the hand that cannot measure and weigh. They are critical methods, having, in common with every form of criticism, the power to do good when there is something that must be destroyed, dissolved or reduced. But wherever something has to be built up, they only do harm.

Both theories may therefore be allowed to pass without disparagement, in so far as, like medical poisons, they are entrusted to the sure hand of the physician. But fate has ordained that they should not remain with the competent physician. Of late they have become known to the medical

public, and as almost every practising physician has an indefinitely high percentage of neurotic cases among his clientèle, he is almost compelled to acquire some suitable technique of treatment; thus he finally arms himself with the difficult psycho-analytic method. Often he is quite incompetent to use such a method, for where could he have learned the secrets of the human mind? Certainly not from his academic studies. The smattering of psychiatry he acquired for his examination barely suffices to enable him to recognize the symptoms of the commonest mental disturbances; it is far indeed from giving him any penetrating insight into the human mind. Hence he is almost totally unprepared to apply a method such as these caustic remedies, which require for their successful application an unusual knowledge of the mind. One must be in a position to distinguish the diseased and useless from what is valuable and worth preserving; and to make this distinction is a matter of the greatest difficulty. Whoever would receive a profound impression of the way in which a psychologizing doctor can, irresponsibly, from narrow pseudo-scientific prejudice, do violence to the mind he studies, should turn to the writings of Moebius on Nietzsche, or, better still, to the various 'psychiatric' writings on the 'case' of Christ. He will surely not be able to forego a 'threefold lamentation' over the patient who meets with such an 'understanding.'

Further, the knowledge of psycho-analysis—much to the discomfiture of medicine, which nevertheless has not accepted it—has passed into the hands of the teachers. This is right: for it is really, if rightly handled and understood, an educational method, and belongs to the social sciences. I should never advise, as an educational method, the exclusive application of the pure sexual analysis of Freud. Its employment might have disastrous consequences, owing to its one-sidedness. In order to make the original psycho-analysis available for educational purposes there was need of the transformation

which the labour of recent years has brought, that is, the expansion of the method to a general psychological interpretation.

Both the theories, then, which I have discussed lack universality ; they are caustic remedies to be applied locally. They are destructive and reductive. They say to everything : ' You are nothing but . . . ' They explain to the invalid that his symptoms have arisen thus or so, and are nothing but this or that. It would be quite unjust to assert that reduction must be wrong in any given case, but, when exalted to a general explanation of the mind, whether sick or healthy, a theory that is merely reductive proves impossible. The human mind cannot be so explained. Certainly sexuality is always and everywhere present, the urge to power certainly permeates all the heights and depths of the mind ; yet the mind is not merely one or the other, nor is it, for that matter, both together. It is also that which it has made and will make out of both urgencies. A man is only half understood when we know how all that is in him has come about. If that were the only question, he might as well have been dead long ago. As a living being he is not thus comprehended, for life has not only a yesterday, nor is it explained by reducing to-day to yesterday. Life has also a to-morrow ; and to-day is only understood when we can unite to our knowledge of what was yesterday the advent of to-morrow. This is true of all psychological expressions of life, even of pathological symptoms. The symptoms of neurosis, in particular, are not simply consequences of causes that operated once, whether ' infantile sexuality ' or infantile instinct to power ; they are also attempts towards a new synthesis of life. In the same breath it must doubtless be added, unsuccessful attempts. Nevertheless they are attempts possessing a germ of value and meaning. They are embryos that miscarry owing to the inclement conditions of inner and outer nature.

The reader may ask himself : what in the world can be

the value and meaning of a neurosis—this most useless and untoward affliction of mankind? To be nervous—how can that do any good? Such good, perhaps, as flies and other vermin do—created by God that man may exercise the useful virtue of patience. However stupid this idea may be from the standpoint of natural science, it may none the less be quite shrewd from the standpoint of psychology—applicable to ‘nervous symptoms’ if not to vermin. Even Nietzsche, characteristically scornful of stupid and banal ideas, has more than once acknowledged how much he owed to his sickness. I have myself seen more than one man who owed his entire usefulness and the justification of his being to a neurosis which prevented all crucial follies in his life, and forced him to an existence that developed his valuable potentialities—germs that might have been rendered abortive had not neurosis with its iron grip held him to the place where he belonged. It is even true of some men that the whole meaning of their life, the true significance of their being, lies in the unconscious, while in the conscious is all that tempts and leads them astray. With others these relations are reversed, and with them neurosis has a different meaning. In such cases a far-reaching reductive treatment is in place, but in the former cases it certainly is not.

The reader at this point may be inclined to grant the possibility of neurosis having such a meaning in certain cases, but will nevertheless be disposed to deny so far-reaching and significant a purposiveness to this malady in all its commonplace, daily manifestations. What value, for example, could there be in the above-mentioned case of asthma with its hysterical anxiety states? I admit that here the value is not obvious, especially when the case is considered from the standpoint of a reductive theory, that is, as a *chronique scandaleuse* of the individual’s psychological development.

The two theories we have been discussing are seen to have this much in common : they pitilessly unveil everything that is worthless in man. They are theories, or more correctly hypotheses, which explain the nature of the pathological factor. They are accordingly concerned not with the values of a man, but with his negative qualities which they render disturbingly conspicuous. From this point of view it is possible to become reconciled to both standpoints.

A 'value' is a possibility through which energy can achieve development. But a negative value is also such a possibility, as we see, for example, clearly in the notable manifestations of neurotic energy. This negative phenomenon, therefore, is also properly a 'value,' but of such a kind as to make possible useless and hurtful manifestations of energy. Energy in itself is indeed neither good nor evil, neither useful nor hurtful, neither valuable nor valueless, but indifferent ; because everything depends upon the form into which the energy passes. Form gives energy its quality. Yet, on the other hand, mere form without energy is likewise indifferent. That an actual value may be realized, energy is necessary on the one hand, and on the other a valuable form. In neurosis psychical energy is undoubtedly present, but in a worthless form. Methods based upon the theories under discussion serve as solvents of this inferior form. They justify themselves by their function as a caustic remedy. By means of them we obtain free, but indifferent energy. The opinion has hitherto prevailed that this newly gained energy is at the conscious disposal of the patient, in such wise that he can apply it at his pleasure. Since it was supposed that the energy was nothing but the instinctual power of sex, it was usual to speak of a 'sublimated' application of it, and it was assumed that the patient, aided by analysis, could transfer the energy regarded as sexual into a 'sublimation'—a non-sexual application, the practice of an art perhaps, or some other good or useful activity.

According to this conception, it would be open to the patient to decide, arbitrarily or from inclination, the line along which his energy should be sublimated.

This conception has a certain justification in so far as it is possible for a man to mark out a definite line along which his life shall develop. But we know that there is no human foresight or wisdom capable of prescribing a direction to our life, except within narrow limits. The intricate labyrinth of fate confronts us, all too rich in possibilities ; and yet of these many possibilities, only one is our own right way. Who—though armed with the completest knowledge of his own character that is humanly possible—would presume to designate beforehand that single possibility ? It is true that much can be attained by the will, but, in view of the fate of certain specially strong-willed personalities, we must regard it as false in principle to seek to subdue our fate at all costs to our own will. Our will is a function directed by our reflective powers ; thus it depends upon the quality of the superior part of our nature. This superior part, if true to itself, acts in accordance with reason or intellect. But has it ever been shown, or shall it ever be, that life and destiny harmonize with our human reason—that they, too, are rational ? On the contrary, there is good ground for conjecturing that they are irrational, or rather, that in the last resort, their meaning lies beyond human reason. The irrationality of events is shown in what we call chance. We are indeed compelled to deny chance, because *a priori* we cannot think an occurrence which is not causally and necessarily conditioned, so that chance is excluded. But, practically, chance is everywhere, and so obtrusive that we may as well pocket our causal philosophy. The fullness of life is governed by law and yet not so governed, is rational and yet irrational. Hence reason, and the will that is grounded in reason, are valid only a little way. The further we extend this rationally directed choice, the surer we may be that we

are thereby excluding irrational possibilities of life which have as good a right to be lived. It was indeed highly expedient for man to gain some power to direct his life. That the attainment of reason is the greatest achievement of humanity may be justly maintained; but that is not to say that man's development must always be along the line of rationality. The frightful catastrophe of the world-war has dealt a heavy blow to the most optimistic champions of rationalized culture.

In January, 1913, Ostwald¹ wrote as follows: "The whole world is unanimous that the present condition of armed peace cannot be maintained and is gradually becoming impossible. It demands monstrous sacrifices from each single nation far exceeding the outlay for purposes of culture, yet without any corresponding positive gain. If mankind could discover ways and means for doing away with all these preparations for wars which never take place, all this enslavement of a considerable part of the nation's manhood, at the age of maximum strength and efficiency, for the furtherance of war, with all the other innumerable evils which present conditions create, such an immense economy of energy would be effected that from this moment onwards we could expect a blossoming of culture hitherto undreamed of. For war, like personal combat, though the oldest of all possible means of settling contests, is on that very account the most inept, and entails the most grievous waste of energy. Hence the complete doing away with warfare, potential no less than actual, is a necessity for the economy of energy and one of the supremely important cultural tasks of our day."

The irrationality of destiny, however, did not concur with the rationality of the well-meaning thinker; it ordained not only the destruction of the accumulated weapons and armies, but, far beyond that, a mad and monstrous devastation, mass murder without parallel. Perhaps humanity

¹ *Die Philosophie der Werte.*

might draw from this the conclusion that, by means of rational purpose, only one side of destiny can be mastered.

What may be said of humanity in general is also valid for each individual, since humanity consists only of individuals, and as the psychology of humanity is, so also is the psychology of the individual. In the world-war we experienced a fearful reckoning with the rational purposiveness of civilized organization. What is called 'will' in the individual is in the nation called 'imperialism.' For will is a demonstration of power over destiny, that is to say, an exclusion of the fortuitous. Civilized organization is rational, brought about through will and purpose—purposive sublimation of free and indifferent forms of energy. It is the same in the individual; and just as the idea of a universal cultural organization has received a fearful correction through this war, so must the individual during the course of his life often have to learn that so-called 'disposable' forms of energy are not to be disposed of by him.

I was once consulted in America by a business man of about forty-five years of age, whose case is a good illustration of what has been said. It was a question of the typical American self-made man, who had worked his way up in the world from the bottom. He had been very successful and had founded an immense business. He had succeeded in gradually organizing the business so as to be able to retire from the management of it. Two years before I saw him he had indeed retired. Hitherto he had lived exclusively in his business, and had concentrated all his energy upon it with the almost incredible intensity and one-sidedness peculiar to the successful American business man. He had purchased a splendid estate where he thought he would 'live,' and where he proposed to have horses, motor-cars, golf, tennis, and 'parties' of every description. But he had reckoned without his host. The energy that should have been at his disposal would not go into these engaging

perspectives, but went off capriciously in quite another direction. A few weeks after the beginning of the longed-for happy life of bliss, he began to brood over peculiar, vague sensations in his body, and a few weeks more sufficed to plunge him into a state of extreme hypochondria. He had a complete nervous collapse. A healthy man, of uncommon physical strength and abounding energy, he was reduced to the condition of a peevish child. There was an end to all the splendid prospects. He fell from one state of anxiety into another, and tormented himself almost to death with fantastic worries. He then consulted a famous specialist, who immediately and correctly judged that there was nothing wrong with the man but idleness. The patient saw the sense of this, and returned to his former work. To his great disappointment, however, no interest in his business could be aroused. Neither patience nor resolution were of any use. His energy could not by any means be forced back into the business. Then his condition became worse than before. All that had formerly been living, creative energy in him was now turned back against himself with terrible, destroying force. His creative genius rose up, as it were, in revolt against him; and just as he had formerly built up great organizations in the world, so now did his dæmon create a subtle system of hypochondriacal illusion that all but annihilated him. When I saw him he was already a hopeless moral ruin. I tried to make clear to him that such a gigantic energy might indeed be withdrawn from business, but the question remained, where should it go? The finest horses, the swiftest cars and the most entertaining parties failed in this case to allure the energy; although it might be quite rational to think that a man who had devoted his whole life to serious work had a natural right to enjoy himself. Yes, if fate could be brought under human control, it would certainly be so—first work, then well-earned leisure. But fate takes an irrational course, and, inconveniently enough,

the energy of life demands a channel congenial to itself ; otherwise it is simply dammed up and becomes destructive. My line of argument met with no response, as indeed was to be expected. A case so far advanced as this can only be cared for till death ; it cannot be cured.

This example clearly shows that it does not lie in our power to transfer 'disposable' energy at pleasure to a rationally chosen object. The same may be said of the apparently disposable energy which we obtain when we have destroyed its form through the caustic of psycho-analysis. This energy can, as we have said, be applied voluntarily at best for a short time. It revolts from any continuous pursuit of the rationally presented possibilities. Psychical energy is indeed a fastidious thing that demands the fulfilment of its own conditions. However much energy may be present, we cannot make it useful so long as we have not been able to find it a congenial channel. All my investigation of the last decade has been concentrated upon this question.

The first stage of this work was the perception of the limits within which each of the above discussed theories is valid. The second stage consisted in the recognition of the fact that these two theories correspond to opposite psychological types which I have designated as introverted and extraverted.

William James¹ had already been struck by the existence of both these types among thinkers. He distinguished them as 'tender-minded' and 'tough-minded.' Similarly, Ostwald² found an analogous division into 'classical' and 'romantic' types among men of learning. I am therefore not alone in my idea of types, as evidenced by these well-known names among many others. Inquiry into history has shown me that not a few of the great spiritual controversies rest upon the opposition of the two types. The most signifi-

¹ *Pragmatism.*

² *Grosse Männer.*

cant case of this kind is the opposition between nominalism and realism, which, beginning with the difference between the Platonic and the Megarian schools, became the heritage of scholastic philosophy, where it is Abelard's great merit to have made at least the attempt to unite the opposed stand-points through his 'conceptualism.' This controversy has continued right on into our own age, where it is revealed in the opposition between a spiritual and a materialistic view of the universe.

Not only in the history of mind in general, but in that of single individuals, there appears this opposition of types. It has indeed come to light in recent investigation that either type has a predilection to marry its opposite, the two types being unconsciously complementary to one another. It is the nature of the introvert always to think and consider before acting. Naturally his action is thereby retarded. His shyness and doubt in the presence of the object induces hesitation, and so he always has difficulty in adaptation to the outer world. The extravert, on the other hand, always has a positive relation to things. He is, so to speak, attracted by them. New, unknown situations exercise a charm upon him. In order to make acquaintance with something unfamiliar, he will jump into it with both feet. Usually he acts first and then reflects on his action; thus his action is rapid, held in leash by no doubts and hesitations. Hence these types seem created for a symbiosis, a life of reciprocal interdependence. The province of the one is reflection, of the other initiative and practical dealing. When the two types are united in marriage they may effect an ideal union. So long as the two partners in the union are wholly concerned with adaptation to the manifold external needs of life, their rapport is excellent. When, however, the husband has made enough money, or if heaven should send a fine legacy, so that the outer urgencies of life no longer press, then they have time to occupy themselves with one another. Hitherto

they stood back to back and protected each other against the pressure of necessity. Now they turn towards each other and look for reciprocal understanding—to discover that such understanding has never been attained. Each speaks a different language. The two types thus begin to be ranged in opposition to each other. This warfare is poisonous, violent, and full of mutual depreciation, even if it be conducted quietly in the utmost intimacy. For the value of the one is for the other the negation of value.

It might reasonably be supposed that the one, conscious of his own value, would be able quietly to recognize that of the other, and that in this way any conflict would be superfluous. I have seen a number of cases in which this line of argument was adopted, without, however, the achievement of any satisfactory goal. Where, indeed, it is a question of altogether normal people, they may pass smoothly through such critical periods of transition. We may define that man as normal who can somehow exist under any circumstances that yield him in one way or another the necessary minimum of the means of life. But countless is the number of those for whom this is impossible; such normal men are not to be found in any abundance. The man we call 'normal' is, properly speaking, an ideal man whose fortunate blend of character is of comparatively rare occurrence. The greater number of more or less differentiated men need conditions of life which provide for more than a bare security of food and sleep. For these the end of a symbiotic relationship comes with a severe shock.

It is not easy to understand why this should be so. Yet if we consider that no man is simply introverted or simply extraverted, but has potentialities for both attitudes, one having been developed as a function of adaptation, we shall immediately hazard the conjecture that in the introvert, extraversion lies sleeping and undeveloped in the background, as likewise in the extravert, introversion has a meagre and

shadowy life. This is actually the case. The introvert has in fact an extraverted attitude, but it remains unconscious, because the scrutiny of his consciousness is directed always on the subject. He certainly sees the object, but he has depreciatory ideas of it, or at least inhibiting ideas, so that he always keeps as far from it as possible, as if it were something powerful and dangerous. I will make clear my meaning by a simple illustration. Two youths were wandering together in the country. They came to a fine castle. Both wanted to investigate it. The introvert said: "I should like to know what it is like inside." The extravert answered: "Let's go in," and started to enter by the gateway. The introvert drew back—"Perhaps one is not allowed to enter," he said, with vague ideas of policemen, fines, and fierce dogs in the background. Whereupon the extravert answered: "Well, we can always ask. They'll let us in right enough." His ideas are of the kindly old watchman, the hospitable lords of the manor, and of possible romantic adventures. On the strength of extraverted optimism they both find themselves actually in the castle. But now comes the *dénouement*. The castle has been rebuilt inside, and contains nothing but a couple of rooms with a collection of old manuscripts. By chance, old manuscripts are the chief joy of the introverted youth. Hardly has he caught sight of these when he becomes as one transformed. He loses himself in contemplation of the treasures, he expresses himself with enthusiasm. He engages the man in charge in conversation in order to get from him as much information as possible, and when the result is meagre the youth asks for the curator, so that he may propound his questions to him. His shyness has vanished, objects have taken on a seductive glamour, and the world wears a new aspect. But meanwhile the courage of the extraverted youth is ebbing lower and lower. His face grows longer and he begins to yawn. No kindly watchmen are forthcoming here, no knightly hospitality.

not a trace of romantic adventure, only a castle made over into a museum. As for manuscripts, surely there are plenty of these at home. While the enthusiasm of the one rises, the spirits of the other fall; the castle bores him, the manuscripts put him in mind of a library, the library is associated with the university, the university with studies and approaching examinations. Gradually the castle, once so interesting and attractive, is shrouded in a veil of gloom. The object becomes negative. "Isn't it glorious," cries the introverted youth, "to have discovered this wonderful collection?" "The place bores me to extinction," replies the other in undisguised ill humour. This exasperates the introvert, who resolves in his own mind never again to go on an excursion with an extravert. The latter in his turn becomes annoyed with the other's vexation and thinks he always knew the fellow was an inconsiderate egoist who would squander for his own selfish interest all the lovely spring day that could be so much better enjoyed out-of-doors.

What has been happening here? Both were enjoying their wanderings together in symbiosis, till they arrived at the fatal castle. Then the forethinking, or *Promethean* introvert said, "It could be seen from within." The active and after-thinking, or *Epimethean* extravert opened the door. At this point the relation of the types becomes inverted. The introvert, who at first almost resisted the idea of going in, cannot now be induced to go out, and the extravert regrets the moment when he entered the castle. The former is fascinated by the object, the latter by his negative thoughts. When the former became aware of the manuscripts, a transformation took place in him. His shyness disappeared, the object took possession of him, and he yielded himself willingly. The latter, on the other hand, experienced a growing resistance to the object, and was eventually taken prisoner by his ill-humoured subjectivity. The former became as though extraverted, the latter as though introverted. But the

extraversion of the introvert is different from the extraversion of the extravert, and the introversion of the extravert is different from the introversion of the introvert. So long as both were wandering together in gaiety and harmony, they did not fall foul of each other, because each was in the character natural to him. Each was positive to the other, because their attitudes were complementary. They were complementary, however, only because the attitude of the one included the other. This is seen in the short interchange of speech at the gateway. Both wanted to enter the castle. The doubt of the introvert as to whether it were possible to enter held good also for the other. The initiative of the extravert likewise held good for the other. In this sense the attitude of the one included the other, and this is always true in some degree if an individual is in the attitude naturally suited to him, for this attitude has some degree of collective adaptation. This is true also of the introvert's attitude, although it always proceeds from the subject. It simply goes from subject to object, while the extravert's attitude goes from object to subject.

At the moment, however, when in the case of the introvert the object overpowers the subject and draws him into it, his attitude loses its social character. He forgets the presence of his friend, he no longer includes him, he becomes absorbed in the object and does not see the boredom of his friend. In the same way the extravert loses his consideration for the other when his subjective expectation undergoes disillusionment, and he is drawn back into his subjective ideas and moods.

We may, therefore, give an account of the occurrence under such a formula as this :—In the case of the introvert there has been produced, through the influence of the object, an extraversion of inferior kind ; while in the extravert there emerges, in place of his social attitude, an inferior type of introversion. And with this we return to the proposition

from which we started, "The value of the one is the negative value of the other."

Occurrences that are of positive, as well as those of negative character may constellate the inferior counter-function. Once this has happened, the individual becomes sensitive. Sensitiveness is the symptom of the presence of inferiority. Thus the psychological conditions of division and misunderstanding arise, not only as between two people, but also in the form of division within oneself. The very essence of the inferior function is characterized by its autonomy. It is self-sufficient, it attacks, it fascinates, it entangles us, in such wise that we cease to be master of ourselves and become incapable of fair judgment between ourselves and others.

Yet it is a necessity for the development of character that we should allow the other side, the inferior function, to find expression. We cannot permanently allow one part of our personality to be cared for symbiotically by another. The moment when we shall have need of the other function may occur at any time and find us unprepared—as the illustration shows—and the consequences may be evil. The extravert in such circumstances loses his indispensable relation to the object, the introvert loses his equally indispensable relation to the subject. *Per contra*, however, it is also indispensable for the introvert to acquire a power of action uninhibited by doubts and hesitations, and for the extravert to take account of the self, yet without thereby imperilling his relationships.

The type-problem, then, raised through consideration of the issue between Freud and Adler, obviously leads us to a new problem—the problem of the opposites. In the case of extraversion *versus* introversion, it is clearly a question of two natural, psychological attitudes or movements working in opposition to each other. Goethe has referred to them as diastole and systole. In their harmonious alternation

they might indeed be expected to bring about a rhythm of life, but only the art of life at its highest level seems capable of achieving this rhythm. To accomplish it one must either be quite unconscious, so that the natural process suffers no violence through a conscious act, or else one must be conscious in the highest possible degree, in order to be able to will and to carry out the opposite movement. Since we cannot develop backwards to animal unconsciousness, there remains for us nothing save the more difficult forward pathway to higher consciousness. No doubt that consciousness, which should enable us to live the great Yea and Nay of life of our own free will and purpose, is an altogether superhuman ideal. Still, it is a goal. Our modern mentality allows us consciously only to will the Yea, and bear with the Nay. When that is the case, much is already achieved.

The problem of the opposites, as a principle inherent in human nature, forms the third stage in the progressive development of our understanding. This problem is, in general, a problem for mature age only. A practical analytical treatment of a patient will hardly ever begin with this problem, especially not in the case of young people. The source of neurosis in the young is, as a rule, the collision between the forces of reality and an inadequate, infantile attitude. The latter, from the causal point of view, is characterized by an abnormal dependence on the real or imaginary parents, from the final point of view, by unrealizable fictions, plans, and aspirations. Here the reductive analysis of Freud and Adler is quite in place. But there are many types of neurosis which arise for the first time in mature age, or which actually break out on such a scale that those suffering from them become incapable of carrying on their work. Naturally in such cases it may be inferred, that in youth a neurotic dependence on the parents existed, together with every kind of infantile illusion. But all that did not prevent the persons in question from taking up a profession, and successfully

practising it, marrying, and, whether for good or ill, sustaining the marriage union until the time in mature age when the attitude, upon which they had hitherto relied, suddenly failed them.

In such a case it is of little avail to make conscious the phantasies of childhood and the dependence on the parents, though it is a necessary part of the procedure and has often some favourable result. But the real therapy begins at the moment when the patient sees that it is no longer the father and mother who stand in his way, but himself—an unconscious part of the personality, that is to say, which plays the rôle of father and mother. Again, this knowledge, however useful, is still of a negative kind, so long as it is a mere statement—‘I know that it is not father and mother who stand in my way, but I myself.’ *Who* is it in him that stands in his way? What is this mysterious part of his personality lying concealed behind the forms of father and mother, keeping him under the illusion that the reason for his trouble must be something external? This part is the opposite of his conscious attitude. It gives him no rest, and works continually as a hidden disturbance until it is accepted. It is true that for young people liberation from the past may be sufficient; for before them lies an inviting future, rich in possibilities. It suffices to break a few bonds, the urge to life will do the rest. We are confronted, however, with a task of a different order in the case of those who have already a large part of their life behind them, for whom the future no longer beckons with marvellous possibilities, and nothing, perhaps, can be expected save the endless round of familiar duties, or the dubious pleasures of advancing years.

Should it ever have fallen to us to liberate young people from their past, we see that they transfer the imago of their parents to a suitable substitute that does duty instead. The feeling, for example, that adhered to the mother now goes

to the wife instead, and the authority of the father is transferred to respected teachers and superiors, or even to institutions. This does not by any means constitute a complete liberation, but serves as a practical pathway which is taken by the normal individual unconsciously, and therefore without inhibition or resistance.

The problem for the adult is very different. This part of the way now lies behind him, trodden as it was with more or less difficulty. Liberation has been achieved from the parents, now perhaps long since dead. The mother has been sought and found in the wife, the father in the husband. Fathers and institutions have received due honour. Fatherhood or motherhood has been achieved. With all this already in the past, the individual has perhaps learned to perceive that what at first meant for him progress and satisfaction has become a tedious error, part of the illusion of youth, upon which he now looks back with mixed regret and envy, because nothing awaits him now but advancing years and the end of all illusions. There are now no more fathers and mothers. All the illusory projections that he made upon the world and upon things come gradually back to him, jaded and worn out. The energy returning upon him from these relationships falls into the unconscious and activates all that he had hitherto neglected to develop.

The liberation of the instinctual energy that has been bound up in neurosis gives to the young man buoyancy, hope, and the possibility of extending the scope of his life. To the man of riper years the unfolding of the function of the opposites out of its sleep in the unconscious means a renewal of life. This development, however, is no longer directed towards liberation from infantile ties, destruction of infantile illusions, and transference of the old images to new figures; it goes towards the problem of the opposites.

This principle of opposition may naturally be regarded as underlying juvenile mentality, and a psychological theory

of the youthful psyche must give full value to this fact. The views of Freud and Adler are therefore in contradiction only if they claim to be such a theory. In so far as they are content to be regarded as technical methods of treatment, they are not in contradiction and do not exclude each other. In the neurosis of a youthful introvert, the psychological theory of Adler seldom fails, and in the treatment of the young extravert it is always advisable, indispensable indeed, to take full account of the Freudian standpoint, especially of the sexual theory. A scientific theory which shall go further than a mere technical method of treatment must be based upon the principle of the opposites, for without this, it could only lead to the re-establishment of a neurotically unbalanced psyche. There is no equilibrium, and no system of self-regulation apart from opposition. And the psyche is a system depending upon self-regulation.

If at this point we take up once more the thread we let fall at an earlier stage, we can now see clearly why it is that the very value of which the individual stands in need lies within the neurosis itself. At this point, too, we can turn back to the case of the young woman and apply to it the insight we have gained. She is an extravert with an hysterical neurosis. Let us suppose, then, that this invalid is 'analysed.' By this we mean that through the treatment she has come to understand the nature of the unconscious ideas that lay hidden behind her symptoms, and has regained possession of the psychical energy which, by becoming unconscious, had constituted the strength of the symptoms. The practical question therefore arises: what is to be done with the so-called disposable energy? The patient, in accordance with her psychological type, would find it rational to deal with this energy by extraversion, in other words, to transfer it to an object—to philanthropic work, for example, or other useful activities. This may be a possible way in those exceptional cases of peculiarly energetic natures that do not

shrink on occasion from torturing themselves to the quick, or of men whose glory lies in just such activities, but in most cases it is not possible. For it must never be forgotten that the libido, as the psychical energy is technically called, is already, unconsciously, in possession of its object—that is, in this case, the young Italian, or some other equally real human substitute. Under these conditions such a fine sublimation of energy, however much to be desired, is impossible to effect. For in general the real object affords the energy a much better channel than do the most admirable moral activities. Unfortunately, we are too inclined to talk of man as it would be desirable for him to be, rather than as he really is. But a doctor has always to do with the real man, who remains obstinately himself until the nature of his reality is recognized in its completeness. True education can proceed only from naked reality, not from any ideal illusion about man, however attractive.

It is unfortunately true that it is not possible voluntarily to direct the so-called disposable energy. It follows its own course. Indeed it must have already found that course before it is completely released from bondage to the unsuitable form. We actually make the discovery that the phantasies of the patient, which were originally occupied with the young Italian, have been transferred to the doctor himself. The doctor has himself become the object of the unconscious libido. Should this not happen, or should the patient refuse altogether to recognize the transference, or should the doctor not understand the phenomenon, or interpret it falsely, vigorous resistances supervene, directed towards making the relation with the doctor completely impossible. Patients then simply go away and look for another doctor, or some one who understands them; or, if they also relinquish this search, they degenerate.

But if transference to the doctor takes place, and is accepted, a natural form is found which both supplants the

earlier form and at the same time provides for the energetic process an outlet relatively free from conflict. If the libido is allowed its natural course, it will find its own way into the transference. Where this is not the case, it is always a question either of arbitrary revolt against the laws of nature, or of an incompetent handling of the case by the doctor.

In the transference almost every kind of infantile phantasy is projected. Such projections must be cauterized—resolved, that is to say, by being subjected to reductive treatment. This was formerly called ‘the dissolving of the transference.’ By this means energy is set free from this inappropriate form also, and again we encounter the problem of disposable energy. This time, too, we shall put our confidence in nature, and trust that, even before it is sought, an object will be chosen which will provide the favourable channel.

CHAPTER V

THE PERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS AND THE SUPER-PERSONAL OR COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

At this point the fourth stage of our investigation begins. We pursued the analytical elucidation of the infantile transference phantasies until it became quite clear to the patient that he had made his physician stand for father, mother, uncle, guardian, and teacher, in a word for each and all of the parental authorities. But, as experience repeatedly demonstrates, other phantasies begin to appear, which represent the physician as saviour or as a god-like being. Obviously this is in complete contradiction to healthy conscious reasoning. It transpires, further, that these divine attributes go far beyond the bounds set by the Christian conceptions in which we have all grown up, and assume heathen characteristics, very often, indeed, animal forms.

The transference is in itself nothing but a projection of unconscious contents. At first the so-called superficial contents of the unconscious are projected, and under these circumstances the physician is interesting as a possible lover (somewhat similar to the young Italian in the case we were discussing). Then he appears as the father, either in the good sense, or as the 'thunderer,' according to the qualities with which the patient endowed his actual father. At times the physician has a maternal significance for the patient, a fact of extraordinary implication, but still within the framework of the possible. All these phantasy-projections are dependent upon personal reminiscences.

But now there come up forms of phantasy that have an extravagant and impossible character.¹ The physician then suddenly appears endowed with uncanny powers, somewhat like a magician, or a demoniacal criminal, or as the corresponding personification of goodness, a saviour. Again he may appear as an incomprehensible mixture of both aspects. Of course it is to be understood that the physician does not appear in this guise to the consciousness of the patient, only that phantasies which picture him thus come up to the surface. If, as not infrequently happens, the patient cannot perceive at once that this way of seeing the doctor is a projection from his (the patient's) unconscious, he behaves somewhat foolishly. At this point one often encounters great difficulties, demanding much good will and great patience on both sides. There are even, in exceptional cases, patients who cannot restrain themselves, and begin to spread all sorts of stupid tales concerning the doctor. Such patients simply will not accept the fact that their phantasies really come from themselves and have little or nothing to do with the character of the doctor. This persistent mistake arises from the fact that there are present no foundations of personal memory for this class of projection. One can sometimes show that similar phantasies had, at a certain time in childhood, involved the father or mother, neither mother nor father, however, having actually given justification for them.

Freud has shown in a brief essay how Leonardo da Vinci was influenced in his later life by the fact that he had two mothers. The fact of the two mothers, or of a double origin, was real in Leonardo's case, but it has also played a rôle in the lives of other artists, as in that of Benvenuto Cellini who in phantasy devised such an origin for himself. In general

¹ I must emphasize the fact that, as a rule, these phantasies do not, in uncomplicated cases, appear in young people, but usually in mature adults, for whom the physician can no longer normally play the rôle of father.

it is a mythological theme and many heroes are endowed by legend with two mothers. The phantasy does not come from the actual fact that the heroes have two mothers, but is a generally disseminated 'primordial image' belonging to the secrets of the common mental history of humanity, and not to the field of personal memory.

There are present in every individual besides his personal memories the great 'primordial images,' as Jacob Burckhardt once aptly called them, those potentialities of human representations of things as they have always been, inherited through the brain structure from one generation to the next. The fact of this inheritance explains also the really amazing phenomenon, that certain legends and themes repeat themselves the whole world over in identical forms. It explains, further, why it is that our mentally diseased patients can reproduce exactly the same images and associations as those we are familiar with in old texts. I have given some examples of this in my book *The Psychology of the Unconscious (Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido)*. I do not by any means assert the inheritance of ideas, but only of the possibilities or germs of ideas, something markedly different.

In this further stage of the transference, then, when these phantasies that no longer depend on personal memories are reproduced, we have to do with the manifestations of the deeper layers of the unconscious, where sleep the primordial images common to humanity.¹

This discovery leads now to the fourth stage of the new conceptual scheme, that is, to the recognition of two levels in the unconscious. We have to differentiate between a personal unconscious² and an impersonal or super-personal

¹ To these images I also apply the term archetypes (*Urbilder*).

² The personal unconscious, of which I also speak as the 'sub-conscious,' in contrast to the absolute or collective unconscious, contains forgotten memories, suppressed (purposely forgotten) painful ideas, apperceptions sometimes described as below the

unconscious. We speak of the latter also as the collective unconscious, because it is apart from the personal and quite universal. For its contents can be found in all minds, and this is obviously not the case with personal contents.

The primordial images are the deepest, the most ancient, and the most universal thoughts of humanity. They are as much feelings as thoughts, and have indeed an individual, independent existence, somewhat like that of the 'partial souls' which we can easily discern in all those philosophical or gnostic systems which base themselves upon the apprehension of the unconscious as the source of knowledge, as, for example, Steiner's anthroposophical *Geisteswissenschaft*. The conception of angels, archangels, "principalities and powers" in St. Paul, of the *archontes* and kingdoms of light in the gnostics, of the heavenly hierarchies in Dionysius the Areopagite, all come from the perception of the relative independence of the archetypes, or dominants of the collective unconscious.

We have now found the object chosen by the libido when freed from the personal-infantile form of transference. It sinks into the depths of the unconscious, and there activates what has lain sleeping from the beginning. It has discovered the buried treasure from which mankind has ever and always created, out of which have been drawn its gods and its demons, and all those most urgent and mighty thoughts without which man ceases to be man.

Let us take as an example one of the greatest thoughts which the nineteenth century brought to birth, the idea of the conservation of energy. Robert Mayer, the real creator of this idea, was a physician, and not a physicist or 'natural philosopher,' for whom the making of such a concept would have been more appropriate. But it is worth

threshold (subliminal), that is, sensory perceptions that were not strong enough to reach consciousness, and, finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness.

knowing that, strictly speaking, the concept was not made by Mayer. Neither did it come into existence through the coalescence of ideas or scientific hypotheses then extant, but it actually made him its creator. He writes about it in the following way to Griesinger (1844): "I have by no means hatched out the theory at my writing desk." He then reports certain physiological observations which he had made in 1840-41 as ship's doctor. "Now if one wants to be clear on matters of physiology," he continues in his letter, "some knowledge of physical processes is indispensable, unless one prefers to develop the matter from the metaphysical side, a way that disgusts me utterly. I therefore held fast to physics, and stuck to the subject with such interest that I paid but little attention to the remote quarter of the globe in which we were. Many may laugh at me for this, but the fact remains that I was happiest when I could stay on board and work without interruption. For there I had many an hour of inspiration the like of which I cannot remember either before or since. Some flashes of thought that came to me while in the roads of Surabaja were at once carefully followed up, and these in turn led to new subjects. Those times have passed, but the gradual testing of the idea that then came to birth in me has taught me that it is a truth, which was not only subjectively felt but which can be objectively proved. It remains to be seen whether this can be done by a man so little versed in physics as I am."

In his book on energetics, Heim sets forth the view that "Robert Mayer's new idea has not been slowly disentangled from the traditional concepts of force by deeper reflection on them, but belongs to those ideas that are grasped intuitively, ideas that, arising in another mental domain, immediately take possession of thought and force it to reshape the traditional beliefs in accordance with them."

The question is whence comes the new idea that presses itself upon consciousness with such elemental force? And

whence did it derive the power that could so seize upon consciousness that attention was completely withdrawn from the manifold impressions of a first voyage to the tropics? These questions are not easy to answer. If we apply our theory to this case, the explanation must be as follows: the idea of energy and of its conservation must be a primordial image that has been latent in the collective unconscious. This conclusion forces us further to demonstrate that there has actually been a primordial image of this kind in existence in the mental history of the human race, and that it has been in operation through the ages. This proof can, as a matter of fact, be produced without much difficulty, for the most primitive religions in the most widely separated regions of the earth are founded upon this image (*Bild*). These are the religions, sometimes called dynamistic or pre-animistic, whose unique and determining idea is to the effect that there exists a generally disseminated magical power¹ to which everything is subordinated. Tylor, the well-known English investigator, as well as Frazer, have misunderstood this idea as animism. Primitives do not in reality mean souls or spirits by their conception of power, but something which the American investigator Lovejoy² has appropriately called 'primitive energetics.' This concept corresponds to the idea of soul, spirit, God, health, bodily strength, fertility, magic, influence, power, prestige, and methods of healing, as well as to certain states of feeling which are characterized by the release of affects. Among certain Polynesians, '*mulungu*,' that is, this primitive concept of energy is spirit, soul, a dæmonic being, magic, and prestige; and when anything astonishing happens, the people cry out '*Mulungu!*' This concept of energy is also the first form of the concept of God among primitive races, and

¹ The so-called *mana*. Compare Söderblom: *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens*, Leipzig, 1916. (Also R. R. Marett: *The Threshold of Religion*. Methuen, 1914. Translator.)

² *The Monist*, vol. xvi., p. 363.

is an image which has developed in ever new variations during the course of history. In the Old Testament the magical force shines in the burning bush and in the countenance of Moses ; in the Acts of the Apostles it appears in the pouring forth of the Holy Ghost from heaven in the form of tongues of flame. In Heraclitus it appears as world energy, as ever-living fire ; in Persian religion it is the glow of fire, *haôma*, the divine grace ; among the Stoics it is *heimarmene*, the power of fate. Again, in mediæval legends it appears as the aura, or the halo that blazes up as a great flame from the roof of the hut in which a saint is lying in a state of ecstasy. In the faces of the saints men see the sun of this power, the fullness of light. According to an ancient point of view, the soul itself is this power ; in the idea of its immortality there lies its conservation. The Buddhistic and primitive view of metempsychosis (transmigration of souls) contains the notion of the soul's unlimited power of transformation together with a constant conservation.

This image, then, has been stamped upon the human brain for æons of time, and so lies ready in the unconscious of every man. It needs only certain conditions in order to reappear. These conditions were evidently fulfilled in the case of Robert Mayer. The greatest and best ideas are formed out of these primordial images which are the ancient common property of all humanity.¹

¹ I have often been asked whence come these archetypes or primordial images (the *eidola* of Plato). It seems to me that their origin can be explained in no other way than by regarding them as the deposits of the oft-repeated experiences of humanity. A common, yet, at the same time, most impressive experience is the daily apparent movement of the sun. We certainly cannot discover anything about it in the unconscious, in so far as the physical processes known to us are concerned, but we do find the sun myth there in all its innumerable modifications. It is this myth that forms the sun archetype, and not the physical process. The same can be said of the phases of the moon. The archetype is a disposition to produce over and over again the same, or similar mythical conceptions. According to this it seems as though what was impressed upon the unconscious was exclusively the subjective phantasy-ideas aroused by the physical process. Therefore

Having fully discussed this example to show the origin of new ideas out of the treasury of the primordial images, we will now take up the further presentation of the process of transference. We saw that the libido of the patient had, for its new object, seized upon those apparently absurd and singular phantasies, namely, the contents of the collective unconscious. As I have already said, the unrecognized projection of primordial images upon the physician involves a danger to the further treatment which is not to be underrated. The images contain not only every beautiful and great thought and feeling of mankind, but also every wicked deed of shame or devilry of which men have been capable. If, then, the patient cannot distinguish the personality of the physician from these projections, every possibility of an understanding is lost, and a human relation becomes impossible. But if the patient avoids this Charybdis, he falls into the Scylla of introjecting the images, that is, he ascribes them not to the doctor but to himself. This danger is just as disastrous. If he projects, he vacillates between an exaggerated and pathological deification of the doctor, and a contempt of him that bristles with hate. If he introjects the images, he achieves a laughable self-deification, or a moral self-laceration.

The mistake that he makes comes from taking to himself personally the contents of the collective unconscious. Thus he makes himself either god or devil. Herein lies the psychological reason why men must always have demons and cannot live without gods. No doubt we must make the exception of some peculiarly clever specimens of the *homo occidentalis*

we may assume that archetypes are the oft-repeated impressions of subjective reactions. Obviously this hypothesis merely pushes the problem further back without solving it. Nothing prevents us, however, from assuming that certain archetypes are already present in animals; that they are involved in the peculiarities of the living organism itself, and are, therefore, immediate expressions of life whose nature cannot be further explained.

of yesterday and the day before—supermen whose god is dead; wherefore they themselves become gods, that is, rationalistic fake-gods with thick skulls and cold hearts. The concept of god is simply a necessary psychological function of an irrational character which has nothing to do with the question of the existence of god. The human intellect can never answer this question, and still less can it give any proof of god. Furthermore, such proof is altogether superfluous, for the idea of an all-powerful divine being is present everywhere, if not consciously recognized, then unconsciously accepted, because it is an archetype. Something or other in our souls is of superior power, and if it is not consciously a god, it is at least the 'belly,' as St. Paul says. Therefore I consider it wiser to recognize the idea of god consciously; otherwise, something else becomes god, as a rule something quite inappropriate and stupid, such as only an 'enlightened' consciousness can devise. Our intellect has long known that one cannot think god, much less conceive in what fashion he really exists, if indeed at all. Just as little can one conceive a process that is not causally conditioned. Theoretically there can be no accidents, yet in practical life one is continually stumbling on accidents. It is the same with the idea of the existence of god; it is once and for all an impossible problem, but the *consensus gentium* has spoken of gods for æons of time, and will still be speaking of them æons hence. No matter how beautiful and perfect man may believe his reason to be, he can always be certain that it is only one of the possible mental functions, and covers only that one aspect of the phenomena of life which corresponds to it. There lies on every hand the irrational, that which does not fit in with reason. And this irrational is equally a psychological function, the collective unconscious in a word; while the function of consciousness is essentially rational. Consciousness must have reason, first, in order to discover some system in the chaos of

irregular, individual events occurring in the universe ; and, secondly, at least in the domain of human affairs, in order to act. We have the praiseworthy and useful ambition to root out the chaos of the irrational within and without us as completely as possible, and have apparently advanced some distance in the achievement of this aim. A mental patient once said to me : " Doctor, I disinfected the whole heavens last night with sublimate, but have not discovered any god." Something of the same kind has happened to us.

Old Heraclitus, who was indeed a very wise man, discovered the most extraordinary of all psychological laws, namely, the regulating function of the opposites. He called it *enantiodromia* (a running contrary ways), by which he meant that everything tends sooner or later to go over into its opposite. (Here I would refer the reader to the case of the American business man which illustrates an enantiodromia in the clearest possible way.) Thus the rational attitude of culture necessarily goes over into its opposite, the irrational devastation of culture.¹

One must not identify oneself with reason, because man is not and cannot be wholly rational, nor will he ever become so. This is a fact which should be noted by all pedants of culture. The irrational cannot and must not be wiped out. The gods cannot and must not die. I said just now that there seems to be something, a kind of superior force, in the soul of man and that if this is not the idea of god, then it is the belly. I was seeking to express what seems to me the fact, that one or other basic instinct, or complex of ideas, consistently attracts the greatest amount of psychical energy, whereby it forces the ego into its service. Generally the ego is sucked into this focus of energy to such a degree, that it

¹ This sentence was written during the world war. Although the war is over, I have let it remain in its original form because it contains a truth which is verifiable again and again in the course of history.

becomes identified with it and thinks that it wishes and needs nothing further. But in this way there develops a craze, a monomania or possession, a most exaggerated one-sidedness which endangers the psychical equilibrium most seriously. Without doubt the capacity for such one-sidedness is the secret of success; wherefore our culture has striven assiduously to foster it. The passion, or the heaping up of energy which is involved in such monomanias is what the ancients called a god, and our common speech of to-day still does the same. Do we not say "he makes a god of this or that"? A man believes that he wills and chooses, and does not notice that he is already possessed, that his greatest interest has become a master who has arrogated to himself the power. These interests are gods of a kind, and, when recognized by many, gradually lead to the formation of a church and draw about them a herd of the faithful. We call this an organization. Thus grew up the state, the army, the financial system and similar bugbears, and consequently the anarchic reactions which seem to try to drive out the devil with Beelzebub. The enantiödromia, which always threatens if a movement attains undisputed power, offers no solution of the problem; for the disorganizing movement is quite as blind as that of organization.

The only person who escapes the gruesome law of enantiödromia is the man who knows how to separate himself from the unconscious, not by repressing it, for then it merely lays hold of him from behind, but by making clear to himself that it is something different from himself. In doing this, the solution of the Scylla and Charybdis problem, which I pictured above, is achieved. The patient must learn to distinguish in his thoughts between what is the ego and what is the non-ego, or collective unconscious. In this way he obtains the material with which, from this moment on and for a long time afterwards, it will be his task to come to terms. His energy, that before was flowing into inappropriate,

pathological channels, has now found its real sphere. Part of the differentiation of the psychological ego from the non-ego consists in the ability of a man to stand with feet firmly planted in his ego-function; that is, he must fulfil his duty towards life completely, so that in every respect he is a vital member of human society. All that he neglects in this respect falls into the unconscious, and reinforces the latter, with the result that he is often in danger of being swallowed up by it, if his ego-function is not firmly established. Heavy punishments threaten one here. As Synesius suggested, it is just the 'inspired' soul (*pneumatike psyché*) that becomes god and demon, and suffers divine punishment, being torn asunder, like Zagreus. Nietzsche experienced this at the beginning of his mental sickness, when, in *Ecce Homo*, the god against whom he had armed himself in front by a desperate scepticism fell upon him from behind. The enantiodromia is the being torn asunder between the pairs of opposites, which, being attributes of deity, also belong to the divine man, who owes his god-likeness to the overcoming of his gods.

As soon as we begin to speak of the collective unconscious we find ourselves in a sphere, and concerned with a problem, which is quite precluded in the practical analysis of young people, or of those who have remained infantile too long. Whenever the father and mother imagos still need to be transferred over to the analyst, whenever there remains a single phase of outer life, naturally experienced by the average man, which must be conquered by the patient, then it were better not to mention the collective unconscious or the problem of the pairs of opposites. But when the parental transferences and the youthful illusions have been mastered, or are, at least, ripe for mastery, then we are forced to speak of the problem of the opposites and of the collective unconscious. Here we find ourselves outside the domain covered by the views of Freud and Adler, for we are no longer

concerned with the question of how to deal with the obstacles that hinder a man in the practice of a calling, in marrying, or in anything that means the further expansion of life. Instead, we are confronted with the task of finding a meaning which will make possible the very continuance of life, in so far as it is to be more than mere resignation and mournful retrospection.

Our life is like the course of the sun. In the morning the sun gains continually in strength until it blazes forth in the zenith-heat of high noon ; then comes the enantiodromia : its continued movement forward does not mean an increase but a decrease in strength. Thus our task in handling young people is different from that presented by people who are getting on in years.

In the case of the former, it is enough if we remove all the hindrances that make expansion and the upward way difficult ; but for the latter, the older people, we must summon up all that gives support to the downward journey. An inexperienced youth thinks, indeed, that one can let the old people go, because in any case there is nothing much that can be done with them : life is behind them, and they cannot be considered as much more than petrified pillars of the past. But it is a great error to assume that the meaning of life is exhausted in the period of sexual youth and growth ; that, for example, a woman who has passed the menopause is ' finished.' The afternoon of life is just as full of meaning as the morning, only its meaning and purpose is a wholly different one. Man has two aims : the first is the aim of nature, the begetting of children and all the business of protecting the brood ; to this period belongs the gaining of money and social position. When this aim is satisfied, there begins another phase, namely, that of culture. For the attainment of the former goal we have the help of nature, and moreover of education ; but little or nothing helps us towards the latter goal. Indeed, often a false ambition survives, in

that an old man wants to be a youth again, or at least feels he must behave like one, although within himself he can no longer make believe. It is this that makes the transition from the natural to the cultural phase terribly difficult and bitter for many people. They cling to the illusions of youth, or at least to their children, in order to preserve in this way a fragment of illusion. One sees this in mothers, who find in their children their only justification, and who imagine they have to sink away into empty nothingness when they give them up. It is no wonder, then, that many bad neuroses develop at the beginning of the afternoon of life. It is a kind of second puberty period, a like repetition of storm and stress, not infrequently accompanied by all the tempests of passion, the 'dangerous age.' But the problems which appear in this age are no longer to be solved by the old rules; the hand of the clock cannot be turned back; what youth found and must find outside, the man of middle life must find within himself. Here we face new problems which often cause the physician no little cudgelling of the brains.

The transition from morning to afternoon is a revaluation of earlier values. There comes the necessity of examining into the value of the opposites of our previous ideals, of becoming aware of the error in our former convictions, of recognizing the falsehood in what had before been truth, and of feeling how much hate lay in that which we had till now accepted as love. Of those who are drawn into the conflict of the problem of the opposites, not a few throw overboard everything that had previously seemed to them valuable and worth striving for, and try to live a life as opposite as possible to that of the former ego. Changes of profession, divorces, religious conversions and apostasies of every sort are the symptoms of this swinging over into one's opposite. The disadvantage of a radical conversion into the opposite is that the previous life now suffers repression.

Thus just as unbalanced a condition is brought about as existed before, when the opposites of the conscious virtues and values were still repressed and unconscious. As in earlier years neurotic disturbances came about because of the unconsciousness of opposing phantasies, so there again develop disturbances of even a worse sort perhaps, due to the repression of former idols. Obviously it is a fundamental mistake to think that when we recognize the non-value in a value, or the falsehood in a truth, the value or the truth then ceases to exist. It has only become relative. Everything human is relative, because everything depends on a condition of inner antithesis ; for everything subsists as a phenomenon of energy. Energy depends necessarily upon a pre-existing antithesis, without which there could be no energy. There must always be present height and depth, heat and cold, etc., in order that the process of equalization—which is energy—can take place. All life is energy and therefore depends on forces held in opposition. This makes the tendency to deny all previous values in favour of their opposites just as pathological as the original one-sidedness ; moreover, in so far as a generally recognized and indubitable value comes into question and is cast aside, a manifestly fatal loss occurs. One who so acts throws himself overboard with his values, as Nietzsche also came to see.

The solution of the problem lies not in a conversion into the opposite, but in the retaining of the former values together with a recognition of their opposites. This naturally means conflict and division within oneself, and it is intelligible that one should shrink from it, philosophically as well as morally. Therefore, more often than a conversion into the opposite, a rigid stiffening in the view-point previously held is sought as a solution. One must admit that in this attitude so often displayed by elderly men, and which appears so unsympathetic, there is yet a merit worthy of recognition. At least these men do not become renegades ; at least they remain

erect and fall neither into indefiniteness, nor into the mire. They are not defaulters, merely slowly dying trees, or to put it more generously, 'witnesses of the past.' But the accompanying symptoms, the rigidity, the petrification, the narrow-mindedness, the lagging behind of these *laudatores temporis acti* are undesirable manifestations. Indeed they are definitely harmful, for the way in which such people support a truth, or any worthy aim, is so inflexible and violent that one is more repelled by their unmannerliness than drawn by the merit of the case, so that the result is the opposite of the good intended. The fundamental cause of their stiff and numbed condition is anxiety concerning the problem of the opposites. They feel a presentiment and secret fear of the 'sinister brother of Medardus.' Therefore there can be one truth only, and that must be absolute, or it can afford no protection against the threatened overthrow, which is sensed everywhere save in oneself. But actually we have the most dangerous revolutionary within ourselves, and this must be realized by anyone who would pass over safely into the second half of life. As soon as we take cognizance of this rebel within ourselves, we exchange the apparent safety that we have so far enjoyed for a condition of uncertainty, of internal division and of contradictory convictions. The worst feature of this condition is that it seems to offer no outlet. '*Tertium non datur*,' says Logic, 'There is no middle way.'

The practical necessities arising in the treatment of the sick have therefore forced us to look for ways out of this intolerable situation. If a man is constantly confronted by an apparently insurmountable psychological obstacle, he draws back—*reculer pour mieux sauter*—making what is known technically as a regression. He turns back to times when he found himself in similar situations, and seeks to apply again the methods that helped him then. But what was helpful in youth does not avail in old age. What good did it do that American business man to return to his former

work? It was a failure. So the regression continues back to childhood: hence the childishness of many elderly neurotics! Finally it reaches the time before childhood. This may sound strange, but actually we are speaking of something that is not only logical, but altogether possible. We have already said that the unconscious contains, as it were, two layers; first the personal, and secondly the collective. The personal layer does not go further than the earliest memories of infancy; the collective unconscious, on the other hand, all time before the actual dawn of infancy, that is, the residue of the life of the ancestors. While the memory-images of the personal unconscious have some detailed form, since they consist of images that have been experienced, such detail is lacking in the memory-traces of the collective unconscious, since they have not been experienced individually. If the regression of the psychical energy, retreating before an insurmountable object, goes back even further than the time of early infancy, it reaches the traces or deposits of ancestral life, and mythological images awaken. An inner mental world, whose existence we never before suspected, unfolds and displays contents which are perhaps in sharpest possible contrast to our previous conceptions. These images are of such intensity as to make it quite intelligible to us that millions of cultured people should have plunged into theosophy and anthroposophy. The reason is that these modern gnostic systems meet the desire for the expression and formulation of these inner wordless experiences more satisfactorily than any of the existing forms of the Christian religion, not excepting Catholicism. Our consciousness is now so thoroughly permeated with Christianity, so completely fashioned by it, that the unconscious counter-position cannot find acceptance therein. Thus an antithesis to Christianity is sought for, and it is found in the eastern religions of Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Taoism. The extraordinary syncretism of

theosophy, its astonishing amalgamations and combinations, go a long way towards meeting this need, and the numerical success of theosophy is thus explained. But, in this easy way an individual experience is supplanted by images and words borrowed from a foreign psychology. Conceptions, ideas and forms that are not the growth of our soil cannot be understood by our hearts, only by our heads. Indeed, even our thought cannot clearly grasp them, since they were never discovered by us. It is a case of stolen goods which do not bring prosperity. Just so far, then, as these ideas are foreign to us the satisfaction felt in them is a stupefying self-deception. Such a surrogate makes the people who make use of it shadow-like and unreal : they put empty words in the place of living realities, whereby, rather than endure the tension of the opposites, they coil themselves up in a pale, two-dimensional, phantom world, where every living and creative thing withers and dies.

The wordless experiences, which are evoked by the regression into the pre-infantile period, demand no surrogate, but rather an individual shape and expression within each man's life and work. These images have grown out of the life, the sorrows and joys of our ancestors, and they strive to return to life not as experiences only, but as deeds. On account of their opposition to the conscious they cannot be translated directly into our present world ; hence a way must be found that can mediate between the conscious and the unconscious.

CHAPTER VI

THE SYNTHETIC OR CONSTRUCTIVE METHOD

WE now come to the fifth stage in our understanding of the problem. Coming to terms with the unconscious involves a process with its own distinctive labour and technique. This process has been termed the transcendent function,¹ because it represents a function founded on real and imaginary, or rational and irrational data ; thus bridging over the yawning chasm between the rational and irrational functions of the psyche. The transcendent function has its methodological basis in a new way of treating the psychological material provided by dreams and phantasies. The theories discussed at the beginning of this essay are based on an exclusively causal-reductive procedure which resolves the dream or phantasy into memory-components and fundamental, instinctive processes. I have made clear above what is the justification as well as the limitation of this method. The method fails at the point where the dream symbols can no longer be reduced to personal reminiscences or strivings, that is, when the images of the collective unconscious begin to be produced. It would be quite senseless to seek to reduce these collective images to personal ones ; indeed not only senseless but directly injurious, as painful experience has taught me. The images or symbols of the collective unconscious only yield their distinctive value when subjected to

¹ I discovered only subsequently that the concept of the transcendent (or transcendental) function occurs also in higher mathematics, and that it is actually the name of the function dealing with real and imaginary numbers.

a synthetic, not analytic, mode of handling. Just as analysis (the causal-reductive procedure) separates the symbol into its components, so the synthetic method integrates the symbol into a general and intelligible expression. The synthetic method is not altogether simple ; therefore I will give an example by means of which I can explain the whole process.

The following dream is that of a patient who had just reached the critical border-line between the analysis of the personal unconscious and the stage when contents of the collective unconscious begin to appear. She is about to cross a broad stream. There is no bridge, but she finds a ford where she can cross. Just as she is on the point of doing so, a big crab, that lay hidden in the water, seizes her by the foot and will not let go. She wakes in terror.

Associations :

1. Stream.—“ This forms a boundary that is difficult to pass over. I must overcome an obstacle ; this has to do with the fact that I am progressing very slowly ; I ought really to reach the other side.”

2. Ford.—“ An opportunity to cross in safety, a possible way ; otherwise the stream would be too broad. In the analytical treatment lies the possibility of surmounting the obstacle.”

3. Crab.—“ The crab lay quite hidden in the water ; I did not see it at first. Cancer (German *Krebs* = crab) is a terrible disease—incurable. (There followed a series of recollections of Mrs. X., who died of cancer.) I am afraid of this disease. The crab is an animal that walks backwards : obviously it wants to pull me into the stream. It clutched hold of me in a horrible way and I was terribly frightened. What is it that keeps me from getting across ? Oh yes, I had another great scene with my friend.”

There is something peculiar about the relation with this friend. It is a sentimental attachment, of a homosexual character, that has lasted some years. The friend is very like the patient in many ways, and is also nervous. They have strong artistic interests in common. The patient is the more definite personality of the two. Because their mutual relationship is too intimate and excludes too many of the other possibilities of life, both are nervous; and, in spite of an "ideal" friendship, they have great quarrels, due to their mutual irritability. The unconscious takes this means of putting a distance between them, but they pay no attention to it. The quarrel usually begins because one of them finds that she is not yet sufficiently understood, and suggests that they must speak more plainly to one another; whereupon both make enthusiastic efforts to unbosom themselves. Naturally a misunderstanding comes about almost at once, and a worse scene than ever ensues. *Faute de mieux*, this quarrelling had been for a long time a pleasure to both, which they were unwilling to relinquish. My patient, in particular, could not for long renounce the sweet pain of being misunderstood by her best friend, although, as she confessed, every scene "tired her to death." She had long since realized that this friendship had outlived its function, and that it was only from mistaken ambition that she clung to the belief that something ideal could still be made of it. The patient had formerly had an exaggerated, fantastic relation to her mother, and after her mother's death had transferred her feelings to her friend.

*Analytical (Causal-Reductive) Interpretation.*¹—This interpretation may be summed up in a sentence: 'I see clearly that I ought to cross the stream (that is, give up the relation with my friend), but I would much prefer that my friend

¹ A parallel conception of the two kinds of interpretation occurs in Silberer's admirable book, *Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism*, Kegan Paul, 1921.

should not release me from her claws (embrace).’ This, taken as an infantile wish, means: “Mother would like to draw me to her with the exuberant embrace I know so well.” The incompatibility of the wish lies in the strong undercurrent of homosexuality, which had been abundantly proved by obvious facts. The crab seizes her by the foot. The patient has large “masculine” feet; she plays the masculine rôle with her friend, and has corresponding sexual phantasies. The foot is known to have phallic significance. (Detailed evidence of this is to be found in Aigremont.¹) The complete interpretation then runs as follows: The reason why she will not let her friend go is because her unconscious homosexual wishes are fixed upon her. As these wishes are morally and æsthetically incompatible with the tendency of the conscious personality, they are repressed and therefore unconscious. Her terror is an expression of this repressed wish.

This interpretation is exceedingly depreciative of the patient’s exalted conscious ideal of friendship. To be sure, at this point in the analysis the patient would not have taken exception to such an interpretation. Some time ago certain facts had amply convinced her of her homosexual tendency, so that she could freely admit this inclination, although it was naturally painful to her to do so. If, then, I had given her this interpretation, I should not at this stage in the analysis have encountered any resistance. She had already overcome the painfulness of this unwelcome tendency by understanding it. But she would have said to me: “Why do we analyse this dream at all? It only reiterates what I have now known for a long time.” This whole interpretation tells the patient nothing in the least new, it is therefore uninteresting and ineffective. Such an interpretation would at the beginning of the treatment have been impossible in this case, because the unusual prudery of the

¹ *Fuss und Schuhsymbolik*, Leipzig, 1909.

patient would not have tolerated anything of the sort. The 'venom' of understanding had to be instilled carefully, and in small doses, until the patient gradually became more reasonable. When, however, the analytical or causal-reductive interpretation brings to light nothing new, but only the same material in different forms, then the moment has come when another mode of interpretation is called for. The causal-reductive procedure has certain drawbacks. First, it does not take accurately into account the patient's associations, *e.g.* in this case the association of the illness (cancer) with "crab" (*Krebs* = cancer). Second, the peculiar choice of symbol remains unexplained. For instance, why should the mother-friend appear as a crab? A more attractive and plastic representation would have been a nymph. ("*Halb zog sie ihn, halb sank er hin,*" etc.) An octopus, a dragon, a snake, or a fish would have served as well. Third, the causal-reductive procedure ignores the fact that the dream is a wholly subjective phenomenon, and that consequently in an exhaustive interpretation, the crab could never be referred to the friend or the mother alone, but must also refer to the subject, the dreamer herself. The dreamer is the whole dream; she is the stream, the ford, and the crab. That is to say, these details are expressions of psychological conditions and tendencies in the unconscious of the subject.

I have therefore introduced the following terminology: I call every interpretation in which the dream symbols are treated as representations of real objects an interpretation on the objective plane. In contrast to this is the interpretation which refers back to the dreamer himself every part of the dream, as, for instance, all the personalities who take part in it. This is interpretation on the subjective plane. Objective interpretation is analytic, because it dissects the dream contents into complexes of reminiscence which refer to actual conditions. Subjective interpretation is synthetic

in that it detaches the underlying complexes of reminiscence from their actual causes, and presents them as tendencies or parts of the subject, reintegrating them with the subject. (In any experience I do not merely experience the object, but in the first place myself, provided that I render account to myself of the experience.)

Since the subject is also real, the synthetic or constructive method of interpretation ¹ is based, therefore, on the concept of a subjective plane.

The Synthetic (Constructive) Interpretation.—The patient is unconscious of the fact that it is in herself that the obstacle lies that should be overcome, the boundary-line that is difficult to cross, and that hinders further progress. Still it is possible to pass this barrier. To be sure, a special and unexpected danger threatens at this moment, namely, something 'animal-like'—non-human or super-human—that moves backwards into the depths, and that would drag down the whole personality of the dreamer. The danger is, moreover, like a deadly disease, that begins secretly somewhere, and is incurable, *i.e.* overpowering. The patient imagines that her friend stands in her way and tries to drag her down. So long as this is her belief she must, of course, influence her friend, 'lift her up,' teach, improve, and educate her. She is forced into futile and impractical, idealistic efforts in order to avoid being dragged under by her friend. The friend, of course, makes similar efforts, being in a like case with the patient. So the two keep jumping at one another like fighting cocks, each trying to fly over the other's head. The higher the pitch to which the one screws herself, the more must the other likewise torment herself. Why? Because each thinks the fault lies in the other, in the object. Interpretation of the dream on

¹ Jung: *The Content of the Psychoses*. I have also called this procedure the 'hermeneutic' method. See *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 2nd edition, 1917, p. 468.

the subjective plane brings release from this folly, for it shows the patient that she has something in herself which hinders her from crossing the boundary; that is, from getting out of the one situation or attitude into another. The interpretation of a change of place as a change of attitude is supported by the mode of expression in certain primitive languages, where, for example, the sentence 'I am thinking of going' becomes 'I am at the place of going.' In order to make the language of dreams understood, we use many parallels from the psychology of primitive races as well as from historical symbolism. This is because dreams originate in the unconscious, which contains the residual potentialities of function of all preceding epochs of evolution.

Obviously, in our interpretation everything now depends upon understanding what is meant by the crab. We know that it symbolizes something that comes to light in her relation to the friend (she connects the crab with her friend)—something that appeared also in her relation to her mother. Whether both mother and friend actually have this quality is irrelevant as regards the patient. 'The situation will only be changed when the patient herself has changed. Nothing can be changed in the mother since she is dead. The friend cannot be nagged into changing. If she wants to change, that is her own affair. The fact that the quality in question is associated with the mother points to an infantilism. What is there in common in the patient's relation to her mother and to her friend? The common factor is an extravagant, sentimental demand for love, so passionate that the patient feels herself overwhelmed. This demand is an overpowering infantile craving, characteristically blind. One is dealing then with a part of the libido that has not been disciplined, differentiated, or humanized, but which still possesses the compulsive character of an instinct in its untamed state. For such libido an animal is an entirely appropriate symbol. But why in this instance should the

animal be a crab? The patient associates cancer with it, of which disease Mrs. X. died at the age the patient has just reached. There may be, then, an identification with Mrs. X. We must therefore make inquiries concerning this Mrs. X. The patient relates the following facts in regard to her: Mrs. X. was widowed early; she was very lively and fond of gaiety. She had a series of adventures with men, in particular one with a very gifted artist, whom the patient knew personally and who always impressed her as remarkably fascinating and strange.

An identification can only occur on the basis of an unconscious, unrealized resemblance. Now what is the resemblance between our patient and Mrs. X.? I was able here to remind the patient of a series of earlier phantasies and dreams which had shown plainly that she also had a frivolous vein in her. This tendency, of whose presence she had only a dim intuition, she had always anxiously repressed, from a fear that she might be led by it into an immoral life. We have now gained a further and important contribution towards the understanding of the 'animal' element; we have again come upon the same untamed, instinctive desirousness, but in this case directed towards men. At the same time we have discovered another reason why she cannot get free of her friend. She must cling to her in order not to fall a victim to this other tendency, which seems to her much more dangerous. In this way she remains at an infantile, homosexual stage, which serves her as a defence. (Experience shows this need for a defence to be one of the most potent motives in the maintaining of unadapted, infantile relations.) But in this sum of libido lies her well-being, the germ of her future healthy personality, which does not shrink from the hazards of human life.

The patient had drawn other conclusions from the fate of Mrs. X. She had taken her sudden severe illness and early death as a punishment of fate for the gay life which

the patient, though not admitting the feeling, had always envied her. When Mrs. X. died, the patient pulled a long face, which concealed a 'human, all too human,' malicious satisfaction. As a punishment for this tendency, the patient, taking Mrs. X.'s example as a warning, deterred herself from living and from further development, and burdened herself with the misery of the unsatisfying friendship. Of course this whole sequence of events had not been consciously clear to her, otherwise it would never have come to pass. But the correctness of this interpretation was easily verifiable from the material.

The history of this identification by no means ends here. The patient subsequently emphasized the fact that Mrs. X. possessed a not inconsiderable artistic capacity which developed only after her husband's death, and which led to her friendship with the artist. This fact seems to be one of the essential reasons for the identification, if we remember that the patient had remarked what a strong and peculiarly fascinating impression the artist had made upon her. A fascination of this kind is never exercised exclusively by one person on another. It is a phenomenon of reciprocal relation between two people, in so far as the fascinated person must offer a corresponding disposition. But this disposition must be unconscious, otherwise no fascination is experienced. Fascination is a phenomenon of compulsion which lacks conscious ground; that is, it is not a process of the will, but something that emerges from the unconscious and forcibly obtrudes itself upon consciousness. All compulsions arise from unconscious motives.

It must therefore be assumed that the patient has an unconscious disposition similar to that of the artist. Thus the patient becomes identified with a man. We recall at once the analysis of the dream where we met an allusion to the 'masculine' foot. Actually the patient does play a thoroughly masculine rôle with respect to her friend; she

is the active one of the two who sets the tone of the relation, who commands her friend and occasionally even forces her to some course in which she does not concur. The friend is distinctly feminine, both in external appearance and otherwise, while the patient is of a somewhat masculine type. Her voice too is stronger and deeper than that of her friend. Mrs. X. is pictured as a very feminine woman, her gentleness and amiability being comparable, the patient thinks, to the character of her friend. This gives us a new clue: the patient obviously plays to her friend the part of the artist to Mrs. X. Thus she unconsciously completes her identification with Mrs. X. and her lover. In this way she gives expression to the frivolous vein in herself which she had so anxiously repressed, but she is not living it consciously, rather is she the plaything of her unconscious tendency.

We now know a good deal about the crab: it represents the inner psychology of this untamed part of the libido. The unconscious identifications keep drawing her on. They have this power because, being unconscious, they cannot be subjected to insight and correction. The crab is the symbol of the unconscious contents. These contents are always drawing the patient back again into the relation with her friend. The crab walks backwards. But the relation to her friend is synonymous with illness; it was through it that she became neurotic—hence the association with illness.

This discussion belongs, strictly speaking, to the analysis on the objective plane, but we must not forget that we came to it only by making use of the subjective mode of interpretation, which thereby shows itself an important heuristic principle. For practical purposes we might rest content with the results thus far reached, but we must also satisfy the demands of theory. Not all the associations have yet been used, nor has the significance of the choice of the symbol been brought out sufficiently.

Let us recur to the patient's remark that the crab lay hidden under the water, and that she had not seen it at first. She had not at first perceived the unconscious relations discussed above ; they lay hidden in the water. But the stream is the obstacle that prevents her from crossing. It is precisely the unconscious ties binding her to her friend that have been hindering her ; the unconscious was the obstacle. In this case, then, the water signifies the unconscious, or better, the state of being unconscious, being hidden ; for the crab also is the unconscious, or rather, the sum of libido hidden in the unconscious.

CHAPTER VII

THE DOMINANTS OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

THERE now lies before us the task of raising to the subjective plane the unconscious relations that have hitherto been taken objectively. To this end we must once more separate them from their objects and take them as referring to images of a subjective nature, to complexes in the unconscious of the patient herself. If we interpret Mrs. X. subjectively we find in her the image of what the patient fears yet unconsciously desires. Mrs. X. thus represents what the patient would like to become, and yet resists becoming. In a certain sense Mrs. X. is a picture of the patient's future character. The uncanny artist cannot very well be brought on to the subjective plane, because the element of unconscious artistic capacity lying dormant in the patient has already been taken up in the figure of Mrs. X. It would be right to say that the artist is the image of the masculine element in the patient which, not being consciously realized, remains in the unconscious. This is true in a certain sense, for the patient does indeed deceive herself in this respect. She seems to herself particularly delicate, sensitive, and feminine, with nothing in the least masculine about her. She was therefore indignantly amazed when I called her attention to her masculine traits. But the element of uncanniness, of fascination, cannot be explained through her masculine characteristics. It is apparently entirely lacking in her ; yet it must be in her somewhere, because she herself produced this very feeling.

Whenever such an element as this cannot be discovered, experience teaches us that it has always been projected. But into whom? Is it still projected into the artist? He has long since disappeared out of the circle of the patient's acquaintance, and cannot very well have taken the projection with him, since it lies anchored in the unconscious of the patient. No, such a projection is always actual, that is, there must be some one upon whom this portion of libido is at present projected, else she would be able to perceive it in herself.

Here we again reach the objective plane, for otherwise we cannot work out this projection. The patient knows no man who means anything especial to her, save myself, who as her doctor mean a good deal to her. Probably then she has projected this part of her libido upon me, though I must say I had noticed nothing of the sort. These subtler elements never appear on the surface, but always come to light outside the clinical hour. Therefore I questioned her cautiously thus: "Tell me, how do I seem to you when you are not with me? Am I just the same?" Reply: "When I am with you, you are very pleasant, but when I am by myself, or have not seen you for some time, then you change for me often in a remarkable way. Sometimes you appear quite idealized, and then again different." Here she hesitated, and I helped her out by saying: "Yes, but in what way different?" Reply: "Often you seem quite dangerous, uncanny like an evil magician, or a demon. I don't know how I ever get such ideas—you are not a bit like that."

So this element is in me as part of the transference, and that is why it is missing in her inventory. We thus recognize a further important fact. I was contaminated (identified) with the artist; then she naturally plays the rôle of Mrs. X. with me in her unconscious phantasy. I could easily prove to her this fact by means of material previously brought to light—sexual phantasies. But I myself then am the obstacle

the crab, that is hindering her from getting across. If in this singular case we were to limit ourselves to the objective plane the position would be serious indeed. Of what use would it be to say: "But I am not in any sense this artist, nor am I in the least uncanny, nor an evil magician." That would leave the patient quite cold, because she knows all that as well as I; the projection would exist as before, and I should be still the obstacle to her further progress.

It is at this point that many a treatment has come to a standstill. There is no way for the doctor to help the patient out of such an entanglement with the unconscious other than by lifting himself to the subjective plane, where he is to be regarded as an image. An image of what? Here arises the greatest difficulty of all. "Yes," the doctor will say, "an image of something in the unconscious of the patient." Whereupon she will say, "What, I am a man, and an uncanny, fascinating one at that, a wicked magician or a demon? No, I cannot accept that; it is nonsense. I would sooner believe that you are all that." She is right: it is preposterous to want to transfer such things over to her, for she can as little submit to be made into a demon as the doctor. Her eyes flash; an evil expression appears on her face, the gleam of an unknown hate never seen before; something snake-like seems to creep up in her. I am suddenly faced by the possibility of a fatal misunderstanding. What is it? Is it disappointed love? Does she feel offended—depreciated? There lurks in her glance something of the beast of prey, something really demoniacal. Is she then really a demon? Or am I myself the beast of prey, the demon, and is there sitting before me a terrified victim, trying to defend herself against my evil spells with the brute strength of despair? All this must surely be nonsense—fantastic delusion. What have I touched upon? What new string is vibrating? Yet it is only a passing moment. The expression on the patient's face becomes quiet again, and, as though relieved,

she says : " It is extraordinary ; I've just had a feeling that you have touched the point which I could never get over in relation to my friend. It's a horrible feeling, something inhuman, evil, cruel. I cannot describe how queer this feeling is. It makes me hate and despise my friend when it comes, although I struggle against it with all my might."

This utterance threw an explanatory light on what had gone before ; I have taken the place of the friend. The friend has been overcome. The ice of the repression has been broken and the patient has unwittingly entered upon a new phase of her existence. Now I know that I shall inherit all that was painful and evil in the relation to her friend. What was good will fall to me also, but it will be in violent conflict with that mysterious unknown x that the patient has never been able to master. A new phase of the transference has begun, which, however, does not as yet show clearly the nature of the x that has been projected upon me.

It is certain that if the patient cannot get beyond this form of the transference, the most troublesome misunderstandings threaten, for she must treat me as she has treated her friend ; that is, the x will be continually in the air giving rise to misunderstandings. It will inevitably fall out that she sees the wicked demon in me, since she cannot accept it in herself. All insoluble conflicts come about in this fashion. And an insoluble conflict means bringing life to a standstill.

But there is still another possibility : the patient could use her old defence mechanism in the new difficulty, and could look over and beyond the obscure point. That is, she could begin to repress the material again, instead of keeping it conscious, which is the necessary and obvious demand of the whole method. By such repression nothing is gained ; on the contrary, the x now threatens from the unconscious, where it is even more unpleasant.

irrationally, devoting even their highest idealism and their best wits to giving form as completely as possible to the madness of the irrational. In a small way we can see this happening in our patient, who fled from a possibility of life that seemed irrational to her (Mrs. X.), only to live it in a pathological form, to her own loss, in relation to an unsuitable object.

There is no possible alternative but to recognize the irrational element as a necessary, because ever present, psychological function. Its contents are not to be taken as concrete realities—that would be a regression—but as psychological realities. They are realities because they are effective things, that is, things that work (*Wirklichkeiten*). The collective unconscious is the deposit of the world experience of all times, and therefore it is an image of the world that has been forming for æons, an image in which certain features, the so-called dominants, have been elaborated through the course of time. These dominants are the ruling powers, the gods, that is, representations of dominating laws and principles, of average regularities in the sequence of secular processes. In so far as the images laid down in the brain are relatively true productions of psychical events, their dominants, that is, their general characteristics emphasized by the accumulation of similar experiences, correspond to certain fundamental physical facts that are also universal. Hence it is possible to take over unconscious images as intuitive conceptions of physical events. We can see an example of this in the æther, the primordial breath, or soul-substance, the notion of which appears in man's conceptions the whole world over; a further example is energy, magic power, an equally widespread intuition.

On account of their connection with physical things the dominants usually appear as projected—appear, indeed, when the process is unconscious, as projected upon the persons of the immediate environment, usually in the form of

abnormal, under- or over-valuations which give rise to misunderstandings, quarrels, infatuations and every kind of folly. People say 'He makes a god of So-and-so,' or 'So-and-so is the *bête noire* of X.' Also there grow up in this way modern myth-formations, that is, fantastic rumours, suspicions, and prejudices.

The dominants of the collective unconscious are therefore extremely important things of significant effect, to which we must give our utmost attention ; they are not to be simply repressed, but must be most diligently pondered. Since they appear for the most part as projections, and since, on account of the kinship between unconscious images and the object, projections are only attached where some external inducement exists, the evaluation of them is especially difficult. If some one projects the dominant of 'devil' upon a fellow human being, it is because the man has something in him to which this dominant can be attached. But that is by no means to say that the man is therefore, so to speak, a devil ; on the contrary, he may be a particularly good fellow, but antipathetic to the person making the projection, so that a 'devilish effect' arises between them. Nor is he who projects necessarily a devil, although he must recognize that he too has in himself a devilish element which he has just stumbled upon, inasmuch as he projected it ; but that does not make him a devil ; indeed, he may be just as decent a man as the other. The appearance of the devil dominant in such a case means that the two people are incompatible, now and for the near future ; wherefore the unconscious forces them apart and holds them away from one another.

One of the dominants that is almost always met with in the analysis of projections from the collective unconscious, is the 'magical demon' with overwhelming and uncanny power. Meyrink's *Golem* is a good example of this ; also the Tibetan wizard in Meyrink's *Fledermäuse*, who kindles

the world-war by magic. Obviously Meyrink formed this image freely and independently out of his unconscious, by giving word and picture to a feeling similar to that which my patient projected upon me. The magician dominant appears also in Zarathustra, while in Faust it is, so to speak, the hero himself.

The image of this demon is the lowest and most ancient form of the concept of god. It is the dominant of the primitive tribal magician or medicine man, a peculiarly gifted individual invested with magical power.¹ This figure appears very often in the unconscious products of my patients as dark-skinned, and of Mongolian type. These things were familiar to me long before Meyrink wrote.

With the recognition of the dominants of the collective unconscious an important step forward is made. The magical or demonic effect of the fellow-being disappears when the uncanny feeling is traced to a definite content of the collective unconscious. Now, however, we have an entirely new and unsuspected task before us: that is, the question how the ego is to be reconciled with this psychological non-ego. Can we content ourselves with the statement of the active existence of unconscious dominants, and for the rest let the matter take care of itself? That would be to induce a condition of permanent dissociation in the subject, a split between the individual psyche and the collective psyche. On the one side we should have the differentiated modern ego, while the other side would represent a sort of negro-culture, a thoroughly primitive condition. We should then have set clearly before our eyes, what really does exist, a veneer of civilization over a dark-skinned brute. But such a dissociation requires an immediate synthesis and

¹ The idea of the medicine man, who associates with spirits and has control over magical powers, is so deeply rooted in many primitives that they believe 'doctors' are to be found also among animals. Thus the North Californian Achumanis speak of ordinary coyotes, and 'doctor' coyotes.

development of what has remained undeveloped. There must be a unification of the two parts.

Before entering upon this new question, let us return to the dream that was our point of departure. Through our discussion we have attained a widened understanding of the dream, and especially of an essential part of it, that is, the fear. This fear is a demonic dread of the dominants of the collective unconscious. We saw that the patient identified herself with Mrs. X., and thereby showed that she also had some relation to the uncanny artist. It was apparent that she identified the doctor (myself) with the artist, and further we saw that I became, on the subjective plane of interpretation, an image for the magician-dominant of the collective unconscious.

All this is covered in the dream by the symbol of the crab that walks backwards. The crab is the living content of the unconscious that can in no way be exhausted nor rendered inoperative by analysis on the objective plane. But what we could do was to separate the mythological or collective psychological contents from the objects of consciousness, and to consolidate them as psychological realities outside the individual psyche.

So long as the collective unconscious and the individual psyche are coupled together without differentiation no progress can take place; or, to speak in terms of the dream, the boundary cannot be crossed. If the dreamer does nevertheless prepare to cross the boundary, then what was unconscious becomes activated, seizes her and drags her under. The dream and its material characterize the collective unconscious both as a lower animal living hidden in the depths of the water, and also as a dangerous illness that can be cured only by a timely operation. To what extent this characterization is apt has already been seen. As we said, the animal-symbol points especially to what is extra-human, that is supra-personal; for the contents of the collective unconscious

are not merely the archaic residue of specifically human ways of functioning, but also the residue of functions of the animal ancestry of mankind, whose duration in time must have been infinitely greater than the relatively brief epoch of specifically human existence.¹ These residues, or, to speak in Semon's terms, these engrammes, are extremely liable, when active, not only to arrest the progress of development, but to divert the libido into regressive channels until the store of energy that has activated the collective unconscious has been used up. But the energy becomes once more available, in so far as the conscious position that is contraposed to the collective unconscious can take it into account. Religions have produced this energetic cycle in a concretistic² way through cultural communication with the gods—the dominants of the collective unconscious. This method is too much at variance with our intellectual morality for us to accept it as an adequate, or even possible, solution of the problem. If, however, we apprehend the figures of the unconscious as collective unconscious dominants, hence as collective psychological phenomena or functions, this hypothesis does no violence to our intellectual conscience. This solution is rationally acceptable, and by means of it we secure the possibility of coming to terms with the activated residues of our racial history. This reconciliation makes feasible the crossing of the confining boundary, and is, therefore, appropriately called the transcendent function. It is synonymous with a forward development into a new attitude, which in the dream is indicated by the other side of the stream.

In all this parallels with hero myths are manifest. The typical battle of the hero with the monster (the unconscious

¹ In his philosophical dissertation on Leibnitz' theory of the unconscious H. Ganz has used the *engramme* theory of Semon as an explanation of the collective unconscious. The concept of the collective unconscious advanced by me coincides in essentials with Semon's concept of the phylogenetic *mneme*.

² Concretistic=thought of as objectively real.

content) frequently takes place on the shore of a body of water, or perhaps at a ford, as is the case in the Indian myths, familiar to us in Longfellow's *Hiawatha*. In the decisive battle, the hero (like Jonah) is always swallowed by the monster, as has been shown by Frobenius¹ in a wealth of material. Inside the monster the hero begins in his own way to deal with the beast, while the creature is swimming eastward with him to the rising sun. What he does is to cut out an essential piece of the viscera, the heart for instance, by virtue of which the monster lives, that is, the valuable energy by which the unconscious was activated. He thus kills the monster, which then drifts to land, where the hero, new-born through the transcendent function (the 'night-journey under the sea' of Frobenius), steps forth, often in company with all those whom the monster had previously devoured. Thus the normal condition is restored; for the unconscious, having been robbed of its energy, no longer occupies the dominating position. In this way the myth, a people's dream, graphically describes the problem which, in its individual setting, was also the problem of our patient.²

I must now emphasize the not unimportant fact, which must also have struck the reader, that in my patient's dream the collective unconscious appears under a very negative aspect, as something dangerous and harmful. This is a consequence of the richly developed, indeed over-luxuriant, phantasy-life of the patient, which is connected with her literary gift. Her heightened power of phantasy is a symptom

¹ *Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes*, Berlin, 1904.

² Those of my readers who have a further interest in the problem of the pairs of opposites and its solution, as well as in the activity of the unconscious along mythological lines, are referred to my book, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, Kegan Paul & Co., 1915 (*Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Denkens*, Deuticke, Leipzig und Wien II Aufl., 1925); also to *Psychological Types*, Kegan Paul & Co., 1923 (*Psychologische Typen*, Rascher, Zürich).

of illness in that she revelled in it too freely, while letting real life pass her by. Any more mythology would be dangerous for her, because her external life had not been adequately lived. She has still too little hold upon real life to risk all at once a reversal of standpoint. The collective unconscious had overcome her, and threatened to draw her away from a reality still insufficiently fulfilled. The collective unconscious must therefore, as the dream indicates, present itself to her as something dangerous, otherwise she would have made out of it, all too readily, a refuge from the demands of life. I do not wish, however, by this negative example to convey the impression that the unconscious plays this dubious rôle in all cases. I will therefore add two dreams of a young man, which illuminate another and more favourable side of the function of the unconscious. I do this the more gladly since the solution of the problem of the opposites is only possible through the irrational way indicated by contributions from the unconscious, such as dreams.

First, I must make the reader in some measure acquainted with the personality of the dreamer; for without this acquaintance one can hardly place oneself in the peculiar atmosphere of the dreams. There are dreams which are pure poems, and which therefore can only be understood through the mood they convey as a whole. The dreamer is a youth a little over twenty years old, but still wholly boyish in appearance. There is even a suggestion of girlishness in his looks and in his modes of expression. He is intelligent, with pronounced intellectual and æsthetic interests. His æsthetic interests predominate: one feels at once his good taste and fine appreciation of all forms of art. His feelings are tender and delicate, somewhat fantastic, of the character pertaining to puberty, but of a feminine nature. The feminine element obviously predominates; there is no trace of the boorishness often found at puberty. He is clearly too young for his age, apparently therefore a case of retarded

development. Another indication of this is the fact that he came to me on account of homosexuality. The night preceding his first visit he had the following dream :

" I find myself in a great cathedral filled with a mysterious twilight. It is said to be the cathedral of Lourdes. In the middle is a deep, dark well into which I ought to descend."

The dream is plainly a coherent expression of a mood. The dreamer's comments are as follows: " Lourdes is the mystical fountain of healing. Naturally I thought of that yesterday, since I was coming to you for treatment and was in search of a cure. There is said to be such a well at Lourdes. Probably it is very unpleasant to go down into this water. The well in the church was ever so deep."

What does this dream say? Apparently it is quite clear, and one might be content to take it as a kind of poetic formulation of the mood of the preceding day. But we should not stop there because experience shows that these dreams are much deeper and more significant. One might suppose from this dream that the dreamer came to the doctor in a very poetic mood, that he entered upon the treatment as though it were a sacred religious act to be performed in the mystical half light of an awe-inspiring sanctuary. But this in no way corresponds to the fact. The patient merely came to the doctor in order to be treated for an unpleasant matter—his homosexuality, which is far indeed from being poetical. At any rate from the actual mood of the day before it would hardly be intelligible to us why he should dream so poetically, if we were to accept so direct a causality in the origin of the dream. But perhaps we could assume that the stimulus to the dream was just the extremely unpoetical occasion which impelled the patient to seek treatment. We might hazard the supposition that the patient dreamed in such a highly poetic way just by reason of the lack of poetry in his mood the day before, somewhat as a man who has fasted by

day may dream at night of an abundant feast. It must be admitted that in the dream the thought recurs of the treatment, of the cure with its unpleasant procedure ; but all this reappears with a poetical illumination, that is, in a form that meets most effectively the vivid æsthetic and emotional needs of the dreamer. He is inevitably lured on by this attractive picture, despite the fact that the well is dark, deep, and cold. Something of the mood of this dream would persist after sleep, and continue into the morning of the day on which he must submit himself to an unpleasant and unpoetical duty. Perhaps drab reality would be irradiated with a bright, golden reflection from the dream feeling.

Is this, then, the aim of the dream? That is quite possible, for according to my experience by far the greater number of dreams have a compensatory character. They emphasize another side in each particular case, in order to maintain the psychic equilibrium. But compensation of mood is not the only aim of the dream picture. A correction in the understanding of the situation is also involved. The patient had naturally no adequate notion of the treatment to which he was about to submit himself. But the dream gives him an image that indicates in poetical metaphor the essence of the treatment he is to undergo. This is at once apparent if we follow up his associations and comments on the image of the cathedral.

"The cathedral," he says, "brings to my mind the cathedral of Cologne. I have been greatly interested in it from childhood. I remember that my mother first told me about it. I also remember that, whenever I saw a village church, I used to ask if that were the cathedral of Cologne. I wanted to be a priest in such a cathedral."

The patient is here describing a very important event of his youth. As in most cases of this kind, there was in him an especially close bond with his mother. We must not

understand from this an especially satisfactory or intense conscious relation with the mother, but rather a secret subterranean bond that perhaps only expressed itself in consciousness through the retardation of character development—a relative infantilism. In its development the personality struggles away from such an unconscious infantile tie, for nothing is more fatal to development than persistence in an unconscious, or, as one might say, psychically embryonic condition. Therefore the instinct seizes the first opportunity to supplant the mother by another object. In order that this object may be a valid substitute for the mother, it must bear some analogy to her, and in the case of our patient this is true in the fullest sense. The intensity with which his childish phantasy seized upon the symbol of the Cologne cathedral corresponds to the strength of the unconscious need to find a substitute for his mother. The unconscious need is naturally intensified in a case where the infantile bond threatens to become injurious. Therefore it is that his childish imagination took up the idea of the Church with such enthusiasm, the Church being in the fullest sense and in every meaning a mother. We speak not only of Mother Church, but even of the womb of the Church. In the ceremony known in the Catholic Church as *benedictio fontis*, the baptismal font is actually spoken of as “*immaculatus divini fontis uterus*” (the immaculate womb of the divine fountain-head). We believe, of course, that such meanings must be consciously known before they could be effective in individual phantasy, and that it is impossible that they should affect a child unacquainted with them. These analogies certainly do not work by way of the conscious, but in quite another fashion.

The Church presents a high spiritual surrogate for the merely natural, or ‘carnal’ tie to the parents. The individual is thus freed from an unconscious natural relation that, strictly speaking, is no relation, but a condition of

primordial unconscious identity which, on account of its unconsciousness, has an extraordinary inertia and offers the greatest resistance to every higher spiritual development. It is hard to know wherein such a condition can be distinguished from that of an animal. To promote and make possible the liberation of the individual from his original, animal-like condition is by no means the special prerogative of the Christian Church. The rôle played by the latter is merely the modern, more especially the Western, form of an instinctive striving that is probably as old as mankind itself—a striving that exists in the most varied forms among all primitive peoples who are in any way developed and have not again degenerated. It corresponds to the institution, or rite, of initiation into manhood. At the time of puberty, the youth is brought into the 'men's house' or some similar place of consecration, where he is systematically alienated from his family. At the same time he is initiated into religious secrets, and is thus not only brought into quite new relations, but also introduced to a wholly new world, he himself having become "*quasi modo genitus*," a renewed and changed personality. The initiation is often attended with all kinds of tortures, circumcision and similar rites being not uncommon. These practices are undoubtedly very ancient and have left their traces in our unconscious just as have many other primitive experiences. They have almost become instinctive mechanisms, so that they continually reproduce themselves, quite apart from any external urge, as in student fraternity baptisms (*Fuxtaufen*), or the more extravagant forms of initiation found among American students. They are engraved in the unconscious as a primordial image, as an archetype, as St. Augustine says.

When the mother spoke to her little son about the cathedral of Cologne, this primordial image was stirred and awakened to life. But no priestly educator was at hand to develop what had thus begun, and so the child remained in

the hands of the mother. Yet the longing for a man's leadership kept on growing in the boy, in the form of a homosexual tendency it is true, a faulty development which might never have come about if a man had developed his childish phantasy further. At any rate the deviation into homosexuality has many historical precedents. In ancient Greece, as in many primitive communities, homosexuality and education were, so to speak, identical. Viewed in this light the homosexuality of adolescence, though invariably misunderstood, is none the less a purposeful reaching out toward the man.

According to the sense of the dream, the submission to the treatment signifies for the patient the fulfilment of the meaning of his homosexuality, that is, his entrance into the world of adult men. All that we are forced to explain here, by means of tedious and circuitous discussion, has been condensed by the dream into a few expressive metaphors creating a picture that works far more effectively upon the imagination, feeling, and understanding of the dreamer than would a learned discourse. The patient was thus more adequately and ingeniously prepared for the treatment than if he had been overwhelmed with medical and pedagogical maxims. It is for this reason that I regard the dream not only as a valuable source of information, but also as an extraordinarily effective instrument of education and treatment.

We come now to the second dream, and I must explain in advance that, in the first consultation, I did not refer in any way to the dream we have just been discussing. The dream itself was not mentioned, nor in general was there a word said that could have been remotely connected with what has been considered above. The second dream was as follows :

" I am in a great Gothic cathedral. At the altar stands a priest. I stand before him with my friend, holding in my hand a small Japanese figure of ivory, and I have the feeling that it should be baptized. Suddenly an elderly lady appears,

and, taking from my friend his fraternity ring, puts it on her own finger. My friend is afraid that he may be in some way bound by this. But at the same moment wonderful organ music is heard."

I will here only bring out briefly those points that continue and complete the dream of the preceding day. The second dream is clearly connected with the first: the dreamer is again in the church, that is, in a position to undergo initiation into manhood. A new figure has, however, been added, the priest, whose absence in the previous situation we have already noted. The dream affirms, then, that the unconscious meaning of his homosexuality is fulfilled, and thus a further development can ensue. The essential act of initiation can now begin, that is, baptism. The dream symbol confirms what I have already said: it is not the prerogative of the Christian Church alone to bring about such transitions and spiritual transformations. Behind the ceremonies of the Church there looms a primordial image which under certain conditions can also compel such transformations.

That which, according to the dream, is to be baptized, is a small Japanese figure of ivory. In regard to it the patient commented: "It was a little, grotesque, dwarf-like man, reminding me of the *membrum virile*. It is most curious that this should be baptized; yet with the Jews, circumcision is a sort of baptism. This must have to do with my homosexuality, because the friend standing with me before the altar is the one with whom I am homosexually connected. He is in the same fraternity with me. The fraternity ring obviously stands for our relation."

It is known that in common usage, a ring is a symbol of a bond or relation, for example, the wedding ring. We can therefore safely take the fraternity ring in this case as a metaphor for the homosexual relation, the dreamer's appearance together with his friend being yet another indication of this relation.

The malady that is to be cured is homosexuality. The dreamer is to be led out of this relatively childish condition, and brought into the adult state by means of a kind of circumcision ceremony under the supervision of the priest. These ideas correspond exactly to my analysis of the previous dream. Thus far the development would proceed logically and intelligibly in conformity with archetypal images. But now a disturbing factor appears to enter. An elderly lady suddenly takes possession of the fraternity ring; in other words, she draws to herself what has hitherto been a homosexual relation, and by her act excites in the dreamer fears of being entangled in a new relation involving responsibility. Since the ring is now on the hand of a woman, a kind of marriage has been contracted, that is, the homosexual relation seems to have passed over into a heterosexual one. It is, however, a heterosexual relation of a peculiar kind since it is an elderly lady who is involved. "She is my mother's friend," the patient comments. "I like her very much, in fact she is to me a kind of motherly friend."

From this declaration we can see what has happened in the dream: by virtue of the initiation the homosexual bond is cut, and a heterosexual relation substituted for it, a platonic friendship with a motherly kind of woman. In spite of resembling her, this woman is yet not the mother, so that the relation means a step forward toward masculinity—toward liberation from the mother and mastery of adolescent homosexuality.

The fear of the new tie is easily understood as fear arising from the resemblance to the mother: it might appear that because of the dissolution of the homosexual relation there had been a complete regression to the mother. Or the fear might be of the new and unknown implicit in the adult heterosexual state, with its possible responsibilities, such as marriage, etc. That we are in fact concerned here not with a regression but with an advance seems to be confirmed by

the music that now peals forth. The patient is musical and especially susceptible to solemn organ music. Music therefore signifies for him a very positive feeling, and, in this case, a harmonious conclusion to the dream which is again fitted to spread over the coming morning a beautiful, holy feeling.

If now we recall the fact that up to this moment the patient had seen me in only one consultation, in which little more was discussed than a general clinical anamnesis, it will be evident that both dreams make amazing anticipations. They throw on the patient's situation a singular light, and one strange to the conscious view-point, while at the same time an aspect is lent to the banal clinical situation that is uniquely adapted to the dreamer's whole mental peculiarity, and fitted to stimulate in the highest degree his æsthetic, intellectual, and religious interests. No better conditions for treatment could be imagined than those thus created. From the analysis of these dreams one almost receives the impression that the patient came to the treatment with the utmost readiness and hopefulness, quite prepared to cast aside his boyishness and become a man. In reality this was by no means the case. Consciously he was full of hesitations and resistances; moreover, in the further course of the treatment he constantly showed himself antagonistic and difficult, ever ready to slip back into his former infantilism. The dreams stand therefore in definite contrast to his conscious behaviour; they move along progressive lines and take the part of the teacher. To my way of thinking they display most plainly the peculiar function of dreams. I have called this function one of compensation. The unconscious progressive tendency forms with the conscious regressive tendency a pair of opposites, which maintains a balance in the scales: the influence of the educator is the needle-index on the scales.

The positive character of the rôle played by the images of the collective unconscious throughout the case of this young man results apparently from the fact that the youth

has no dangerous inclination to turn to a phantasy-substitute for reality, and to squander his life therein. The effect of the unconscious images has something of fate in it; one can say of these images: '*Volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt*' (they lead the willing, they drag the unwilling). Perhaps—who knows?—these eternal images may be the reality of what is called fate.

The archetype is, of course, operative always and everywhere, but practical treatment, especially that of young people, may not allow one to bring the patient into relation with it. In the case of older people, on the contrary, it is necessary to give special attention to the images of the collective unconscious, since they are the only source from which, in these cases, hints may be drawn for the solution of the problem of the pairs of opposites. Through the conscious elaboration of this material, the transcendent function reveals itself as a mode of apprehension made possible by the archetypes, and effecting the reconciliation of the opposites. I should have given examples of this, but since in this field we are advancing upon almost unexplored, new territory, it is better not to subject these delicate phenomena to an overhasty formulation. I must content myself here with the statement that through tension between the opposites, the collective unconscious brings forth images, which as symbols make possible an irrational union of the opposites. As far as I could, I have described these processes in my *Psychological Types*, although with the consciousness that in these matters—as difficult as they are important—the final word has not been said.

CHAPTER VIII

THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNCONSCIOUS. GENERAL REMARKS ON THERAPY

HE is greatly mistaken who believes that the unconscious is something harmless which can be made a source of social entertainment, or employed in light-hearted therapeutic experiments. It is true that the unconscious is not always and in all cases dangerous, but the appearance of a neurosis indicates a special heaping up of energy in the unconscious, as it were a charge that may explode. Here caution is necessary. One does not know what may be released when one begins to analyse dreams. Something deeply buried and invisible is set in motion—something which it is highly probable might in some other way have come to light, but which might, on the other hand, never have become visible. It is as if one were digging for an artesian well and risked stumbling upon a volcano. There are no absolute safeguards. If neurotic symptoms are present it behoves one to go cautiously, but the neurotic cases are not by any means the most dangerous. Cases are found of people apparently normal, showing no especial neurotic symptoms—perhaps themselves doctors instructing others—priding themselves on their normality, models of good upbringing, with particularly normal views and habits of life, yet whose normality is an artificial compensation for a latent psychosis. Of course these cases do not often confront the institutional psychiatrist. Those in this condition do not themselves suspect it. A certain presentiment perhaps finds indirect

expression in the individual's special interest in psychology and psychiatry, if he is drawn to such things as the moth to the light. Since the analytical technique brings the unconscious into evidence it destroys in these cases the salutary compensation that existed, and the unconscious breaks out in the form of uncontrollable phantasies and consequent conditions of excitement, which under certain circumstances may lead directly to a psychical disorder, and even eventually to suicide. Happily these latent psychoses appear to be relatively infrequent. If that were not so, the method that is most satisfactory scientifically and therapeutically would be too dangerous to be applied in practice.

The danger of stumbling upon such cases threatens every doctor who is occupied with the analysis of the unconscious, even if he be equipped with a large measure of experience and skill. But through lack of skill, false conceptions, arbitrary interpretations and the like, the doctor may bring to an unfortunate issue cases that need not have turned out badly. This possibility is in no way peculiar to analysis of the unconscious, but pertains to every unskilful clinical intervention. The assumption that analysis makes people mad is obviously just as stupid as the common notion that the psychiatrist must necessarily become mad because of his occupation with insane people.

Apart from the dangers connected with treatment, the unconscious may become dangerous on its own account. One of the most frequent forms of danger is the instigation to accidents. Accidents of every sort, in greater number than the public would ever guess, are of psychological origin. Ranging from insignificant mishaps like stumbling, bumping oneself, burning the fingers, etc., to automobile accidents and catastrophes in the mountains, instances may be found of psychological causation, the accident being sometimes prepared weeks or even months ahead. I have examined many cases of this kind, and could often demonstrate that the

dreams had, weeks beforehand, pointed to a tendency to self-injury, of course symbolically expressed. All those accidents that come about from so-called inattention should be investigated along the same lines. We know that when for one reason or another we are out of sorts, we are liable not only to make great or little blunders but also to do dangerous things which, given the psychologically appropriate moment, might even be fatal. There is a common saying, 'So-and-so died at the right moment,' which comes out of a correct appreciation of the secret psychological causality of the case. In the same way, bodily ills can be brought about or continued. A wrong functioning of the mind can injure the body in important ways, just as conversely a bodily illness can involve the mind sympathetically, for body and soul are not separate entities, but one and the same life. Thus there is seldom an ailment of the body that does not show mental complications, even if its direct causation be not psychological. In my opinion much more attention should be paid to this connection.

It would be wrong, however, to dwell only on the unfavourable side of the unconscious. In all ordinary cases, the unconscious is only unfavourable or dangerous because we are not at one with it and are therefore in antagonism to our instincts.¹ If it is possible for us to develop that function which I have termed transcendent, the disharmony ceases, and we can take advantage of the favourable aspects of the unconscious. The unconscious can indeed give us all the furtherance and help that bountiful nature holds in store for man in overflowing abundance. The unconscious has possibilities that are quite shut off from the conscious; for the unconscious commands not only all the subliminal psychic contents, all that has been forgotten and overlooked, but also the wisdom and experience of uncounted centuries, a wisdom that is deposited and lying potential in the human brain.

¹ The instincts are archetypes.

The unconscious is continually active, creating from its material combinations that serve the needs of the future. It creates subliminal prospective combinations just as does the conscious, only they are markedly superior to the conscious combinations both in refinement and extent. The unconscious, therefore, can also be an unequalled guide for man.

The reader must on no account suppose that the complicated psychological changes I have described take place in every individual case. In practice the treatment is adjusted according to the therapeutic result achieved. This result may appear at almost any stage of the treatment, quite irrespective of the severity or duration of the illness. The treatment of a serious case may last a very long while without the higher phases of the evolution having been reached, or needing to be reached. There are some who, after the attainment of the therapeutic result, go through further stages of change for the sake of their own development. Thus it is not the seriousness of the case that obliges one to pass through the whole process of development. A higher grade of differentiation is only achieved by those who are by nature destined and called to it, that is, who have a capacity and an urge toward such higher differentiation. This is a matter wherein men differ extremely, just as among animal species there are some that are stationary and others that evolve. Nature is aristocratic, but not in the sense of having reserved the possibility of differentiation exclusively for species high in the scale. Similarly the possibility of psychological development in human beings is not reserved for specially gifted individuals. In order to achieve a far-reaching psychological development, neither outstanding intelligence nor any other talent is necessary, since in this development moral qualities can make up for what the intellect fails to achieve. It must not on any account be imagined that the treatment consists in grafting upon people's

minds general formulas and complicated doctrines. Far from that ; each can take what he needs, in his own way, and in his own language. What I have presented here is an intellectual formulation, but it is not what comes under discussion in the practical work. The brief notes of cases that I have inserted give an approximate idea of the practical side of analysis.

The reader should realize that our new kind of psychology has a side that is entirely practical and another that is theoretical. It is not merely a practical method of treatment or education, it is also a scientific theory, in living relation with other sciences.

CONCLUSION

In concluding I must ask the reader's pardon for having ventured to introduce in these few pages so many new things hard to understand. I expose myself to his critical judgment because I consider it the duty of every one who makes a solitary path to share with society what he finds on his journey of discovery, be it refreshing water for the thirsty or a sandy desert of unfruitful error. The one aids, the other warns. Not the criticism of individual contemporaries will decide the truth or falsity of what has been discovered, but future generations and destiny. There are things that are not yet true to-day ; perhaps we dare not find them true, but to-morrow they may be. So every man, whose fate it is to find his own individual way, must go with the bare hope and keen watchfulness of one who is conscious of the loneliness of his path and the danger of its mist-hung abysses.

The peculiarity of the way here described comes in no small part from the circumstance, that in a psychology springing from actual life and working upon it, we can no longer limit ourselves to an intellectual, scientific standpoint. We are forced to take into account the standpoint of feeling also, everything in fact that the mind actually contains.

Above all we must realize that this kind of practical psychology deals not with a mere generalized human mentality, but with individual minds of to-day, and with the manifold modern problems that oppress us all. A psychology that satisfies the intellect only can never be a practical psychology since the totality of the mind can never be grasped by the intellect alone. Whether we wish it or no, we cannot escape the pressure of the present *Weltanschauung*, because the mind craves an expression that will embrace its whole nature.

SECOND ESSAY

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EGO AND
THE UNCONSCIOUS

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PART I. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS UPON CONSCIOUSNESS

CHAPTER I

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF A PERSONAL AND IMPERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS ¹

ACCORDING to the Freudian view the content of the unconscious is limited to infantile tendencies which have been repressed because of their infantile character. Repression is a process that begins in early childhood under the moral influence of the environment and lasts throughout life. Through analysis the repressions are released, and the repressed wishes made conscious.

According to this theory, the unconscious contains only those parts of the personality which could just as well have been conscious, and are repressed only through education. Although from one point of view, the infantile tendencies of the unconscious undoubtedly loom large, it would none the less be incorrect to define or evaluate the unconscious exclusively in these terms. The unconscious has also another side: it embraces not only repressed contents, but likewise all that psychic material which has never attained the threshold value of consciousness. It is impossible to explain the subliminal nature of all that psychic material in terms of repression; otherwise, when all inhibitions were

¹ This paper was originally printed in the *Archives de Psychologie* under the title: *La Structure de l'Inconscient*. The present essay is a very much enlarged and greatly altered presentation of the original text, which, moreover, never appeared in German.

released a phenomenal memory would suddenly emerge that would never forget anything again.

We maintain that besides the repressed material, every psychic content that has become subliminal is to be found in the unconscious, including subliminal sense perceptions. We know, moreover, not only from rich experience, but also on theoretical grounds, that the unconscious also contains material that has never reached the level of consciousness. These are the germs, as it were, of future conscious contents. We have also reason to think that the unconscious is never at rest, in the sense of being inactive, but is continuously engaged in the grouping and regrouping of its contents. Only in pathological cases could this activity be regarded as entirely autonomous. Normally, it is co-ordinated with the conscious in a relation of compensation.

It must be assumed that all these contents are of a personal nature, in so far as they are the acquisitions of the individual existence. But since this existence is limited, the number of acquired contents in the unconscious must also be limited. This being so, it might be inferred that we should be able to exhaust the unconscious, either by means of analysis, or by making a complete inventory of the unconscious contents. This procedure would be theoretically possible if it were true that the unconscious could produce nothing beyond what had already been known and accepted by consciousness. It might also be inferred, as we have observed, that the productivity of the unconscious having been paralysed, we could, by releasing the repression, prevent the sinking down of conscious contents into the unconscious. This, as we know by experience, is possible only to a limited extent. We urge our patients to hold fast to the repressed contents, to organize them once more into consciousness, and to include them in their plan of life. But this procedure, as our daily experience testifies, makes no impression upon the unconscious; since it continues quietly to produce dreams and

phantasies, which, if we are to believe the original Freudian theory, must arise from personal repressions. If in such cases a systematic and unprejudiced observation be maintained, material is found which, though undoubtedly similar to the previous personal contents, seems nevertheless to contain suggestions of contents that reach far beyond the personal limits.

As an example that illustrates what I have just said, I am vividly reminded of a somewhat hysterical patient. Her neurosis, which was not too serious, had its principal cause in a 'father-complex,' as we expressed it in those days—it was about eighteen years ago. By this term a particular relation to the father was connoted, which stood as a hindrance in the patient's way. She had had a very good relation to her father, who had since died. It had been chiefly a feeling relation. In a relation of this kind to the father, the intellect is often developed in such a way that this function subsequently becomes a kind of bridge to the world. Accordingly the patient became a student of philosophy. Her energetic pursuit of knowledge was motivated by her need to free herself from the feeling bond to her father. This operation may succeed if the feeling can also be incorporated in the new stage of development brought about by the intellect; particularly if it becomes feasible to form a feeling relation with a suitable man, who would thus provide an equivalent to the former relation. But in the case I am dealing with the transition could not succeed, because the feeling remained suspended, oscillating as it were, between her father and a man who was not a suitable object. Accordingly her life ceased to advance, and that inner disharmony, so characteristic of the neurosis, made its appearance. The so-called normal man would probably be able to break one or other of these feeling-ties by a powerful act of will, or—which is perhaps more usual—by taking the smooth path of the instinct he would come through the difficulty

unconsciously, without any clear notion of the sort of conflict that lay behind his headaches, or some other physical ailment. But a certain weakness in the instinct, which may have many causes, is enough in many cases to prevent a smooth instinctive transition. Then progress is suspended in a conflict, and the resulting stasis of life is equivalent to a neurosis. As a result of the standstill, the psychic energy flows away in every possible direction, which, at first sight, are apparently quite useless. For instance, an excessive innervation of the sympathetic system produces nervous disorders of the stomach and intestines; or the vagus, and therewith the heart, is excited; or phantasies and reminiscences, uninteresting enough in themselves, are over-valued and literally obsess consciousness. (A louse becomes an elephant!) In this condition a fresh motive is needed that will put an end to the pathological suspension. Unconsciously and indirectly nature herself leads the way to this issue through the phenomenon of the transference (Freud). For, during the course of the treatment, the patient transfers the father-*imago* to the physician, thus in a sense making him the father. Moreover, in so far as he is not the real father, he becomes the equivalent of the man she cannot reach. The physician thus becomes both father and lover after a fashion; in other words, he becomes the object of the conflict. The opposites unite in him, and for this reason he represents a quasi-ideal solution of the conflict. Unavoidably he draws upon himself what, to an onlooker, must seem a well-nigh incomprehensible over-valuation; for, to the patient, he may come to seem like a saviour or a god. This metaphor is not so entirely laughable as it sounds. It is in fact a little too much to be father and lover at the same time. No one could sustain such a rôle for any length of time, just because it is too much. One would have to be at least half a god to carry out the part without breaking; for all the time one would have to be the one that gives.

To the patient in the state of transference this provisional solution seems at first ideal. But in time she comes to a standstill that is just as bad as the neurotic conflict. Moreover, at bottom, nothing has yet happened that could lead to a real solution. The conflict has merely been transferred. None the less, a successful transference can cause the whole neurosis to disappear—at least temporarily. For this reason the transference was recognized by Freud, and with perfect justice, as a therapeutic factor of the first order. But at the same time it is a provisional condition only; although certainly promising the possibility of a cure, it must never be mistaken for the real cure.

This somewhat lengthy explanation was necessary before my example could be understood, since my patient, being actually in the state of transference, had already reached the further limit where the neurotic standstill had begun to be unpleasant. The question then arose, what next? I had of course become the complete saviour, and obviously the idea of having to give me up was not only an exceedingly distasteful, but a really terrifying thought to the patient. So-called 'healthy common sense,' when dealing with such situations, is wont to display a whole repertory of admonitions: 'you simply must,' 'you really ought,' 'you just cannot,' etc. In so far as good common sense is happily not too rare, and also not entirely without effect (pessimists, I know, exist), a reasonable motive can release so much enthusiasm, in just this intensified state of transference, that often a firm decision of will is gained that will even risk a painful sacrifice. If it succeeds, and now and then such things actually do happen, the sacrifice brings blessed fruit; for the former patient now leaps across what seemed insurmountable obstacles, and is practically cured. The physician is so entirely pleased with this result, that theoretical difficulties concerning the little miracle do not occur to him.

If the spring forward is not achieved, and it was not in

my patient's case, then one is faced with the problem of dissolving the transference. On this question 'psycho-analytical' theory sheds little or no light. It seems that we must simply fall back upon some dark belief in fate, and hope that in one way or another the matter will settle itself. Is it true perhaps, as a somewhat cynical colleague once said to me, that "it stops of itself when the patient has no more money"? Or there are the inescapable demands of life which will conspire to make it impossible for the patient to linger on in the transference. These demands compel the sacrifice that was not made voluntarily, and the forcing may lead to a more or less complete relapse. But descriptions of these cases may be looked for in vain in the laudatory class of psychoanalytic literature.

There are of course hopeless cases where simply nothing avails, but there are also cases who do not remain stuck fast, and who do not have to be forced out of the transference with severity and violence. I said to myself, in this juncture with my patient, that there must be some decent clear way by which a person could come out of such an experience into complete integrity and consciousness. My patient had long since used up all her money, if indeed she had ever had any, but I was curious to know what way nature would devise for a satisfactory solution of the transference *impasse*. Since I had never imagined that I possessed that complete human understanding which knows exactly what should be done in every complicated situation, and since my patient knew as little as I, it occurred to me that we might at least keep a look-out for some movement coming from a sphere of the psyche that is uncontaminated by 'superior wisdom' and calculated purpose. Accordingly I turned to the dreams.

Dreams contain images and thought-associations that we cannot create with conscious intention. They develop spontaneously without our assistance; hence they represent

a mental activity that is withdrawn from voluntary direction. Essentially therefore the dream is a highly objective and, in a sense, a natural product of the psyche. Accordingly we might with reason expect from it some indications, or suggestions at least, about the fundamental tendencies of the psychic process. Now, since the psyche is a vital process, hence not merely a causal series of events, but also a purposive process with a final orientation, we might expect that the dream (which presents a kind of self-portrait of the total psychic process) would give us indications about objective causality, as well as about objective tendencies.

On the basis of such reflections, then, we made a careful examination of the dreams. It would lead too far afield to cite in detail all the dreams that followed. It will suffice to give an outline of their general character. The majority of the dreams referred to the person of the physician; that is to say, the active characters in the dreams were unmistakably the dreamer herself and her physician. The latter, however, seldom appeared in his natural form, but was, for the most part, singularly misrepresented or disfigured. At one time his body was of supernatural size, at another he appeared extremely old, then again he resembled her father, but linked up with nature in a singular way as in the following dream. Her father (who was really rather a small man) stood beside her on a hill that was covered with wheatfields. She was quite tiny beside him, for he appeared huge like a giant. He raised her from the ground, and held her in his arms like a little child. The wind swept over the wheatfields, and as the corn swayed in the wind, he rocked her in his arms.

From this dream and from others like it I could discern many things. Above all, I got the impression that her unconscious was holding obstinately to the idea of my being the father-lover. It seemed as though the fatal fixation that we were trying to dislodge was again emphatically strengthened.

Nor could the further implication be denied that the unconscious laid particular stress upon the supernatural, or 'divine' nature of the father-lover, thus emphasizing over again the over-valuation of the transference. I therefore asked myself whether the patient had perhaps never realized the quite fantastic side of her transference, or whether in the end the unconscious could not be reached by insight at all, but must follow blindly and idiotically, something quite nonsensical and impossible. Freud's notion that the 'unconscious can only wish,' Schopenhauer's blind and purposeless Will, the demiurge of the gnostics, imagining himself in his vanity a perfect being, and then, in his blindness and limitations, creating something lamentably imperfect—this pessimistic distrust of an essentially negative 'world soul' came threateningly near. There was nothing in fact to set in opposition to this, except the 'you ought' of common sense, followed by a stroke of the axe that would hew down the phantasy as fast as it grew.

But, as I reconsidered the dreams carefully, another possibility came to my mind. I said to myself: it cannot be denied that the dreams continue to speak in those same metaphors which, both to the patient and myself, are sufficiently familiar, but the patient herself has a real insight into her transference-phantasy. She knows that I appear as a divine father-lover, and she can distinguish this from myself as an actual reality, at least intellectually. Therefore the dreams apparently repeat her conscious standpoint minus the conscious criticism, and this they completely ignore. Accordingly they do not repeat the conscious content *in toto*, but are trying to enforce the fantastic standpoint as opposed to that of 'healthy common sense.'

I naturally asked myself, what is the source of this obstinacy and what is its purpose? That it must have some sort of purposeful meaning I was convinced; for there is no really living thing that has no final meaning, something

that might be explained in other words as a residue or continuum of certain previous facts. But the energy of transference is so strong that it gives one the impression of a vital instinct. What, then, is the purpose of these phantasies? A careful examination and analysis of the dreams, especially of the one I have given in detail, revealed a very marked tendency—in contrast to conscious criticism, which always prefers to reduce things to human proportions—to endow the person of the physician with superhuman attributes. He had to be gigantic, very ancient, greater than the father, like the wind that sweeps over the earth—was he then to be made into a god? Or, I said to myself, should the dreams be taken in the opposite sense, namely, that the unconscious is seeking to create a god out of the person of the physician? Is it trying in a sense to free an intuition or conception of god from the veils of the personal? Taken this way, the transference to the person of the physician might be taken as a misunderstanding on the part of the conscious, a stupid freak of ‘healthy common sense.’ Was the urge of the unconscious perhaps only apparently directed towards the person, but in a deeper sense actually seeking a god? Could the longing for a god be a passion welling up from a more unsophisticated, darker source of the instinct, a source perhaps even deeper and stronger than that from which the love for a human being springs? Or perhaps it is the highest and most real meaning of this purposeless love we call transference? A surviving portion perhaps of the real ‘*Gottesminne*’ that has been lost from consciousness ever since the fifteenth century.

No one will doubt the reality of a passionate desire for a human person; but it seems almost too fantastic for serious consideration, that a piece of religious psychology, long since a part of history, a mediæval curiosity let us say—reminiscent of Mechthild von Magdeburg—should come to light in a professional hour, and be expressed through

the prosaic figure of the doctor as a living and immediate reality.

A really scientific attitude must be unprejudiced. The sole criterion for the validity of a hypothesis is whether or not it possesses a heuristic or explanatory value. The question then becomes, can the possibilities presented above be regarded as a valid hypothesis? *A priori*, there is no reason why it should not be just as possible that the unconscious tendencies have a goal beyond the human person, as that the unconscious can 'only wish.' Only experience can decide which is the more suitable hypothesis.

This new hypothesis was not entirely plausible to my very critical patient; for the previous conception, that I was the father-lover, and as such presented an ideal solution of the conflict, was incomparably more attractive to her feeling. Nevertheless she was sufficiently clear-headed to realize the theoretical possibility of such a hypothesis. Meanwhile the dreams continued to dissolve the physician's person by magnifying it into ever vaster proportions. *Pari passu* with this development there now occurred something which at first I observed with astonishment, namely, a sort of subterranean hollowing out of the transference. Her relationship with a certain friend deepened perceptibly, notwithstanding the fact that in her conscious she held fast to the transference. When the moment for leaving me arrived, it was no catastrophe, but a thoroughly reasonable parting. I had the privilege of being the only witness of the process of severance. I could see how the super-personal 'pole-star' (*Rechtspunkt*) developed a guiding function—I cannot call it anything else,—and step by step gathered to itself all the former overvaluation of the personal; thus, with this new afflux of energy, gaining a powerful influence over the resistant conscious function before the patient was fully awake to what was taking place. I realized from this, that the dreams likewise were not mere phantasies, but presentations of unconscious

developments, that allowed the patient's mind gradually to grow out of the purposelessness of her all too personal tie.¹

This change took place, as I showed, owing to the fact that unconsciously a super-personal directing point (*Rechtspunkt*) was evolved; a virtual goal, as it were, that is expressed symbolically in a form which can hardly be otherwise designated than an intuition of god. The dreams distorted the human person of the physician to superhuman proportions, to a gigantic, extremely ancient father, who is at the same time the wind, and in whose protecting arms the dreamer rests like a tiny baby. If we try to make the patient's conscious idea of god answerable (she had a Christian upbringing) for the cause of the divine image in the dream, then we must bring again its distortion to mind. In religious matters the patient is critical and agnostic, and her idea of a possible godhead has long since passed into the sphere of non-representability, in other words, it is a complete abstraction. In contrast to this, the god-image of the dream corresponds to the archaic conception of a nature-dæmon, a Wotan perhaps. "*Θεός τὸ πνεῦμα*" (God is spirit) is taken back into its original form where *πνεῦμα* means 'wind.' God is the wind, mightier and greater than man, and yet an invisible breath. As in the Hebrew, the Arabic word *rūh* also means 'breath,' 'spirit.'² The dreams develop an archaic divine-image out of the personal form, and this image has no relation at all to the conscious conception of god. It might be objected that this is merely an infantile image, a reminiscence from childhood. I would have no quarrel with this assumption if we were dealing with the image of an old man upon a golden throne in heaven. But there is no trace of that kind of sentimentality; but instead we have a primitive

¹ Compare the transcendent function. *Psychological Types*, p. 610.

² For a fuller elaboration of this theme see Jung: *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 108 and p. 354. (Wind as creator.)

picture that could correspond only to an archaic concept of the spirit.

These primitive images, of which I have given a great number of examples in my book *Psychology of the Unconscious*, challenge one to make a fundamental discrimination of unconscious material, a discrimination altogether different in character from the distinguishing of 'preconscious' from 'unconscious' or 'subconscious' from 'unconscious.' The justification of these latter distinctions does not demand further discussion here. They have their definite value; and as viewpoints they certainly deserve to be carried further. The deeper discrimination that was forced upon me by experience only claims the value of a wider viewpoint.

From what has been said it will be evident that we can distinguish, as it were, a layer in the unconscious which can be called the personal unconscious. The contents of this layer are of a personal nature, inasmuch as they have partly the character of acquisitions of the individual existence and partly of psychological factors that could just as well be conscious. We can well understand that incompatible psychological elements are repressed, and thus rendered unconscious; but on the other hand there is also the possibility that the repressed contents can be made and kept conscious when once recognized. We recognize these as personal contents from the fact that we are able to show their effects, or their partial appearance, or their specific origin in our personal past. They are integral components, belonging to the inventory of the personality, and the loss of these components from consciousness produces an inferiority in this or that respect. We could not call it the sort of inferiority that has the psychological character of an organic crippling, or inherent defect; it has more the character of an omission which is liable to give rise to a feeling of moral resentment. The sense of moral inferiority always indicates that the missing element is something which, if one listens to

feeling, should not be missing ; in other words, it is something that could be conscious if one took enough trouble. The feeling of moral inferiority does not arise from the collision with the generally accepted and, in a sense, arbitrary moral law, but from an inner conflict with the self, which for the sake of psychic equilibrium, demands that the deficit be redressed. Whenever a sense of inferiority appears, it is an indication of two things. In the first place, it means that there is an unconscious component that needs to be assimilated ; and secondly, the possibility of assimilation actually exists. In the last resort it is a man's moral qualities which force him, either by a direct recognition of the necessity, or indirectly, by means of a painful neurosis, to assimilate his unconscious personality and to hold it in consciousness. Whoever proceeds along this path of realizing his unconscious self must of necessity bring the content of the personal unconscious up into consciousness, and the range of the personality is correspondingly widened. I should at once add that this 'widening' process primarily concerns the moral consciousness, or self-knowledge, since the contents of the unconscious that are released and brought into consciousness during analysis are usually unpleasant. That is why they were repressed. They consist of wishes, memories, tendencies, plans, etc. Obviously these are contents which an adequate general confession, for example, could bring to light in a similar way, although to a much more limited extent. The 'widening' is as a rule the product of dream analysis. It is often very interesting to watch how, bit by bit, with the nicest choice, the dreams bring out the essential points. The total material that is added to consciousness effects an essential broadening of the horizon, a deepened self-knowledge. And this knowledge more than anything else is able to humanize a man and make him modest. But even self-knowledge, assumed by all the wise ones of the past to be beyond price in its effect, has very different effects upon

different characters. We get extraordinary evidence of this fact in practical analysis, but I am dealing with this aspect of my subject in the next section.

As is shown by my example of the archaic concept of god, the unconscious seems to contain other things besides mere personal data. My patient was quite unconscious of the derivation of 'spirit' from 'wind,' or of the parallelism between the two. This content was not the product of her thinking, nor had she ever been taught it. The critical place in the New Testament (*τὸ πνεῦμα πνεῖ ὅπου θέλει*) was inaccessible to her, as she could not read Greek. If it were to be taken as a wholly personal component it might be a so-called *kryptamnesia*,¹ namely the unconscious recollection of an idea which the dreamer had once read somewhere. Against such a possibility in this particular case I have nothing to urge; but I have seen a sufficient number of other cases—there are a large number cited in my book mentioned above—where a *kryptamnesia* can be excluded with certainty. Even if this were a case of *kryptamnesia*, which seems to me improbable, we should still need an explanation of the predisposition that caused just this image to be retained and later to be reproduced (*'ekphoriert,'* Semon). In any case, whether with or without *kryptamnesia*, we are dealing with a genuine and really primitive divine-image, which grew in the unconscious of a modern mind and produced a living effect, an effect which both in respect to religion and psychology might cause one to reflect. There is nothing about this image that could be called personal; it is a wholly collective image, the ethnical origin of which has long been known to us. Here is a historical image with a quite general distribution that has come again into existence through a natural psychic function. This is not to be

¹ Compare Flournoy: *Des Indes à la Planète Mars. Étude sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie*, 1900; and Jung: *Collected Papers of Analytical Psychology*, p. 86.

wondered at, since my patient came into the world with a human brain which presumably still functions to-day in much the same way as in the days of the old Germans. We are dealing with a reactivated archetype, as I have elsewhere called these primordial images.¹ The dream has a certain primitive mode, or analogical way of thinking which restores these ancient images to life. They are not inherited ideas, but inherited pathways.² Taking these facts into consideration, we must assume that the unconscious contains not only personal, but also impersonal, or collective components in the form of inherited categories,³ or archetypes. I have therefore advanced the hypothesis that the unconscious possesses in its deeper levels, so to speak, collective contents in a relatively active state. In describing these contents I use the term collective unconscious.

¹ Compare *Psychological Types*, p. 476, pp. 507-8, and pp. 555-6.

² Consequently, the reproach that my views involve 'mystical' and 'fantastic' ideas is obviously inapplicable.

³ Hubert et Mauss: *Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions*. XXIX.

CHAPTER II

PHENOMENA RESULTING FROM THE ASSIMILATION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

THE process of assimilating the unconscious yields very remarkable phenomena. There are some who proceed to construct an unmistakable consciousness or feeling of the self which may be even disagreeably intensified. They know everything, they are completely informed with respect to their unconscious. They believe themselves to be perfectly *au fait* with everything that comes up from the unconscious. At all events with every interview they seem to expand more and more above the head of the physician. Others, on the contrary, are depressed, even smothered by the contents of the unconscious. Their self-confidence is diminished, and they look on with resignation at all the extraordinary things produced by the unconscious. The former, in a superabundance of self-realization, assume a responsibility for the unconscious that goes much too far, overstepping all bounds ; the latter finally abandon all responsibility in an overwhelming realization of the helplessness of the ego over against the fate which rules them through the unconscious.

If we submit these two extreme ways of reacting to a close analytical scrutiny, we find that behind the optimistic self-realization of the one who thinks he knows all about the unconscious, there lurks a helplessness which is as deep, and perhaps even deeper than the other case presents, and which forces the conscious optimism to act the part of a poorly

arranged compensation. But behind the pessimistic resignation of the other who feels smothered by the unconscious, we discover a combative will to power which far exceeds the conscious optimism of the first.

In these two kinds of reaction I have only picked out two well-marked extremes. Had I noted the finer *nuances* I would have kept closer to reality. Every analysant, as I have said elsewhere, is liable to misuse the newly won knowledge (at first unconsciously because of his abnormal, neurotic attitude) if he is not sufficiently cured of his morbid symptoms in the earlier stages to be able to dispense with further therapy. The most essential factor in this stage is that everything should be taken on the objective level, that is to say, without any separation of the imago from the object, or as though in direct relation to the object. Thus the man, for whom the 'other fellow' is the object of prime importance, will conclude from all the self-knowledge that this part of the analysis gives him, 'This, then, is what the other person is like.' He will accordingly feel in duty bound, according to the tolerance or intolerance of his nature, to enlighten the world. But the other, who tends in his relation to his fellow beings to feel himself more as object than as subject, will allow himself to be burdened by the wider knowledge, and will be more or less submerged by it. (I am naturally leaving out of account the great number of more superficial natures who only experience these problems in a tangential fashion.) In both cases a strengthening of the relation to the object takes place, in the first in an active, in the second in a reactive sense. A marked intensification of collective momentum ensues. The one extends the sphere of his actions, the other, the sphere of his endurance.

Adler has employed the expression 'god-likeness' (*Gottähnlichkeit*) to designate certain basic characteristics of neurotic power psychology. If I likewise borrow the same idea from Faust, I prefer to use it in the sense of that

famous passage where Mephistopheles writes in the student's album :

"Stick to the good old text, follow my aunt the snake,
And when they talk of your likeness to God, you'll begin to shiver
and shake."

The "likeness to God" refers, obviously, to the knowledge of good and evil. The analysis and conscious assimilation of the unconscious contents, engenders a certain thoughtful tolerance, by means of which even relatively indigestible elements of the unconscious character can be accepted. This tolerance seems very superior and wise, yet it is often little more than a beautiful gesture, albeit one that involves all manner of consequences. We have yet to bring together two spheres that were before kept anxiously separated. When those resistances which were not absolutely insurmountable have been overcome, the union of the pairs of opposites is achieved, at least in the conscious view. The fuller insight, the approximation of what was before separated, and the consequent overcoming of the moral conflict (apparently at least) yield a feeling of superiority that can easily give the impression of 'godlikeness.' But the same approximation of good and evil can have a very different effect on a different kind of temperament.

The feeling of being a superman, who holds in his hands the scales of good and evil, is by no means a necessary or inevitable consequence. It may also seem as though one were a helpless object caught between hammer and anvil ; not in the least a Hercules at the parting of the ways, but rather a rudderless ship swaying between Scylla and Charybdis. For without knowing it, he is caught up in perhaps the greatest and most ancient of human conflicts, experiencing the pangs of eternal principles in collision. Well might he feel himself like a Prometheus chained to the Caucasus, or as one crucified. This would be 'godlikeness' in suffering. 'Godlikeness' as I have used it here is certainly not a

scientific concept, despite the fact that it expresses very graphically the psychological fact. Neither do I assume that all my readers will immediately grasp the peculiar state of mind which this expression denotes. It belongs too exclusively to the sphere of *belles lettres* to convey these meanings. I prefer, then, to elaborate in more general terms the mental condition embraced by this expression. The understanding and insight gained by the analysant usually reveal much to him that was before unconscious. He naturally applies this knowledge to his environment; in consequence he sees, or thinks he sees, many things that were before invisible to him. Inasmuch as his knowledge is helpful to him, he easily assumes that it would also be useful to others. In this way a certain arrogance is liable to appear; it may perhaps be inspired by the best intentions, but it is none the less annoying to others. He feels as though he possessed a key that opens many, perhaps even all doors. 'Psychoanalysis' itself has this same naïve unconsciousness of its limitations, as is clearly exemplified in the way it fingers works of art.

Since human nature is not constituted wholly of light, but also abounds in shadows, the insight and understanding gained in practical analysis is often somewhat painful, all the more painful, of course, the more one has previously neglected the other side (which is the rule rather than the exception). Hence there are some who take the newly-won insight very much to heart, too much so in fact, forgetting that they are not unique in having a shadow side. They allow themselves to be depressed unduly, and are then inclined to a deep distrust of everything, finding nothing right anywhere. This is why so many able analysts with very good ideas never can bring themselves to publish their conclusions, because the problem of the soul, as they see it, is so overwhelming and vast that it seems to them almost impossible to compass it scientifically. The one type is pushed to

extravagance by his optimism, while the other becomes over-anxious and despondent.

Somewhat in this form is the great conflict staged when reduced to a smaller scale. But even in these lesser proportions, the essence of the conflict is easily recognized. For both the presumption of the one and the despondency of the other reveal the same uncertainty as to their boundaries. The one is excessively expanded, the other is immoderately diminished. Their individual boundaries are in some way obliterated. If now we consider the fact that, as a result of psychic compensation, great humility stands very close to pride, and that 'pride goeth before a fall,' we can discover behind the expansive superiority certain traits belonging to an anxious sense of inferiority. In fact it becomes quite evident that a deep uncertainty forces the too exuberant one to inflate the truths, of which he himself feels none too sure, and to win proselytes to his side in order that this following may prove to himself the value and trustworthiness of his convictions. Moreover, he is not so secure in his fund of knowledge as to be able to hold out alone; at bottom he feels isolated by it, and a secret fear that he may be left alone with it induces him to trot out his opinions and interpretations in and out of season, because only when convincing some one else does he feel protected from gnawing doubts.

It is just the reverse with the over-despondent one. The more he withdraws and hides himself, the greater becomes his secret need to be understood and recognized. Although he speaks of his inferiority he does not really believe in it. From within arises a defiant conviction of his unrecognized value, and in consequence he is sensitive to the slightest disapprobation, always carrying the air of a misunderstood man who is being wrongly deprived of his rightful claims. In this way he cultivates a morbid pride and an increasing sense of dissatisfaction. Of all things in the world this is what he

least desires. All the more, therefore, must his environment be held responsible for it.

Both are at once too small and too great ; their individual average, not being certain in the first place, now fluctuates still more. It sounds almost grotesque to describe this condition as 'godlike.' But since in their respective ways both overstep their human proportions, they are somewhat 'superhuman,' and therefore, figuratively speaking, 'godlike.' If we wish to avoid the use of this doubtful metaphor, I would suggest the term 'psychic inflation.' This concept seems to me appropriate, because the state we are now describing involves an extension of the personality beyond individual limits, in other words, a state of inflatedness. In this state a man tries to fill a space which normally he cannot fill. But this can happen only if he has appropriated to himself certain contents and characters which, since they exist in and for themselves, must always be outside personal boundaries. What lies outside these limits must belong either to some one, to every one, or to no one. Inasmuch as psychic inflation is by no means a phenomenon that is produced exclusively by analysis, but appears just as often in ordinary life, we can investigate it equally well in other manifestations. A very usual case, accompanied as a rule by a singular absence of humour, is the way in which many men identify themselves with their businesses or their titles. My occupation, it is true, is my special activity ; but it also has a collective factor, that has come about historically through the co-operation of many people, and its dignity rests upon the collective approval to which it owes its existence. When, therefore, I identify myself with my profession or my title, I behave as though I myself were also the whole complex of social factors of which a profession consists, or as though I were not only the bearer of the office, but also and at the same time the approval of society that supports it. In so doing, I have made an extraordinary extension of myself, and have

usurped qualities which do not belong to me, but are outside of me. *L'état—c'est moi* is the motto for such people.

In the condition of inflation through knowledge, we are dealing with something similar in principle, although psychologically more subtle. What causes the inflation in this case is not the dignity of a profession, but phantasies of a significant kind. I will explain what I mean by a practical example. I will choose the case of a mentally deranged man of whom I had personal knowledge, and who has been mentioned in a publication by Maeder.¹ The case is characterised by a high degree of inflation. In the mentally diseased we can observe all those phenomena, that are only elusively present in normal people, in a cruder form and on a more extended scale. The patient suffered from paranoidal dementia with megalomania. He was in 'telephonic' communication with the Mother of God and other like powers. In his human reality he had been an unfortunate locksmith's apprentice, who at the age of nineteen had become incurably insane. He had never been highly equipped mentally, but nevertheless he had, among other things, discovered the magnificent idea that the world was his picture-book, the leaves of which he could turn at will. The proof of it was quite simple, he had only to turn himself around and he saw a new side of things.²

This is Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Idea*, in unadorned primitive concreteness. Fundamentally it is a world-shaking idea which springs from a too great remoteness from

¹ A. Maeder: *Psychoanalyt. Jahrbuch*, Bd. II., p. 209 ff.

² While I was engaged in the psychiatric clinic at Zürich, I once took an intelligent layman through the sick-wards. He had never before seen an insane asylum from within. When we had finished our round, he exclaimed, "This is simply Zürich in miniature! A quintessence of the population. It is as though all the types one meets every day on the streets had been assembled here in their classical purity. Oddities and picked specimens of all levels from the top to the bottom!" I had never looked at it before from this angle, but my friend was very largely right.

the world, but it is expressed so naïvely and simply that at first one can only smile at the grotesqueness of it. And yet this primitive view lies at the very heart of the world-vision created by Schopenhauer's genius. A man must be either a genius or insane to be so delivered from the entanglement of reality as to be able to look on the world as his picture-book. Was this view a thought-out or conscious achievement on the part of the patient? Did it come to him? Or did he just fall into it? His morbid disintegration and inflation would point to the latter. It is not he who thinks and speaks, but it thinks and speaks within him; accordingly he hears voices. The difference, then, between this man and Schopenhauer lies in the fact that, in the case of the patient, the idea remained at the stage of a mere spontaneous growth, while Schopenhauer abstracted it and expressed it in language of general validity. In so doing he raised it out of its subterranean, germinal beginnings into the clear light of collective consciousness. It would be quite incorrect to assume that the idea emanating from this sick man's mind had a personal character and value, as though it were something belonging to him. In that case he would have been a philosopher. But a man is only a true philosopher when he succeeds in transmuting a primitive and purely natural vision into an abstract idea belonging to the universality of consciousness. It is this achievement, and this alone, which is his personal value, and which he must appraise as such, without thereby succumbing to inflation. But the sick man's idea is an impersonal value which develops spontaneously within him, and against which he is powerless to defend himself; since it can actually overwhelm him in crazy phantasies that set an ever greater distance between himself and the world. Instead of mastering the idea and expanding it into a philosophical view of the world (*Weltanschauung*), its indisputable force and greatness blew him up, as it were, to abnormal dimensions. The personal value, in other words, lies in the philosophical

achievement, and not in the primary vision. The genesis of the vision is the same with the philosopher, the idea just accruing to him as a part of general human property, in which, theoretically, every one shares. The golden apples come from the same tree, whether they are culled by an imbecile locksmith's apprentice, or by a Schopenhauer.

But there is yet another thing that can be learnt from this example, namely, that the impersonal contents are not just indifferent or dead material that can be annexed at will. They are intensely living forces which have the power of attracting and gripping the conscious function. The identification with one's profession or office is certainly a seductive possibility. Otherwise why should so many men be content to be nothing more than this general worth which society accords them? To look for a personality behind this shell would be fruitless. The opening up would be a massive undertaking, but inside it we should find only a pitiable little man. This is why the profession, or whatever this outer shell may be, is so seductive; it offers an easy compensation for personal insufficiency.

But outer attractions, such as professions, official positions, and other social rôles are not the only things that cause inflation. These represent only the impersonal factors that are outside in society, that is, in the collective conscious. But, corresponding to the social organization that is beyond the individual, there is also a collective psyche beyond the personal mind. This is the collective unconscious, in which elements are concealed that can prove just as attractive as the social ones, as the above example shows. Just as in the first case, where a man can suddenly be sucked up as it were into his professional dignity, thus losing himself in the world ("*Messieurs, à présent je suis Roy*"), so another may disappear equally suddenly when it is borne in upon him, for example, that he has perceived one of those great images which put another face upon the world. In the latter case it is a question

of a magical collective idea (*'représentations collectives'*), something which lies at the heart of the Americans' 'slogan,' or catchword, and on a higher level inspires poetical and religious language. I remember an insane man who was neither a poet, nor was he in any way important; he was just a somewhat quiet and rather sentimental youth. He had fallen in love with a girl, and as so often happens, had not sufficiently ascertained what her feeling was for him. In his primitive state of *'participation mystique'* he took it for granted that his emotion was obviously the emotion of the girl as well, which on the lower levels of human psychology is naturally very often the case. Thus he came to build up a sentimental love-phantasy, which however collapsed in ruins when he discovered that the girl preferred to have nothing to do with him. He was so utterly confused that he went straight to the river to drown himself. It was late at night, and the stars gleamed up at him from the dark water. It seemed to him as though the stars were swimming in pairs under the water, and a wonderful feeling came over him. He forgot his suicidal purpose, and gazed fascinated at the strange, sweet drama that was being enacted in the depths. Gradually he became aware of the fact that every star was a face, and that these pairs were lovers, who were being carried along locked in a dreaming embrace. An entirely new insight dawned upon him. Everything had changed; his fate, his disappointment, even his love, receded and fell away. The memory of the girl became distant, almost to the point of indifference, but instead, with a feeling of complete certainty, unheard-of riches were promised him. He knew at once that an immense treasure, which was his, lay hidden in the neighbouring observatory. The result was that he was arrested by the police at four o'clock in the morning, attempting to break into the observatory.

What had happened to him? The poor man had caught a glimpse of a Dantesque picture, the beauty of which he

could never have grasped and expressed in a poem, and yet he saw it and it transformed him. That very thing which hurt him most was now far away ; a new and undreamed of world of the stars, following their tranquil ways in a realm beyond this sorrow-laden earth, had dawned upon him in the moment when he had touched ' Persephone's threshold.' The intuition of unheard-of riches—who could fail to understand these thoughts?—came to him like a revelation. It was too much for his poor office-cramped head. He did not drown in the river, but in an eternal image, the beauty of which was also extinguished.

Just as one person can disappear in a social rôle, so another can vanish in an inner vision and be lost to his environment because of it. Many incomprehensible changes in the personality, such as sudden conversions, or other deep-seated transformations, originate in the mysterious, attractive power of a collective image,¹ which, as the present example shows, can cause such a degree of inflation that the whole personality may be dissolved. This dissolution means insanity, either transitory or permanent, a ' splitting of the mind,' or schizophrenia (Bleuler).² Naturally this pathological inflation depends to a very great extent upon the innate weakness of the personality as compared with the strength and autonomy of the contents of the collective unconscious.

We can best approximate to the truth if we picture to ourselves the conscious and personal psyche resting upon the wide foundation of an inherited and universal disposition of the mind, which as such is unconscious. Thus our personal psyche would be related to the collective psyche in much the same way as the individual is related to society.

But the individual is not just unique and separate in the

¹ Cf. the definition of ' Image ' in my book, *Psychological Types*, p. 554. Léon Daudet in his book, *L'Hérédité*, calls this process '*auto-fécondation intérieure*,' by which he understands the reawakening of the soul of an ancestor.

² *Dementia praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenie*. 1911.

world ; he is also a social being. In the same way the human mind is not only a separate and quite individual phenomenon ; for it also is a collective one. Now just as certain social functions or instincts are opposed to the interests of separate individuals, so the mind exhibits certain functions or tendencies which, because of their collective nature, are opposed to individual needs. The explanation of this is not far to seek, for every man is born with a highly differentiated brain, that ensures him the possibility of a wide range of mental functioning, which he has neither inherited ontogenetically, nor developed himself. In so far as human brains are uniformly differentiated, the mental functions which this differentiation permits are collective and universal. This explains a very interesting fact, namely, that the unconscious, psychic constitution of the most remote peoples and races shows a very remarkable correspondence. As evidence of this, I need only mention the well-authenticated fact of the extraordinary similarity of the autochthonic myth-forms and motives of the various racial stems. The universal similarity of the brain provides a universal possibility of a similar kind of mental functioning. This function is the collective psyche. In so far as differentiations exist that correspond to race, tribe, or even family, we can also speak of a collective psyche that is limited to race, tribe, or family over and above the level of the universal collective psyche. To borrow an expression from P. Janet,¹ the collective psyche contains '*les parties inférieures*' of the psychic functions, namely, the deeply-rooted, automatic, inherited, and universal elements ; hence the super-personal, or impersonal portion of the individual psyche. The conscious function and the personal unconscious constitute '*les parties supérieures*' of the psychic functions ; that portion therefore that is ontogenetically inherited and developed. It will be evident, then, that every individual who articulates the collective psyche,

¹ P. Janet : *Les Névroses*. 1909.

that is given him as an *a priori* and unconscious heritage, to his ontogenetically acquired mental equipment, as though it were a part of the latter, must expand the limits of his personality in an unjustifiable way, with corresponding results. Because the collective psyche represents the '*parties inférieures*' of the psychic functions, and consequently the basis of every personality, its effect upon the personality is either burdensome or depreciative. The personality is liable to be overborne or inflated by it, either in a smothering of the feeling of self, or else in an unconscious intensification of the ego to the point of a pathological will to power.

Through the fact that analysis makes the personal unconscious conscious, the subject becomes aware of things which, however much he had seen them in others, were never before entertained as components of himself. By means of this knowledge he becomes less peculiar, and more adapted socially. This movement towards collectivity is not necessarily a step backward; it is often very much to the good. For there are many people who repress their good qualities and give free and conscious rein to their infantile wishes. The breaking down of the personal repression brings at first merely personal contents into consciousness; but mixed with them are certain collective elements of the unconscious, such as universal instincts, qualities, and ideas (images), as well as those 'statistical' fragments of average virtue and average vice which we recognize when we say 'every one possesses something of the criminal, the genius, and the saint within him.' Finally, a living image comes to birth that contains virtually all that moves on the black and white chess-board of the world, the good as well as the bad, the beautiful as well as the ugly. Gradually a likeness, or abstracted image of the world is built up through this assimilation, which is felt by many natures as something very positive, and which in certain cases becomes the decisive motivating factor in the treatment of the neurosis. I have myself observed individuals

who, when this condition developed, found it possible, for the first time in their lives, both to arouse and to experience love. Or, in other relations, this condition has enabled patients to dare that needful leap into the unknown, through which they became involved in the destiny that their further growth demanded. Again, I have observed not a few who, through taking this condition for a definitive and final statement, have remained for years in an enterprising state of euphoria. Often, of course, one has heard such cases referred to in glowing terms as examples of analytical therapy. This being so, I feel bound to point out that this euphoric type of case that responds enthusiastically to every kind of enterprise, suffers so pitifully from an inadequate differentiation from the world, that no one could regard them as fundamentally cured. I think they may be said to be just as much cured as not cured. I have had occasion to follow some of these 'brilliant' examples on their way through life, and it must be frankly owned that they exhibit many symptoms of maladjustment; and, if they remain long enough in this condition, that characteristic sterility and monotony gradually develop which is invariably associated with the sacrifice or obliteration of the self. I am speaking here again of border-line cases. Naturally I am not referring to those normal and average folk with all their inferiorities, for whom adaptation is really more of a technical than a problematical question. If I were more a therapist and less an investigator I could certainly not refrain from a certain optimism of judgment, because my interest would be centred in the number of cures. But my conscience as an investigator is concerned not with numbers, but with quality. Nature is aristocratic, and one valuable person outweighs ten others of less value. I followed these valuable people, and it was from them that I learned the dubiousness of the results of a purely personal analysis, and in addition, gained a certain understanding of the cause of the dubiousness.

If, in the process of assimilating the unconscious, we make

the mistake of including the collective psyche in the inventory of the personal psychic functions, a dissolution of the personality into its pairs of opposites inevitably follows. Besides the pair of opposites just described, namely, megalomania and the sense of inferiority—which is the one especially evident in neurosis—there are many other pairs of opposites, from which I will single out good and evil, the specifically moral opposites. The specific virtues and vices of humanity are contained in the collective psyche as well as everything else. One person takes collective virtues to himself, as though they were his personal merit, another takes as his personal guilt the collective vices. Both identifications are as great an illusion as were the superiority and inferiority, in the case already described. For the imagined virtues, as well as the imagined sins, are merely the moral pair of opposites contained in the collective psyche that are brought to consciousness either through feeling or by some artificial means. To what extent these opposites are contained in the collective psyche is exemplified by the primitives in whom one observer will perceive the greatest virtues, while another will record the very worst impressions received from the self-same tribe. Both are true for the primitive, whose personal differentiation is admittedly still undetached from his origins. Consequently his psyche is essentially collective, and for the most part unconscious. He is still practically identical with the collective psyche, and therefore possesses the collective virtues and vices, without any feeling of personal claim or responsibility, and without any sense of conflict. The conflict develops only when a personal psychic development begins, and reason discovers the irreconcilable nature of the opposites. The result of this knowledge is repression. We want to be good and, therefore, must repress the evil ; thus the paradise of the collective psyche comes to an end. The repression of the collective psyche was an absolute necessity of personality development.

Development of personality in primitives, or more accurately, the development of the person, is a question of magical prestige. The figure of the medicine man, or the chief, is always the model of personal prestige ; both make themselves conspicuous by the uniqueness of their ornaments and by their ways of living, that is to say, by the way in which they express their rôles. The individual is singled out from the rest by the singularity of his outer tokens, and when this singularity also includes the ritual secrets, the differences are still further enhanced. By these and similar means, the primitive creates around him a screen, which might be called a *persona* (mask). Masks, as we know, are actually used among primitives in totem ceremonies, for instance, as a means of enhancing or changing the personality. In this way, a distinguished individual is apparently able to remove himself from the sphere of the collective psyche, and in so far as he succeeds in identifying himself with his *persona* he is really detached. This detachment means magical prestige. It would be easy to assert that will to power is the impelling motive of this development. But it must not be forgotten that the building-up of prestige is always a collective compromise ; for in every case, there must be not only an individual who seeks prestige, but also a public seeking an individual upon whom the prestige is to be conferred. It would be therefore incorrect to interpret this situation as the act of one man who creates prestige for himself because of his individual will to power ; since essentially it is an entirely collective opportunity. Society as a whole needs the magically effective person ; accordingly it makes use of the will to power in the individual, and of the will to submit in the many as a vehicle to this end. Together these two components create personal prestige. This latter phenomenon possesses, as is shown in the history of political beginnings, the very greatest importance for the common life of the people. We ourselves have not yet advanced beyond this level.

The importance of personal prestige can hardly be overstated, because it also involves the very real danger of a regressive loss of individuality in the collective psyche, not only for the distinguished individual, but also for his followers. This possibility is most likely to occur when the goal of the prestige, namely, general recognition, has been reached. The person then becomes a collective truth. When this point is reached it is always the beginning of the end. To gain prestige is not only a positive achievement for the distinguished individual; it is also an asset to his clan. The individual distinguishes himself by his deeds, the many by their renunciation of power. So long as this attitude needs to be defended and maintained against adverse environmental influences, the achievement remains positive; but, as soon as there are no more obstacles, and general recognition is attained, the prestige loses its positive value and becomes, as a rule, a dead letter. A schismatic movement is now due, whereby the process repeats itself.

Because personality is of such paramount importance for the life of the community, everything likely to disturb its development is sensed as a danger. But the greatest danger is the premature disintegration of prestige by an untimely irruption of the collective psyche. Absolute secrecy is one of the best known primitive means of exorcising this danger. Collective thinking, feeling, and achievement are relatively effortless in comparison with individual accomplishment; hence there is always a great temptation to allow collective functioning to take the place of individual differentiation. If the differentiated personality who has been protected by magical prestige, becomes levelled down and finally absorbed in the collective psyche (Peter's denial) the individual suffers 'loss of soul,' because an important achievement has either been abandoned, or allowed to slip back into regressive channels. For this reason, taboo infringements are followed by Draconian punishments, corresponding to the

importance of the situation. If we restrict ourselves to the purely causal view, and regard these things as historical survivals and metastases of the incest taboo,¹ it is impossible to understand what value these measures could have. If, however, we approach the problem from the final view-point, much that was quite inexplicable becomes clear.

A strict differentiation from the collective psyche is, then, a *sine qua non* for the development of personality, since a partial or blurred differentiation inevitably leads to a liquefaction of the individual in the collective. In the analysis of the unconscious the danger of the collective psyche becoming fused with the personal is always present, and this, as I have shown, has unfortunate results. These results can be harmful in two respects: the patient's life-feeling or relation to himself may be falsified, and secondly his relation to his fellowmen can become definitely injurious, if he has any influence at all over his environment. Through his identification with the collective psyche, he is invariably tempted to force the demands of his unconscious upon others, since the state of identity with the collective psyche is always accompanied by a feeling of general validity (god-likeness) which simply disregards the differences in the personal psychology of his fellowmen. (The feeling of general validity comes from the universality of the collective psyche.) A collective attitude naturally presupposes the same collective attitude in others. But that means a ruthless disregard, not only of individual distinctions, but also of those of a more general kind within the collective psyche itself, such, for example, as differences of race.² This disregard of individual

¹ Freud: *Totem and Taboo*.

² Hence it would be an unpardonable mistake, to accept the conclusions of a Jewish psychology as generally valid. It would occur to no one to take Chinese or Indian psychology as binding for ourselves. The cheap accusation of anti-semitism levelled at me on the ground of this criticism is as unintelligent as an anti-Chinese prejudice would be on the same score. It is true that an earlier and deeper level of psychic development can be tapped, where it is still

distinctiveness naturally means the suffocation of the single individual, the consequence of which is a rapid obliteration of the element of differentiation in the community. This element of differentiation is the individual. All the highest achievements, as well as all the vilest deeds, are individual. The greater a community is, and the more the summation of collective factors, peculiar to every large community, is supported by conservative prejudice to the detriment of everything individual, the more will the individual be morally and spiritually crushed. And thus the only source of moral and spiritual progress is choked up. Naturally, in such an atmosphere, the only things that can flourish are society and all the collective elements in the individual. All that is individual in a man has to go under, which means, it is repressed. The individual elements are forced into the unconscious, where they become transformed regularly into the principle of evil. The destructive and anarchical tendencies thus produced have a bearing socially, it is true, through certain prophetically inclined individuals, or through conspicuous crimes like regicide and the like, but in the great mass of the community they remain in the background, and are seen only indirectly in the inevitable moral degeneration of society. It is a well-known fact that the morality of a society as a whole is in inverse ratio to its size ; for the more individuals congregate together, the more individual factors become blotted out. This means the decay of morality, which rests entirely upon the moral feeling of the individual, the indispensable condition of which is freedom. It follows that every man is unconsciously a worse man, in a certain

impossible to distinguish between an Aryan, Semitic, Hamitic, or Mongolian mentality, since all human races have a common collective psyche. But with the beginning of racial differentiation, essential differences are developed in the collective psyche. For this reason we cannot transplant the spirit of a foreign race *in globo* into our mentality without sensible injury, a fact which does not, however, deter many natures that are poor in instinct from affecting Indian philosophy and the like.

sense, when he is in society than when acting alone ; he is carried by the group and to that extent is relieved of his individual responsibility. A large company that is made up of entirely admirable people resembles, in respect to its morality and intelligence, an unwieldy, stupid, and violent animal. Hence the larger the organization, the more is its immorality and blind stupidity inevitable. (*Senatus bestia, senatores boni viri.*) By automatically stressing the collective qualities in its individual representatives, society will necessarily set a premium on everything that is average and that tends to vegetate in an easy, irresponsible way. It is unavoidable that individuality will be driven to the wall. This process begins in school, continues at the university, and rules everything in which the state has a hand. In a smaller social body, the individuality of its members is better safe-guarded, their relative freedom is greater, and hence there is a wider possibility of conscious responsibility. Without freedom, there can be no morality. Our admiration of our great organizations would soon dwindle were we to become aware of the other side of the wonder, namely, the tremendous heaping-up and accentuation of all that is 'primitive in man, and the unavoidable disintegration of his individuality in favour of that monstrosity which every great organization is, on its nether side. A man of to-day, who corresponds more or less to the collective moral ideal, has made his heart into a den of murderers. This is not difficult to prove by the analysis of his unconscious, even though he himself is not in the least disturbed by the fact. In so far as he is normally ' adapted ' ¹ to his environment, even the greatest infamy on the part of his group will not disturb him, so long as the majority of his companions steadfastly believe in the exalted morality of their social organization.

The picture I have just outlined of the influence of society

¹ Compare ' adjustment ' and ' adaptation ' : *Psychological Types*, p. 419.

upon the individual, is equally true of the influence of the collective unconscious upon the individual psyche. But the latter influence, as my example shows, is as invisible as the former is visible. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the inner effects should not be understood, and that people to whom such things happen are called pathological freaks and are treated as crazy. But if one of these 'freaks' should chance to be a real genius, the fact may be noted by the next, or the succeeding generation. Although it may seem perfectly plausible to us that one man can be drowned in his own social worth, it may nevertheless seem quite inexplicable that another should seek a goal that is wholly different from what the many desire, and that he should vanish permanently in this other direction. Both would be more to our liking were they but endowed with humour—that truly divine attribute of man, according to Schopenhauer, which alone fits him to maintain his soul in the state of freedom.

Through the analysis of the unconscious the far-reaching effects of collective instincts and basal forms of human thought and feeling are recognized as a valuable asset to the conscious personality. But they cannot be assimilated without a correspondingly far-reaching disturbance of the mind. In practical treatment, therefore, it is of the very greatest importance to keep always in mind the integrity of the personality. If the contents of the collective psyche are conceived as a personal possession of the individual, it may mean either a moral seduction, or a burdening of the personality that can be almost unmanageable. Hence it is absolutely imperative to make a clear distinction between what is personal content, and what contents belong to the collective psyche. But this distinction is not too easy to make, since the personal grows out of the collective psyche, and is intimately linked up with it. It is difficult to say therefore, which contents are to be allotted to the collective psyche, and which to the personal. There is no doubt at all, for instance,

that the archaic symbolism we find so frequently in phantasies and dreams is a collective factor. All the fundamental instincts and basal forms of thought and feeling are collective. And the same applies to everything that is generally understood, generally present, or generally said and done. When we examine ourselves closely, we are astonished to see how much of our so-called individual psychology is really collective. So much is this the case that what is individual seems to be completely overshadowed and obliterated by it. But inasmuch as individuation¹ is a quite indispensable psychological requirement, it is possible to infer from this estimation of the superior force of the collective, what extremely careful attention is demanded by this tender plant, individuality, if it is not to be completely smothered by the collective.

Man has one capacity, which is of the greatest possible service for collective aims, but which is quite the most harmful for individuation, namely, the power of imitation. Social psychology cannot dispense with imitation, for without it mass organizations, the state, and the ordering of society are simply impossible. Imitation embraces suggestibility, *i.e.* the influence of suggestion and mental contagion; it must be evident therefore that imitation, and not laws and statutes, is responsible for the ordering of society. But every day, on the other hand, we can see how the mechanism of imitation is used, or rather misused, for the purpose of personal differentiation. A distinguished personality, an unusual characteristic or activity is simply imitated, whereby a certain superficial distinction from the immediate environment is achieved. As punishment for this—one is almost bound to express it in these terms—the essential resemblance to the spirit of the

¹ Compare *Psychological Types*, pp. 561 ff. "Individuation, therefore, is a process of differentiation, having for its goal the development of the individual personality." "Since the individual is not only a single, separate being, but, by his very existence, also presupposes a collective relationship, the process of individuation must clearly lead to a more intensive and universal collective solidarity, and not to mere isolation."

environment is intensified to the point of an unconscious, compulsive union with it. Usually this falsified attempt at individual differentiation does not go beyond a pose, and the imitator stays on his former level, only several degrees more sterile than before. For the discovery of the truly individual elements in ourselves, a fundamental and unflinching reflection is required, and then, suddenly, we become aware of the immense difficulty of the task which individuality necessarily entails.

CHAPTER III

THE PERSONA AS A PART OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE

IN this chapter we come to a problem that can cause the greatest confusion, if not taken into account. It will be remembered that analysis of the personal unconscious involves the conscious assimilation of personal contents, and I recommended that these contents which had been repressed, but which could just as well have been conscious, should be called the personal unconscious. It was also shown that assimilation of the deeper layers of the unconscious, which I have called the collective unconscious, often produced an extension of the personality, described as a condition of inflation. This condition may be arrived at by simply pursuing the analytical work, as was the case in the example referred to. By continuing the analysis, there is added to the personal conscious, certain impersonal, universal, and fundamental characteristics of humanity, and by this conjunction the inflation I have described takes place. The inflation must be regarded as the unpleasant consequence of becoming conscious.¹ The conscious personality is a more

¹ This phenomenon, which results from the extension of consciousness, is in no sense specific to analytical treatment. It occurs whenever people are overcome by knowledge or by some important realization. "Knowledge puffeth up" Paul writes to the Corinthians, for the new knowledge had turned the heads of many, as indeed always happens. The state of inflation offers no criterion as to the character of the realization; it merely demonstrates the fact that new knowledge can so seize hold of a weak head, that everything else practically ceases to exist. The person thus afflicted becomes hypnotized by his knowledge, and immediately believes he has solved the riddle of the universe. This is of course synonymous with extreme

or less arbitrary excerpt of the collective psyche. It consists of a sum of psychic facts that are sensed as personal. The attribute 'personal' expresses the state of exclusive possession by this particular person. A consciousness that is purely personal emphasizes its peculiar and exclusive right to its contents with a certain anxiety, seeking therewith to construct a totality. But all the contents that do not readily fit into this totality are either overlooked and forgotten, or repressed and denied. This is also a kind of self-education, but it is too arbitrary, and does too great violence to the facts. In favour of an ideal image, into which one would prefer to mould oneself, too much that is generally human has to be sacrificed. These 'personal' people are accordingly always very sensitive, for something is only too liable to happen that will bring to consciousness some unwelcome part of their real (individual) character.

This excerpt of the collective psyche—fashioned often with considerable pains—I have called the *persona*. The word 'persona' is really a very suitable expression for it; since *persona* originally meant the mask worn by an actor

self-exaggeration. It is in fact such a general reaction, that in Genesis ii. 17, eating of the tree of knowledge is represented as a deadly sin. It may not be immediately apparent why greater consciousness followed by a certain exaggeration of self should be such a dangerous thing. Genesis represents the act of becoming conscious as the breaking of a taboo, as though the gaining of knowledge meant that a sacred barrier had been impiously over-stepped. Genesis is surely right, inasmuch as each step to a greater consciousness is a kind of Promethean guilt. Through the realization, the gods are in a certain sense robbed of their fire. That is to say, something belonging to the unconscious powers has been torn out of its natural connections, and has been subordinated to conscious choice. The man who has usurped the new knowledge suffers, however, a transformation or enlargement of consciousness, which no longer resembles that of his fellowmen. He has certainly raised himself above the human level of his time ('ye will become like God'), but in doing so, he has also alienated himself from humanity. The pain of this loneliness is the gods' revenge, for he can never again return to men. He is, as the myth says, chained to the lonely cliffs of the Caucasus, forsaken of God and man.

to signify his rôle. For if we are bold enough to attempt an exact discrimination between what should be counted as personal, and what as impersonal psychic material, we soon find ourselves in the greatest dilemma ; because, taken fundamentally, the contents of the persona are found to have the self-same character as we noticed when considering the collective unconscious, that is to say, they are quite general in character. Only, by virtue of the fact that the persona is a more or less accidental or arbitrary slice of the collective psyche, we can easily make the mistake of accepting it *in toto* as something ' individual.' Whereas it is, as its name tells us, only a mask of the collective psyche, a mask that is a substitute for individuality, intending to make others as well as oneself believe one is individual. In reality it is only a rôle that is played ; it is, as it were, the collective psyche speaking.

When we analyse the persona we take off the mask ; and then we discover that what seemed to be individual is at bottom collective, in other words, the persona was only the mask of the collective psyche. Fundamentally the persona is not real. It is a compromise between the individual and society as to the kind of semblance to adopt, what a man should ' appear to be.' He takes a name, earns a title, represents an office, and belongs to this or that. In a certain sense all this is real, yet in relation to the essential individuality it is only a secondary reality, a mere compromise formation in which others often have a greater share in the making than the individual himself. The persona is a semblance, a two dimensional reality, to give it a sort of nickname.

But it would be incorrect to present the matter in this way without at the same time recognizing that there is already something individual in the particular choice and definition of the persona, and that, notwithstanding even an exclusive identification of the ego-consciousness with the

persona, the unconscious self, that is, the real individuality is always present, making itself felt if not directly, then indirectly. Although the ego-consciousness is practically identical with the persona—that compromise-formation in which a man appears before collectivity as playing a rôle—yet the unconscious self can never be so completely repressed as to have its power and influence extinguished. Its influence is chiefly manifested in the particular way in which unconscious contents are contrasted with and compensate the conscious. The purely personal attitude of consciousness produces certain reactions from the unconscious, which, besides personal repressions, also contains possibilities for individual development under the veil of collective phantasies. Through the analysis of the personal unconscious, this collective material is brought into consciousness along with the elements of the individuality proper. I am aware that this conclusion is almost incomprehensible to anyone who is not familiar with my conceptions and with my technique, and that it must be peculiarly unintelligible to anyone who is accustomed to view the unconscious from the Freudian standpoint. But if the reader will recall the example of my woman patient who studied philosophy, he can get an approximate idea of what my formulation means. At the beginning of the treatment my patient was unaware that her relation to her father was in the nature of a fixation, and that accordingly she had sought out a man resembling her father, whom she then proceeded to engage on the side of the intellect. This would not have been a mistake, were it not for the fact that her intellect had a peculiar character of protest, a character not infrequently encountered in intellectual women. This kind of intellect is always trying to prove others in the wrong ; it is markedly critical, with an unpleasant personal undertone, but none the less wants to be considered objective. This invariably has an irritating effect upon a man, more especially when the criticism, as not

infrequently happens, hits a sore point which, in the interests of a profitable discussion, were better avoided. But it is an unfortunate peculiarity of this feminine intellect to care less about the possible fruitfulness of a discussion than for the opportunity of seeking out a man's weak spots, and, by hooking fast to these, to irritate the man almost beyond endurance. This is not usually a conscious aim, but rather has the unconscious purpose of forcing the man to be superior, and in this way it tends to make him an object of wonder and admiration. The man does not, as a rule, notice that he is being forced into the hero rôle, and he finds the nagging so unpleasant, that in future he avoids the lady. In the end the only man who can stand her is the one who gives in right away, and who therefore has nothing wonderful about him.

My patient found much to reflect upon in all this, because she had of course no notion of this whole game she was playing. Moreover, she had to gain insight into a regular romance that had been enacted between herself and her father ever since her childhood. It would take us too far afield, were I to give a detailed picture of the way in which, from her earliest years, she had played, with unconscious understanding, upon the shadow side of her father. This was the side that was naturally turned away from the mother, and in consequence she had become—far in advance of her years—a kind of rival to the mother. All this came to light as the content of the personal unconscious. Since, on professional grounds, I did not allow myself to be irritated, I was unavoidably cast for the rôle of hero and father-lover. Thus the transference also consisted chiefly of the content of the personal unconscious. My hero-rôle was an appearance only, and as I became a mere phantom through this projection, she also could play her traditional rôle—that of the supremely wise, all understanding, mother-daughter-lover, a mere rôle, a persona, behind which her real and actual being, her individual self lay hidden. Inasmuch as

at first she was completely identified with her rôle, she was completely unconscious of her real self. She was still lost in the mists of her infantile world, and had not yet made the discovery of the real world. But as she advanced in her analysis, and gradually became conscious of the nature of her transference, she began to have the dreams which I referred to in Chapter I. These dreams brought powerful elements from the collective unconscious which dissolved her infantile world, and also released her from the traditional hero-drama. She came to herself, and to her own real possibilities. This, or something like it, is the course most cases run, if the analysis is pursued with sufficient depth and sincerity. That the consciousness of her individuality should exactly coincide with the reawakening of an archaic image of god is by no means a mere isolated coincidence, but a very frequent occurrence which, in my opinion, corresponds to an unconscious natural order, in other words, a law-determined process.

After this excursion, let us now resume the course of our earlier reflections.

When once the personal repressions are removed, the individuality and the collective psyche, more or less fused together, begin to emerge, and therewith the hitherto repressed personal phantasies are released. The phantasies and dreams which now appear assume a somewhat different aspect. There is one infallible sign of the collective image, namely, it always seems to be 'cosmic' in character. I mean by this, that there is always a connection in the dream and phantasy-images with certain cosmic qualities, such as temporal and spatial infinity, enormous speed and extension of movement, 'astrological' connections, telluric, lunar, and solar analogies, essential changes in the proportions of the body, etc. The obvious application of mythological and religious motives in a dream also points to the activity of the collective unconscious. The collective element is very

often announced by peculiar symptoms,¹ for example, where the dreamer is flying like a comet, or he becomes the earth, or the sun, or a star ; or he may become inordinately large, or dwarfishly small ; or he has died, or has been transported into a strange place, or has become alien to himself, confused, or mad, etc. Similarly, feelings of disorientation, or dizziness may appear along with symptoms of inflation.

The abundance of possibilities in the collective psyche has a confusing and blinding effect. The dissolution of the persona is accompanied by a release of involuntary phantasy, which is apparently the specific activity of the collective psyche. This activity brings undreamed-of contents to consciousness. But as the influence of the collective unconscious increases, the conscious function gradually loses its power of leadership. By imperceptible degrees it consents to be led, while an unconscious and impersonal process gradually takes over the leadership. Thus without noticing the fact, the conscious personality is placed in the position of being one figure among many on the chess-board, and feels himself moved by an invisible player. This it is that decides the game of fate, not consciousness and its purpose. And this was the way in which the dissolving of the transference, apparently so impossible to consciousness, was brought about in the case I mentioned.

This deeper movement of the analytical process is unavoidable whenever the subject is faced with the necessity of overcoming an apparently insuperable obstacle. It goes without saying that this necessity is not present in every case of neurosis, since, in the majority, the first question to be considered is the removal of more or less temporary difficulties of adaptation. Severe cases certainly cannot

¹ In this connection it is not superfluous to note that collective elements in dreams are not restricted to this particular stage of analytic treatment. There are many psychological situations in which the activity of the collective unconscious comes to the surface. But this is not the place to enlarge upon these conditions.

be helped without a far-reaching change in character, in other words, a radical change of attitude. In most cases so much work is demanded by the adaptation to reality, that adaptation to the inner world, *i.e.* the collective unconscious, is postponed *sine die*. But as soon as this inner adaptation becomes a problem, a peculiar, irresistible attraction comes from the unconscious which exercises an essential influence on the conscious direction of life. The predominance of unconscious influences, accompanied by the disintegration of the persona and the relative decline of the guiding power of consciousness, mean a state of psychic disequilibrium. This is brought about artificially in analytical treatment for the therapeutic purpose of resolving a difficulty that might block further development. There are of course innumerable obstacles that can be overcome by good advice and moral backing, assisted by insight and goodwill on the part of the patient. Excellent curative results can be obtained in this way. Not infrequently there are cases with whom no word of the unconscious need be mentioned. But difficulties also exist, for which a satisfactory solution cannot possibly be foreseen. In cases of this kind, if the psychic equilibrium is not already disturbed before treatment begins, it will certainly be upset during the analysis, and without any particular interference on the part of the physician. It often seems as though these patients had only been waiting to find a trustworthy person, in order to throw up the game and collapse. A loss of mental balance such as this is similar in principle to a psychotic disturbance, that is, it can be distinguished from the initial stages of mental disease only by the fact that its further course leads to greater health, while the latter leads to increasing disturbance. It is a condition of panic, a surrender in the face of apparently hopeless confusion. Most cases make desperate efforts to master the difficulty by force of will. Then comes the collapse, in which the previously guiding will fails completely.

The energy thus freed, disappears from consciousness and falls into the unconscious. It is a fact that in these moments the first signs of unconscious activity appear. (As, for instance, in the example of the insane youth.) Obviously the energy that fell away from consciousness has activated the unconscious. The immediate result is a change of mind. It could easily be imagined that, in the case of the youth, a stronger brain might have taken that vision of the stars as a healing vision, and have looked on human suffering *sub specie æternitatis*, in which case his reason would have been restored.¹

In this way what appeared to be an insurmountable difficulty would have been removed. Hence I regard the loss of mental balance as purposive, since it replaces failing consciousness with the automatic and instinctive activity of the unconscious. The latter points toward a new equilibrium, and moreover will achieve this goal, provided that the conscious is able to assimilate the contents produced by the unconscious, in other words, that it is capable of understanding and elaborating them. If the unconscious simply enforces the conscious, a psychotic condition develops. If it can neither completely prevail, nor be understood, a conflict develops that cripples all further advance. But with this question, namely, the understanding of the collective unconscious, we come to a quite considerable difficulty which I have used as the theme of the following chapter.

¹ Flournay: *Automatisme téléologique*; and Jung: *Psychology of Dementia Præcox*.

CHAPTER IV

THE ATTEMPT TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE

(a) *The Regressive Restoration of the Persona*

A COLLAPSE of the conscious attitude is no small matter. It always feels like the end of the world ; as though everything had tumbled back into original chaos. There is a sense of being delivered up, disorientated, like a rudderless ship that is abandoned to the moods of the elements. At least this is how it seems. In reality, however, one has fallen back upon the collective unconscious, which now takes over the leadership. Innumerable examples could be given, where at the critical moment a ' saving ' thought, a vision, an inner voice came with an irresistible power of conviction, and gave a new direction to life. But probably as many instances could be found, in which the collapse meant a catastrophe that destroyed a life ; for in these moments morbid ideas are liable to take firm root, or chosen ideals may be obliterated, which is equally bad. In the first type of case a psychic singularity, or a psychosis develops, and in the latter a condition of disorientation and demoralization. But when the unconscious contents break through into the conscious, filling it with their almost sinister power of conviction, it is very much a question as to how the individual will react. Will he be overpowered by these contents ? Or will he simply believe them ? (The ideal thing, namely, critical understanding, I am leaving out of account for the moment.) The first type of case means paranoia, or schizophrenia. The second

may either become an eccentric with a taste for prophecy, or he may revert to an infantile attitude, but in either case he is cut away from human society and culture. The third case involves the regressive restoration of the persona. This formulation has a rather technical ring to the lay mind, and the reader will rightly assume that it concerns a very complicated psychic reaction observable in the course of an analytical treatment. It would, however, be a mistake to believe that this process only made its appearance in a psychological treatment. The process can be observed just as well, and often better, in other phases of life, as, for instance, whenever fate has intervened in the course of a man's life in a violent and destructive way. Every one of course has suffered adverse turns of fate, but they are generally wounds that heal, leaving no vital, or incurable crippling. But what we are concerned with here are destructive experiences, that can either smash a man completely, or at least cripple him permanently. Let us take the example of a business man, who took too great a risk and has become bankrupt in consequence. If, instead of allowing himself to be discouraged by this disgrace, he retains his daring undismayed, perhaps with a wholesome caution, his wound will heal without leaving a permanent injury. But if, on the contrary, he goes to pieces, renounces any further risks, and laboriously seeks to reconstruct his social reputation within the framework of a much more restricted personality, doing inferior work with the mentality of a scared child, in a small post far below the level of his powers—if this is his reaction, then, in the technical phrase, he has restored his persona in a regressive way. As the result of his fear, he has slipped back to an earlier evolutionary stage of his personality. He has put too low a value on himself, and it almost seems as though he were still standing before the critical experience, but with a complete inability even to dream of repeating such a risk. Formerly perhaps he wanted to do more than he could

accomplish, but now he does not dare even to attempt what he is really fitted for.

Such experiences happen in every walk of life and in every possible form. Hence, they also occur during the course of a psychological treatment. For here, too, it is primarily a question of the enlargement of the personality, a venture and a risk either of an outer or an inner nature. The example of my woman patient (the philosophy student) shows very well what constitutes the critical experience in the treatment. It is the transference. It is possible for the patient, as I indicated above, to glide over the reef of the transference unconsciously, in which case it does not become an experience, and nothing fundamental takes place. Naturally the physician, out of sheer laziness, might easily wish for such patients. But if they are intelligent, the patients will discover the existence of this problem without assistance. When the physician finds himself, as in the case cited, raised into the position of father-lover, and hence flooded with demands, he must perforce think out ways and means by which he can weather this onslaught, without being drawn into the whirlwind himself, and without the patient suffering undue injury. Violent rupture of the transference may bring on a complete relapse, or even worse, so that the problem must be met with great tact and foresight. The first possibility that suggests itself is the hope, that 'in time' the 'nonsense' will stop of its own accord. Everything comes to an end in time, it is true, but this 'time' factor can lengthen unconscionably, and entail intolerable difficulties on both sides. 'Time,' then, had better be renounced as a healing factor in a case of this kind.

A far better instrument for 'combating' the transference would seem to be provided by the Freudian theory of neurosis. The dependence of the patient is explained as an infantile sexual demand, that takes the place of a reasonable application of sexuality. A similar provision is offered by Adler's

theory,¹ which explains the transference as an infantile power-goal, and as a safeguarding tendency. Both theories fit the neurotic mentality so neatly, that every case of neurosis can be explained equally well by either.² This very remarkable fact, which every unprejudiced observer must substantiate, can lead to only one conclusion, namely, that Freud's 'infantile erotism,' and Adler's 'power tendency' are actually one and the same thing, notwithstanding the battle of opinions between the two schools. It is simply a piece of unmastered, and at first unmasterable, primordial instinct that comes to the surface in the transference phenomenon. The archaic phantasy-forms which gradually reach the surface of consciousness, are only a further proof of this fact.

We may try with both theories to make the patient see how absurd and impossible his demands are, and perhaps in the end he will actually come to his senses again. But my patient was not entirely singular in not achieving this desideratum. It is certainly true that the physician is able to save his face with these theories, and wriggle out of the painful situation with more or less humanity. There actually are patients, for whom a greater expenditure of effort is not worth while (or would seem not to be); but there are also cases where this kind of procedure means a senseless injury to the mind of the patient. In the case of my student I dimly felt something of the sort, and therefore abandoned my rationalistic attempts—albeit with ill-concealed mistrust—in order to give nature a chance to correct what seemed to me to be her own foolishness. As I mentioned before, this opportunity taught me something which I believe to be extraordinarily important, namely, the existence of an unconscious function of self-regulation. The unconscious

¹ Adler: *The Neurotic Constitution*. Kegan, Paul & Co., 1921.

² Cf. an example of such a case in Jung: *The Unconscious in the Normal and Pathological Mind*, pp. 32 ff., present volume.

can not only 'wish'; it can also put an end to its own wishes. This knowledge, of such immense importance for the integrity of the personality, will never be grasped by anyone who remains embedded in the opinion that it is merely a question of infantilism. On the very threshold of this realization he will turn back and say to himself: "It was all nonsense of course. I am a crazy visionary. The best thing to do would be to throw the unconscious overboard with all its works." The meaning and purpose he so eagerly desired he will see as only infantile nonsense. He will understand that his longing was absurd: he will learn to be tolerant with himself and the value of resignation. What can he do? Rather than face the conflict he will turn back and restore his shattered persona as best he can on regressive lines, at the same time discounting all those hopes and expectations which had blossomed forth under the ægis of the transference. Thus he becomes smaller, more limited, more rationalistic than before. It could not be said that for every one this result would be *eo ipso* a misfortune. For there are only too many who, on account of their notorious incapacities, are better fitted for a rationalistic system, than for freedom. The latter belongs to the more difficult things. Anyone who can stand this solution of the problem can say to himself with Faust:

"The sphere of Earth is known enough to me;
The view beyond is barred immutably:
A fool, who there his blinking eyes directeth,
And o'er his clouds of peers a place expecteth!
Firm let him stand, and look around him well!
This World means something to the Capable.
Why needs he through Eternity to wend?
He here acquires what he can apprehend.
Thus let him wander down his earthly day;
When spirits haunt, go quietly his way . . ."¹

This solution would be a happy one if it were actually possible

¹ This and the following quotations are taken from Bayard Taylor's translation of *Faust*.—[ED.]

to shake off the unconscious so completely that its energy would also be deprived of its effect. But experience shows us that only part of the energy can be withdrawn from the unconscious; it remains constantly effective, since it not only contains the libido, but is the very source of the libido from which the psychic elements flow. We cannot therefore delude ourselves into the belief that by any sort of magical theory, or method, the libido can be completely drained away from the unconscious, so that the latter is more or less exhausted. We might espouse this illusion for a time, but a day would come when we should have to say with Faust :

“ Now fills the air so many a haunting shape,
That no one knows how best he may escape.
What though One Day with rational brightness beams,
The Night entangles us in webs of dreams,
From our young fields of life we come, elate :
There croaks a bird : what croaks he ? Evil fate !
By superstition constantly insnared,
It grows to us, and warns, and is declared.
Intimidated thus, we stand alone.
The portal jars, yet entrance is there none.”

No one can arbitrarily strip the unconscious of its effective power. At best, one can merely deceive oneself about it. It is as Goethe says :

“ Though no ear should choose to hear me,
Yet the shrinking heart must fear me :
Though transformed to mortal eyes,
Grimmest power I exercise.”

Only one thing is effective against the unconscious, and that is an indubitable outer necessity. (Every one with a certain knowledge of the unconscious recognizes behind the outer necessity the same face which, before, viewed him from within.) An inner necessity can change into an outer one, and so long as the outer need is real, and not just a pose, psychic problems remain more or less ineffective. This is

why Mephisto offers Faust, who is weary of the foolish ways of magic, the following counsel :

“ Good ! the method is revealed
Without or gold or magic or physician.
Betake thyself to yonder field,
There hoe and dig, as thy condition ;
With unmixed food thy body nourish ;
Live with the ox as ox, and think it not a theft
That thou manur'st the acre which thou reapest.”

It is a well-known fact that the ‘ simple life ’ cannot be faked, and therefore the ‘ problemless ’ life of a poor man, who is really delivered over to fate, can never be bought by such cheap imitations. It is not enough to have within one the possibility of such a life. Only the man who is forced to this life by the necessity of his own nature will blindly pass over the problem of the soul, since he has not yet achieved the capacity that could grasp it. But once he has seen the Faustian problem, the escape into the ‘ simple life ’ is closed to him for ever. There is nothing, of course, to stop him from taking a two-roomed house in the country, or from digging his garden, and eating raw turnips. But his soul laughs at this deception. Only what is really oneself has the power to heal.

The regressive restoration of the persona is a vital possibility only in the case of a man who owes the critical failures of his life to his own inflation. With the reduction of his personality, he regains the measure that he is able to fill. But in every other case, resignation and self-depreciation is an evasion, which in the long run can only be maintained by neurotic suffering. Naturally, in the conscious view of the person concerned, his condition does not seem like an evasion, but rather as an impossibility of coping with the problem. Usually he is a lonely figure, and little or nothing is to be found in our present culture to help him. Even psychology offers him at first purely reductive concepts ; since unavoidably it emphasizes the archaic and infantile

character of his transitional state, thereby making it unacceptable to him. That a therapeutic theory may also serve the purpose of helping the physician to keep his own head out of the noose, without loss of elegance, is poor comfort to him. But this really explains why these reductive theories so beautifully fit the nature of the neurosis—they are invaluable for the physician himself.

(b) *Identification with the Collective Psyche*

The second possibility of meeting the problem would be by the way of identification with the collective psyche. This would be equivalent to the acceptance of the inflation, although raised now to a system. In other words, one would be the lucky possessor of *the* great truth, that was waiting to be discovered, the conclusive realization which means the 'saving of the peoples.' This attitude does not necessarily signify megalomania in its most direct form; it corresponds rather to the milder and more familiar form of the prophet, reformer, and martyr. Weak minds run no small risk when exposed to this temptation, since as a rule they have more than their due share of ambition, vanity, and inappropriate naïvety. The opening of the doors to the collective psyche means a renewal of life for the individual, whether or no this renewal is felt as pleasant or unpleasant. Everybody desires to sustain this renewal: one man because his life-feeling is intensified, another, because it seems to promise an abundant increase of knowledge, a third, because it offers him a key which can transform his whole life. Every one, therefore, who does not want to lose the great value that lies buried in the collective psyche, will strive his utmost not to lose the newly won access to the fundamental sources of life.¹ To this end, identification would seem to be the most

¹ I would like here to call to mind an interesting observation of Kant's. In his *Lectures on Psychology* (Leipzig, 1889), he speaks of the "treasure lying in the field of dim representations, which constitute

direct way ; since the disintegration of the persona in the collective psyche is almost a direct invitation to espouse these abysmal powers, or like a descent into the abyss, leaving memory behind. This piece of mysticism is innate in all men of the better sort, just as 'the longing for the mother,' or the backward glance towards the source whence he sprang is born in every man.

As we have already seen, the regressive longing which Freud conceived as 'infantile fixation,' or as the 'incest wish,' contains a particular value and necessity. This is beautifully exemplified in the myths by the fact, that it is just the best and strongest man of the people, its hero, who follows the regressive longing, and purposely exposes himself to the danger of being swallowed-up by the monster of the maternal, primeval element. Yet his heroic quality is shown only by the fact, that he does not allow himself to be finally engulfed, but conquers the monster, not once, but many times. It is the conquest of the collective psyche that yields the real value, the capture of the treasure, the invincible weapon, the magic shield, or safeguard, or whatever things the myth deems most desirable. Therefore, whoever identifies himself with the collective psyche, or, in mythical terms, whoever lets himself be swallowed by the monster—hence more or less consumed by it—is certainly near the treasure that is guarded by the dragon, yet he is in the highest degree unfree, and is there to his own great harm.

No one conscious of the absurdity of this identification would have the courage to make a principle of it. But there is danger in the fact that many lack the necessary humour, or lacking it at just this point, are seized by a sort of pathos, a perpetual pregnancy of meanings which hinders any effective self-criticism. I do not mean to deny in general the existence the deep abyss of human knowledge that we can never reach." This treasure, as shown in detail in my book, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, is the summation of the primordial images in which the libido is invested, or, more accurately, the self-representations of the libido.

of real prophets, but in the name of caution we must begin by doubting each individual case ; since it is a very ticklish matter simply to accept a man without more ado as a genuine prophet. Every real prophet defends himself vigorously against the unconscious expectations which this rôle always provokes. When therefore a prophet suddenly emerges from obscurity, it is better first to bear the possibility in mind of a loss of psychic balance.

But besides the possibility of becoming a prophet, a subtler, and apparently more legitimate joy beckons, namely, one can become the disciple of a prophet. For the great majority this is an altogether ideal technique. Its advantages are these : the *odium dignitatis*, namely the super-human responsibility of the prophet, becomes the so much sweeter *otium indignitatis*. The disciple is unworthy ; modestly he sits at the feet of the ' master,' guarding himself from having ideas of his own. Spiritual laziness becomes a virtue ; it is permissible to bask in the sun of at least a semi-divine being. The archaism and infantilism of the unconscious phantasies are not debited to his own account, since all responsibility is laid at the ' master's ' door. Through his deification of the ' master,' the disciple, without apparently noticing it, waxes in stature ; moreover, does he not possess the great truth—not his own discovery of course—but at least received from the ' master's ' own hands ? Naturally, the disciples always cleave together, not indeed out of love, but with the very understandable intention of receiving an effortless confirmation of their own convictions by creating a collective harmony.

This is an identification with the collective psyche that seems altogether more commendable. Another man has the honour of being a prophet, but also the dangerous responsibility of it. Himself, he is just a disciple, but none the less a joint guardian of the great treasure which the ' master ' found. He feels the full dignity and burden of such a

position, and deems it a solemn duty and moral necessity to revile others of a different mind, to enrol proselytes, and to hold up a light to mankind in general, exactly as though he were himself the prophet. These are the people who, normally concealed behind an apparently modest persona, when inflated by the identification with the collective psyche, suddenly make an appearance on the scene. For just as the prophet is a primordial image of the collective psyche, so the disciple of the prophet is also a primordial image.

In both cases inflation comes into play through the collective unconscious, and the independence of the individuality suffers by it. But since by no means every individuality has the strength to stand alone, the disciple-phantasy is perhaps the best they are able to realize. The gratifications, consequent on the inflation, are at least a small compensation for the loss of spiritual freedom. We should also not minimize the fact that the life of a real, or imagined prophet is full of sorrows, disappointments, and sacrifices, so that the hosannah-singing band of disciples has the value of a compensation. This is all so humanly understandable that one would have to confess to great astonishment if it should lead to any destination whatsoever.

PART II. INDIVIDUATION

CHAPTER I

THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

THERE is a destination and a possibility beyond the stage treated in Part I. This is the way of individuation. Individuation means to become a single, discrete being, and, inasmuch as the concept individuality embraces that innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness of our being, it also includes the idea of becoming one's own real self. Hence individuation could also be translated as 'coming to selfhood,' or 'self-realization.'

The developmental possibilities that were discussed in the preceding chapters are, at bottom, methods of self-deprivation, namely, ways of divesting the self of its reality, in favour of an outer rôle, or in favour of an imaginary meaning. In the former case the self gives place to social recognition, in the latter to the auto-suggestive significance of a primordial image. In both cases the collective predominates. Self-divestiture in favour of the collective corresponds to a social ideal; it even passes for social duty and virtue, although it can also be misused for egoistical purposes. Egoists are often called 'self-centred.' This, naturally, has nothing to do with the concept of 'self,' as I am using it here. On the other hand, self-realization seems to stand in opposition to self-divestiture. This misunderstanding is quite general, and it arises from the fact that not enough

distinction is made between individualism and individuation. Individualism is a purposeful attempt to stress and make conspicuous some ostensible peculiarity, in opposition to collective considerations and obligations. But individuation means precisely a better and more complete fulfilment of the collective dispositions of mankind, since an adequate consideration of the peculiarity of the individual is more conducive to a better social achievement, than when the peculiarity is neglected or repressed. For the uniqueness of an individual must not be understood as a mere strangeness, or singularity of his substance or components, but rather as a peculiar combination of elements, or as a gradual differentiation of functions and capacities which in themselves are universal. Every human face has a nose, two eyes, etc., but these universal factors are variable, and it is this variability which makes individual peculiarity possible. Individuation, therefore, can only mean a psychological evolutionary process that fulfils the given individual dispositions. In other words, it is a process by which a man can create of himself that definite, unique being that he feels himself, at bottom, to be. In so doing he does not become 'self-centred' in the ordinary sense of the word; he is merely fulfilling the particularity of his nature, something vastly different from egoism or individualism.

Inasmuch as the human individual, as a living unity, is made up of universal factors, this unity is wholly collective, and therefore in no sense opposed to collectivity. The individualistic emphasis on one's own peculiarities is, therefore, a contradiction of this fundamental fact of the living being. Individuation, on the other hand, aims at an essential cooperation of all factors. But because the factors—which are themselves universal—appear only in an individual form, their complete recognition produces an individual effect that cannot be surpassed by any other means, least of all, by individualism.

Fundamentally the aim of individuation is to free the self from the false wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and from the suggestive power of the unconscious images on the other. From what has been said, it should now be sufficiently clear as to the psychological meaning of the persona. But when we turn to the other side, namely, to the operative effect of the collective unconscious, we find ourselves in a dark inner world that is vastly more difficult to understand than the psychology of the persona, which is accessible to every one. Everybody knows what it means 'to have an official air,' or 'to play a social rôle,' etc. The persona is a means by which a man can appear to be this or that, or by which he is able to hide behind a mask. He may even build up a definite persona as a barricade. Thus the problem of the persona should offer us no especial difficulties.

But it is another thing to present, in a way that can be generally understood, those subtle inner processes which penetrate consciousness with their mysterious, suggestive power. We can, I think, best portray these influences by the help of examples of mental diseases, creative inspirations, and religious conversions. A most excellent presentation—taken from life, so to speak—of such an inner transformation is to be found in H. G. Wells' *Christina Alberta's Father*. Changes of a similar kind are also described in Léon Daudet's very readable book *L'Hérèdo*. There is likewise a great range of material in William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Although in many cases of this kind there are certain external factors which either directly condition the change, or at all events set it going, yet it is not always the case that the external factors offer a satisfactory basis of explanation for these deep changes of personality. We have to recognize the fact that these transformations can arise from subjective inner causes, opinions, convictions, and ideas in which outer instigations play no part at all, or at

most a very inessential one. In pathological changes of personality this can be said to be the rule. Certain psychotic cases which present a clear and simple reaction to an overwhelming, external event belong to the exceptions. Hence for psychiatry, the inherited or acquired pathological predisposition is the essential ætiological factor. The same rule applies to most creative intuitions. We should scarcely be entitled to assume, for instance, a purely causal connection between the falling apple and Newton's theory of gravitation. Similarly all religious conversions, that cannot be traced to direct suggestion and contagious example, are based upon independent inner processes, the course of which culminates in a change of personality. As a rule, these processes have the peculiarity of being at first subliminal, that is, unconscious processes that only gradually reach consciousness. This moment can, however, be a very sudden one, the mind being instantaneously flooded with most strange and apparently unsuspected contents. To the lay mind, and even to the person involved, this is the way it appears; but every experienced observer knows that psychological events are never sudden. For in reality the irruption of contents from the unconscious has been as a rule many years in preparation, half a lifetime perhaps; even as far back as childhood various remarkable signs might have been observed which, in a more or less symbolic fashion, hinted at an abnormal development in the future. I remember, for instance, a psychotic case who refused all nourishment, and also made the unavoidable nasal feeding extraordinarily difficult. In fact an anæsthetic was required for the introduction of the nasal tube. The patient had a trick of swallowing his tongue in a peculiar way by pressing it back into the throat: a possibility which at that time was quite unknown to me. In a lucid interval I obtained the following history from the man. Even as a boy he had often revolved the idea in his mind as to how he could take his life, supposing every conceivable measure

were being employed to prevent him. He first tried to do it by holding his breath, until he found that, by the time he had induced a state of semi-consciousness, he had begun to breathe again. He therefore gave up these attempts and conceived the idea of refusing food. This phantasy satisfied him, until he discovered that food could be poured into him through the nose. Now he had to think of a way by which this entrance could be closed, and thus came to the idea of pressing his tongue backwards. At first it was beyond his powers, and so he began a regular training, until at last he succeeded in swallowing the tongue in much the same way as occasionally happens unintentionally during anæsthesia, apparently by a complete voluntary relaxing of the muscles at the root of the tongue.

In this strange way the boy prepared the way for his future psychosis. After the second attack he became incurably insane. This is only one example among many others, but it suffices to show that the apparently sudden, subsequent irruption of strange contents is not in the least sudden in reality, but the natural product of many years of unconscious development.

We now come to the great question, namely, what do the unconscious processes consist in? And how are they constituted? Naturally, so long as they are unconscious, nothing very much can be said about them. But at times they can be said to manifest themselves, partly through symptoms, and partly through actions, opinions, affects, phantasies, and dreams. On the strength of such observations, it is possible to draw certain indirect conclusions concerning the momentary situation and disposition of the unconscious processes, and to infer their course of development. But let there be no illusion, that the real nature of the unconscious processes is therefore known. We never succeed in getting further than the hypothetical 'as if.'

'No mortal mind can probe the innermost secrets

of nature,' and the mystery of the unconscious is no less unfathomable. We do know, however, that the unconscious never rests—even when we sleep we dream. Many people will be heard to say that they never dream, but the probability is that they simply do not remember their dreams. It is a curious fact, that even people who talk in their sleep, usually fail to remember either the dream which prompted them to speak, or even the fact that they dreamed at all. Not a day passes but we make some slip in speech, or something slips from our memory which at other times we know perfectly well, or a mood sways us, the source of which we cannot trace. All these are symptoms of a coordinated unconscious activity which, though directly visible in dreams at night, only occasionally breaks through the inhibitions of our waking consciousness.

So far as our present experience goes, we can posit the statement that the unconscious processes maintain a compensatory relation to consciousness. I purposely use the word 'compensatory' rather than 'contrasting,' because the conscious and the unconscious are not necessarily opposed to one another. It is true to say that by their reciprocal functioning they constitute a totality, the self. In accordance with this definition, therefore, the self is a quantity that is superordinated to the conscious ego. It includes not only the conscious, but also the unconscious psyche, and is therefore a personality, so to speak, in the same way that we are. It is easy to imagine that we possess partial souls. Thus, we can see ourselves as a persona, for instance, without too great difficulty. But it passes our bounds of conception to make a clear picture of what we are as self, because, for this operation, the part is required to apprehend the whole. There is little hope that we shall attain to even an approximate consciousness of self, for no matter how much we make conscious, there will always be an indeterminate and indeterminable quantity of unconscious elements, which belong to

the totality of the self. Hence the self will always remain a superordinated quantity.

The unconscious processes that compensate the conscious ego contain all those elements that are necessary for the self-regulation of the total psyche. On the personal level, these are the unrecognized personal motives appearing in dreams. Or they may be concerned with some underlying significance of a situation in our waking life that we had overlooked. Or they may be conclusions we failed to observe, or affects that were not admitted, or criticisms we spared ourselves. But the more a man becomes conscious of himself through self-knowledge and its corresponding effect upon action, there is an increasing tendency for that layer of the personal unconscious that has overlaid the collective unconscious to disappear. In this way a conscious function is born, that is no longer imprisoned in the petty, over-sensitive, and personal world of the ego, but participates freely in the wider world of objective interests. This extended consciousness ceases to be a knot of personal wishes, fears, hopes, and ambitions that have always to be compensated or corrected by unconscious, personal counter-tendencies. Instead, it now becomes a function of relation that is linked up with the world of objects, and by which the individual is pledged to an unconditioned, responsible, and indissoluble intercourse with the world. The complications that belong to this stage are no longer egoistic wish-conflicts, but difficulties that concern others just as much as oneself. Fundamentally, it is collective problems that have to be dealt with at this stage. These set the collective unconscious in motion because they need a collective, and not a personal compensation. A very striking fact can now be experienced, namely, that the unconscious produces contents which are valid not only for the individual, but also for others, for many even, and possibly for every one.

The Elgonyi, natives of the jungles of Elgon, explained to me that there are two kinds of dreams, the ordinary

dream of the small man, and the 'big vision' that comes only to the great man, the medicine man, for instance, or the head-man. The little dreams are of no account, but if a man has a 'big dream' he calls the tribe together and tells the dream to all.

How is a man to know whether his dream is a 'big' or a 'little' one? He knows it by an instinctive feeling of significance. He feels himself so overwhelmed by it that he would never think of keeping the dream to himself. He is forced to tell it on the assumption—which is perfectly correct psychologically—that it is significant for everybody. For us, too, the collective dream has a feeling of importance that seems to urge us to share it with some one. It arises from a conflict of relationship and, therefore, must be incorporated within the sphere of conscious relations. This is necessary just because it is a compensatory process, and not merely an inner personal perversity.

The processes of the collective unconscious are concerned not only with the more or less personal relations of an individual to his family, or to a wider social group, but also with his relations to society and to humanity in general. The law of unconscious compensation might be stated as follows: In so far as the condition which releases the unconscious reaction is general and impersonal in character, the compensatory manifestations from the unconscious will be correspondingly significant, strange, and overwhelming. This peculiar, overwhelming, or impressive character is so imperative, that it enforces some kind of communication, not only privately, but also in the manner of a revelation or avowal. It can actually force a man to impersonate his phantasy in a most dramatic fashion.¹

How the unconscious compensates relations is well shown by the following example. A somewhat arrogant gentleman

¹ Cf. Mr. Preemby's impersonation of Sargon the Magnificent in Wells' *Christina Alberta's Father*.—[Ed.]

once came to me for treatment. He was engaged in business in partnership with his younger brother. Considerable tension arose between the two brothers, and this among other causes was an essential factor in my patient's neurosis. From the account my patient gave me, it was not altogether clear what the real cause of the tension was. He had all kinds of criticisms to make about his brother's attitude, and he certainly did not present the latter's gifts in a very favourable light. His brother came frequently into his dreams, at times assuming exaggerated proportions, as for instance in the rôle of a Bismarck, Napoleon, or Julius Cæsar. His house appeared as the Vatican, or Yildiz Kiosk. Obviously there was an unconscious need to exalt his brother's rank in some essential way. I concluded from this that my patient set too high a value on himself, and depreciated his brother. The further course of analysis completely justified this inference.

Another patient, a young woman, who clung to her mother with a sentimental and morbid dependence, was inclined to dream about her in a very unfavourable light. She appeared in the dreams as a witch, a ghost, or a pursuing demon. The mother had spoiled the daughter beyond all reason, and had so blinded her by tenderness, that she had no conscious insight at all into the harmful influence which her mother exercised over her. Accordingly the unconscious instigated a compensatory criticism of the mother.

I once made the mistake myself of giving a patient too low a value, both intellectually and morally. In a dream I saw a castle built high upon a mighty cliff. On the highest tower was a loggia, and there sat my patient. I did not hesitate to tell her this dream and, naturally, with the best result.

It is a familiar experience that a man is prone to make a fool of himself in front of the very people he has unjustly undervalued. Obviously, the reverse can also happen, as,

for instance, occurred to a friend of mine. While still a junior student he had written to Virchow, begging for the privilege of an audience with "His Excellency." When, trembling with anxiety, he presented himself at the appointed time, he proceeded to introduce himself with : " My name is Virchow." Whereupon Virchow, smiling mischievously, said, " Ah ! so your name is Virchow too ? " The feeling of his own insignificance was obviously just too much from the point of view of my friend's unconscious, and so he was impelled forthwith to identify himself with the greatness of Virchow.

In these more personal relations, there is naturally no need of very collective compensations. But in the case first mentioned, the figures employed by the unconscious have a definite collective character, generally recognized heroes in fact. In this case only two possibilities of interpretation present themselves, either the younger brother is a man of recognized and quite exceptional collective significance, or else my patient is morbidly exaggerating his own importance, not in relation to his brother alone, but in respect to everybody. There was no real justification for the first assumption, but the man's very appearance and demeanour supported the latter. Since this arrogant attitude was in evidence, not only in relation to the brother, but also hampered his relations to a wider social group, the compensation process employed powerful collective images.

The same thing applies to the second case. The ' witch ' is a collective image ; hence we must conclude that the blind dependence of the young woman was equally true of her attitude to the social group, as it was of her relation to the mother. This was actually so, since she was living in an exclusively infantile world, in which the world was still identified with the parents.

These examples I have given are concerned with relations within the personal orbit. But there are also impersonal relations which occasionally necessitate an unconscious

compensation. In these cases collective images appear that possess a more or less mythological character. Moral, philosophical, and religious problems on account of their universal application are naturally most fitted to evoke mythological compensations. In the novel by H. G. Wells that I referred to above, the author depicts a really classical type of compensation. Mr. Preemby, a small, irrelevant fledgeling of a personality, discovers that he is actually the reincarnation of Sargon, King of Kings. Fortunately, the author's genius rescues poor Sargon from the curse of pathological absurdity, and even gives the reader the opportunity of realizing the tragic and eternal meaning in this lamentable absurdity. Mr. Preemby, a complete nonentity, realized himself to be the culminating point, through which all the ages of the past flowed into the future. This knowledge would not be bought too dearly at the price of a little madness, provided, of course, that little Preemby was not completely engulfed by the monster of a primordial image, which, as a matter of fact, is very nearly what happened to him.

The general problem of evil and sin is another aspect of our impersonal relation to the world. This problem, therefore, more than almost any other, is fitted to produce a collective compensation. I had a case of compulsion neurosis, a lad of only sixteen, and the following dream was one of the first symptoms of his condition: He is walking in an unfamiliar street. It is dark. He hears steps coming behind him. With a feeling of fear he quickens his pace. The steps come nearer and his dread increases. He begins to run. But the steps seem to overtake him. Finally he turns round, and there is the devil. In mad terror he leaps into the air and remains apparently suspended. This dream was repeated twice, a sign of its especial importance.

Even from a surface view, the compulsion neuroses, by reason of their scrupulosity and ceremonial compulsiveness, present somewhat the aspect of a moral problem; but when we

take a deep, inner view we find them brim full of inhumanity, criminality, and ruthless evil. The conscious personality, often finely organized in other respects, is utterly unable to integrate these malign characters, and struggles desperately against them. This accounts for the fact, that so many things have to be done in a ceremonially 'correct' way, as a sort of counterbalance to the evil which threatens from the background. The neurosis began after this dream, and it consisted essentially of the fear of contamination. The patient had to keep himself, as he expressed it, in a 'provisional' or 'uncontaminated' state of purity. To this end, he either severed or made 'invalid' every contact with the world, and with everything that reminded him of the transitoriness of human existence. This necessitated all sorts of crazy formalities, scrupulous cleansing ceremonies, and the anxious observance of innumerable rules and prohibitions of an unbelievable complexity. Even before the patient had any suspicion of the hellish existence that lay before him, the dream showed him that if he wanted to come down to earth again there would have to be a pact with evil.

Elsewhere I have mentioned a dream that represents the compensation of a religious problem in a young theological student. He was involved in all sorts of difficulties of belief, a not unusual experience in a modern man. In his dream he was the pupil of the 'white magician,' who however was dressed in black. When he had instructed him up to a certain point, the white magician told him he should now seek the 'black magician.' The black magician appeared, but clad in a white robe. He made it known that he had found the keys of paradise, but needed the wisdom of the white magician in order to understand how to use them. It is self-evident that this dream contains the problem of the opposites, which has, as we know, found a solution in the Taoistic philosophy that is altogether different from the view which commends itself to Western minds. The figures used in the dream are

impersonal collective images that correspond to the nature of the impersonal religious problem. In contrast to the Christian view, the dream brings out the relativity of good and evil in a way that immediately calls to mind the well-known Taoistic symbolism of *yang* and *yin*.

These compensations do not, however, give us the right to conclude that, as consciousness becomes more deeply engrossed in universal problems, the unconscious will invariably produce correspondingly far-reaching compensations. There is, if one may so put it, a legitimate and an illegitimate preoccupation with impersonal problems. Excursions of this kind are legitimate, only when they proceed from the deepest and truest individual need. They are illegitimate when they feed a mere intellectual curiosity, or are a means of escape from unpleasant reality. In the latter case the unconscious offers all-too-human and purely personal compensations, of which the manifest aim is to bring the conscious back to ordinary things. People of this kind who wander illegitimately through infinity, often have absurdly banal dreams which tend to assuage their exuberance. Thus we are able at once to infer from the character of the compensation, whether or no the conscious strivings have a serious justification.

There are still many people who are afraid to admit the possibility that the unconscious could have tremendous ideas. Some one may well demur: "But do you really believe that the unconscious is capable of offering a constructive criticism upon our Western attitude of mind?" Naturally, if this problem is taken intellectually, and rationalistic aims are imputed to the unconscious, the thing becomes absurd. We must always make sure that we do not foist conscious psychology upon the unconscious. Its mentality is purely instinctive, and it has no differentiated functions. Its mode of thinking is altogether different from what we understand by 'thinking.' It merely fashions an image that answers to the conscious situation. This image contains just as much

thought as feeling ; it may even embrace all the psychic elements. The only thing it is not, is a product of rationalistic reflection. It would be more in keeping with its nature, if we described such an image as an artistic vision. We are liable to forget that a problem which could produce such a dream as the one last mentioned, is not, even in the dreamer's conscious life, an intellectual question, but a profound emotional problem. The ethical problem is a matter of passionate importance to a moral man, and it is rooted in the deepest instinctive processes of his nature, as well as in his most ideal aspirations. It is for him a devastatingly real problem. Can we wonder, then, that the deeps of his nature should give their answer to it ? It is of course a fact, that every one believes his own psychology to be the measure of all existing things, and when this ' every one ' happens to be a numskull, such a problem as this will never come into his range of vision. But this fact must not trouble the psychologist, since he has to take things objectively, as they actually are, and to learn not to mutilate them in favour of a subjective presupposition. There are certain rich and impressionable natures who are legitimately gripped by an impersonal problem, and it is perfectly possible for their unconscious to respond in the same style. The conscious, for example, may be tormented by the question : " Why should this frightful conflict exist between good and evil ? " And with equal force the unconscious can reply : " Look right into it. The two need one another ; even in the best, and just because it is the best, the seed of evil lies, and nothing is so bad but that some good could come of it."

The dreamer could have a presentiment that the apparently insoluble conflict might conceivably hinge upon a prejudice, an attitude of mind that was contingent upon time and place. When unveiled, the apparently complicated dream image might turn out to be a kind of instinctive common sense, the mere germ of a reasonable idea which

perhaps a riper mind could just as well have produced consciously. At all events, Chinese philosophy conceived it many centuries ago. The strangely appropriate and graphic shaping of the idea is a prerogative of that primitive, natural mind that is alive in all of us ; only it has been eclipsed by a one-sided development of consciousness. If we consider the unconscious compensation from this point of view, a justifiable reproach can be levelled at us for judging the unconscious too much from the standpoint of consciousness. In reality, I started out upon this train of thought from the standpoint that the unconscious merely reacted to the conscious contents, albeit in a very meaningful way, still none the less lacking its own initiative. That I believe the unconscious to be merely reactive in all cases is by no means the impression I intend. On the contrary, there are very many experiences which seem to prove that not only can the unconscious act spontaneously, but it can even take over the leadership. There are cases innumerable of people who linger on in a pettifogging unconsciousness, only to become neurotic in consequence. The neurosis is instigated by the unconscious in order to expel them from their apathy, and this in spite of their own laziness and often desperate resistance.

It would, I think, be wrong to assume that the unconscious in these cases was working on a deliberate and concerted plan, or was striving to develop certain definite ends. I know of nothing that could authorize this assumption. Essentially the driving motive, so far as it is possible for us to comprehend such things, seems to be merely an instinct for self-development. If a general plan were involved (regarding it teleologically), then every individual who rejoices in a superfluity of unconsciousness would be forced to higher consciousness by an irresistible urge. That this is not the case is self-evident. There are vast masses of individuals—one might almost say social strata—who, notwithstanding a notorious unconsciousness, do not become neurotic. The

few who are singled out for this destiny are really 'superior' men who, for one reason or another, have remained too long on a too primitive level. In the long run their nature will not tolerate an acquiescence in, what is for them, an unnatural torpor. As a result of their narrow conscious outlook and their too limited existence they spend too little energy. The unused surplus gradually accumulates in the unconscious, and finally explodes in the form of a more or less acute neurosis. This simple mechanism does not necessarily conceal a 'plan.' An urge towards self-realization—which is perfectly comprehensible—would be a quite adequate explanation. It might also be expressed in terms of retardation of the personality.

Since it is extremely probable that we are still a long way from the absolute summit of consciousness, every one is presumably capable of wider consciousness. We may accordingly assume that the unconscious processes are always rendering accessible to consciousness contents which, if recognized, would be constantly extending the conscious range. Regarded in this light, the unconscious appears as a field of experience, the extent of which is quite unlimited. If it were true that it merely reacted to consciousness, it would be quite appropriate to describe it as a psychic mirror-world. But if this were so, the real source of every content and activity would be found in consciousness, and there would be absolutely nothing in the unconscious except the distorted reflexions of conscious contents. The creative process would be enclosed within the conscious, and every new creation would be merely an invention or contrivance of consciousness. The facts of experience are definitely against this hypothesis. Every creative man knows that involuntariness is the essential characteristic of the creative idea. Because the unconscious is not just a reactive reflexion, but an independent, productive activity, its realm of experience is a world of its own. It has its own reality, of which this much can be said : it affects us just as we affect it.

In this sense the world of the unconscious is commensurate with the world of outer experience, and just as material objects are the constituent elements of the latter, so we must regard psychic factors as constituting the objects of that other world.

The idea of psychical objectivity is in no sense a new discovery. It is, in fact, one of the earliest and most universal 'achievements' of humanity, as evidenced by the primitive conviction of the concrete existence of a spirit-world. The world of the spirits was, to be sure, never an actual discovery, such, for example, as fire-boring, but it meant that a reality was experienced, or made conscious, that was in no way inferior to that of the material world. I doubt if anywhere there are primitives who are unacquainted with 'magical effects' or 'magical substance.' ('Magical' is only another word for 'psychical.') It would also seem that practically all primitives are aware of the existence of spirits.¹ 'Ghost,' is a psychical fact. We distinguish our own bodies from other bodies that are strange to us, and the primitives do just the same thing when they make a distinction between themselves and their own souls (that is if they have the notion of 'souls' at all) and the spirits. These are sensed as strange and as 'not belonging.' They are objects of outer perception, whereas the native's own soul (or one of a variety of souls in the case where a plurality is assumed), despite the fact that it is believed to be akin to the spirits, is not usually regarded as an object of so-called sensuous perception. After death the soul (or one of the plurality of souls) becomes a ghost which survives the dead man, and quite frequently it shows a marked deterioration of character that contradicts the idea of personal immortality. The Bataks² actually assert

¹ In view of negative statements on this point, it should always be borne in mind that the fear of ghosts is frequently so great, that people will even deny that they have any fear of them. I have come across this myself among the inhabitants of Mount Elgon.

² Warnecke: *Die Religion der Batak*.

that the very people who were good when alive become evil and dangerous ghosts. It is interesting that nearly everything which the primitives assert about the spirits, *e.g.* the annoyances and tricks played upon the living, especially the sinister character they ascribe to the '*revenants*,' corresponds even in detail to the well-established spiritistic phenomena. This similarity would seem to point to an identical explanation. And indeed it is recognized, that the 'spiritistic' communications from the 'spirits' are concerned with the activities of certain psychic fragments, and in precisely the same way the primitive's ghosts are manifestations of unconscious complexes. The importance attributed by modern psychology to the 'parental complex' is in direct continuity with the primitive experience of the dangerous effects proceeding from the ghosts of the parents. Even the error of judgment that the primitive makes, with his instinctive assumption that the spirits are realities of the outer world, is carried on into our psychology, namely, in the assumption (which is only partially correct) that the actual parents are responsible for the parental complex. In the old trauma-theory of the Freudian psychoanalysis, and in other quarters as well, this assumption carried the value of a scientific explanation. In order to avoid this confusion, I have advocated the use of the term 'parental imago.'

It is naturally not conscious to the naïve man, that those who belong to him in the nearest and most intimate relations create in him an image with which they only partly coincide, and that its other part is fashioned of material which originates within the subject himself. The imago is developed from two sources, one of which comprises the total effects coming from the parents, while the other springs from the specific reactions of the child. Hence it yields only a very qualified reproduction of the object. The naïve man will necessarily believe that his parents are as he sees them. Because the image is unconscious it is projected, and when the parents die, the

projected image continues with its own momentum, as though it were a ghost with an entirely independent existence. The primitive man, then, speaks of the ghosts of his parents who come back again at night, while the modern man has the same experience, but calls it a father, or a mother-complex.

Exactly corresponding to the limitation and poverty of a man's conscious field, will these deeper psychic contents (*imagines*) take on a quasi-external appearance in his eyes, either as ghosts, or as magical potentialities projected upon living people (magicians, witches, etc.). On a higher level of development, where it is possible to speak of the existence of psychic representations, there is no longer a complete projection of all psychic images (where this is the case, even trees and stones talk together) but one or other complex is at least near enough to conscious integration as to be accepted as somehow belonging to the subject, and not regarded as an alien power. Although this feeling of 'belongingness' is not so immediately convincing as to substantiate the complex in question as a subjective conscious content. It remains in a kind of no-man's land, so to speak, between the conscious and the unconscious. On the one side it has achieved a relative connexion with consciousness, while on the other it still carries on an autonomous existence. Because of this relative autonomy it can work against the conscious, or at all events it is not necessarily obedient to subjective intention. Perhaps it may even be superordinated to it, as a spontaneous source of inspiration or warning, or of 'supernatural' information. Such a content would be explained psychologically as a partially autonomous complex that is not yet completely integrated into consciousness.

The 'souls' of the primitive mind, likewise the Egyptian *Ba* and *Ka*, are complexes of this nature. On higher levels, and in particular among the civilized peoples of the West, this complex is always a feminine being (*anima* and $\psi\chi\eta$) assuredly not without deep and significant grounds.

CHAPTER II

ANIMA AND ANIMUS

AMONG all possible ghosts the spirits of the parents possess the greatest significance. Hence the universal distribution of the ancestor-cult. In its original form this served principally to conciliate the '*revenants*,' but on the higher levels of culture it developed into an important moral and educational institution (as in China, for instance). The parents belong to the child in the most immediate sense, and therefore their influence has the most powerful effects. This influence is necessarily severed, however, as adolescence goes over into maturity; hence the parental imagines tend, whenever possible, to become increasingly repressed from consciousness; and perhaps, because they retain a somewhat oppressive after-effect from early influences, the imagines easily assume negative attributes. In this way the parental imagines remain as alien elements, so to speak, in a psychic 'outer darkness.' In place of the parents, woman now takes her position as the most immediate environmental influence in the life of the adult man. She accompanies him, she represents 'belongingness' in a high degree, inasmuch as she lives with him and is more or less of the same age. She is not of a superior order like the parents, either by virtue of age, authority, or physical strength. But she is a factor exercising a powerful influence. And this, like the parental influence, produces an imago of a relatively autonomous nature. It differs however from the parental imago, in that it is not split off by further development, but is retained integrally

associated with consciousness. Woman's psychology is so unlike a man's, that she is, and always has been, a source of information about things which constantly escape man's eyes. She can mean inspiration to him. Her intuitive capacity, often superior to man's, can give him timely warnings, and her feeling, which is always more keenly orientated towards personal things, can show him ways which his own more impersonal feeling would never discover. In this respect what Tacitus says about the Germanic women is exactly to the point.

Here, without a doubt, lies one of the main sources of the feminine quality of the soul. But it is apparently not the only source. No man is throughout so masculine that he possesses no feminine qualities at all. The facts are rather the reverse. For it is just these very masculine men who reveal, albeit in a very guarded form, a very sensitive feeling-life (often incorrectly described as 'womanish'). A man regards it almost as a virtue to repress his feminine traits as much as possible, just as a woman, until quite recently, considered it unbecoming to be a man-woman. The repression of feminine traits and dispositions leads naturally to a heaping up of these tendencies in the unconscious. But just as naturally the imago of woman (the soul) becomes the receptacle of these demands. And this explains the fact that, in his love-choice, a man is strongly tempted to win the woman who best corresponds to his own unconscious femininity, a woman, in short, who can unhesitatingly receive the projection of his soul. Despite the fact that such a choice may seem to be as ideal as he feels it to be, it is perfectly possible in the long run that he finds he has married his own worst weakness. Many very remarkable marriages might be explained in this way.

It seems to me, therefore, that two factors have to be considered, namely, besides the influence of real women there is also man's own femininity, and these together explain the

femininity of the soul-complex. This, by the way, has nothing whatever to do with a mere linguistic accident, like that, for instance, which makes the sun feminine in German and masculine in other languages. The art of every age will testify to the feminine nature of man's soul, and there is also the famous question : *Habet mulier animam ?* Most men who have any psychological insight at all appreciate what Rider Haggard means, when he speaks of 'She-who-must-be-obeyed,' and they also recognize the chord that is struck when they read Benoit's portrayal of Antinéa. Moreover, they are apt to know at once what kind of woman it is, who most completely embodies this secret, but only too clearly divined, disposition in their inner being.

The wide recognition accorded to such works as Haggard's and Benoit's shows that there must be some super-individual quality in this image of the feminine anima. It is not something that gains an ephemeral existence from a mere individual peculiarity, but it appeals to all men because of something typical and racial, that has deeper roots than those visible surface connections to which I have just alluded. Both Rider Haggard¹ and Benoit² express this intuition of impersonality quite unmistakably in the historical aspect of their anima figures.

It is a known fact that there is no human experience and, moreover, no experience would be possible, without the existence of a subjective readiness. But what does this subjective readiness consist in ? In the last analysis it must be an innate psychic structure that allows a man to have a particular experience. Thus the whole nature of man presupposes woman, both bodily and spiritually. His system is adapted *a priori* to woman in the same way that it is prepared for a definite world where there is water, light, air, salt, carbohydrates, etc. The form of the world into which he is born preexists in him as a virtual image. And conse-

¹ *She.*

² *L'Atlantide.*

quently parents, wife, children, birth, and death are born in him as virtual images, or as psychic aptitudes. These *a priori* categories are naturally collective in character; they are images of parents, wife, and children in general, and have nothing to do with individual predetermination. These images must be regarded as lacking in individual content, and therefore they are unconscious. They only acquire content, influence, and finally consciousness through the encounter with empirical facts, which touch the unconscious aptitude and thus quicken it to life. In a sense they must be deposits from the experiences of the ancestors, and not mere reproductions of these experiences. So at least it seems to us with our present limited knowledge. (I must own I have never yet found indisputable evidence of the inheritance of memory-images, but I do not regard it as positively excluded that besides these collective deposits, which contain nothing specifically individual, the psyche may also inherit memory acquisitions of a definite individual stamp.)

An inherited collective image of woman exists in a man's unconscious, and with the help of this image he is able to comprehend the nature of woman. This inherited image is the third important source of the feminine character of the soul.

Doubtless the reader will have gathered that we are not here concerned with a philosophical or religious concept of the soul. It is really a psychological recognition of the existence of a semi-conscious psychic complex that has achieved a partial autonomy of function. It is self-evident that this formulation has as much, or as little, to do with either a philosophical or a religious concept of the soul, as psychology with philosophy and religion. I do not want to embark upon a 'warfare of faculties,' nor do I seek to prove either to the philosophers, or to the theologians what that really is which is embraced by the term 'soul.' Yet both must be warned against prescribing to the psychologist what he ought

to understand by 'soul.' The quality of personal immortality, which the religious view is fain to attribute to the 'soul,' can be recognized by science only as a psychological index which is included in the idea of the autonomy of a complex. In the primitive conception, the quality of personal immortality is by no means a constant attribute of the soul, and the idea of immortality as such is entirely absent. But putting this view on one side, which after all is quite inaccessible to science, the immediate sense of 'immortality' merely signifies a psychic activity that transcends the limits of consciousness. 'Beyond the grave' or 'on the other side of death' means, psychologically, beyond the conscious. There is positively nothing else it could mean, since assertions about immortality can be made only by a living man, who, as such, is not exactly in the position to speak about a condition 'beyond the grave.'

The autonomy of the soul-complex naturally supports the idea of an invisible, personal being who apparently lives in a world very different from ours. Inasmuch, then, as the activity of the soul is sensed as that of an autonomous being, not apparently bound up with our mortal substance, the idea can very easily arise that this being must have an entirely independent existence, perhaps in a world of invisible things. It is not, however, immediately clear, why the invisibility of this independent being should at the same time embrace the idea of its immortality. The quality of immortality might indeed derive from another fact, to which I have already alluded, namely, the peculiar, historical aspect of the soul. Rider Haggard has depicted this character very strikingly in *She*. When the Buddhists say that with the 'inward eye' a man nearing perfection can reawaken memories of former incarnations, they are referring to the same psychological condition, but with this difference, that they ascribe the historical factor not to the soul, but to the self. It is altogether in keeping with the thoroughly extraverted

attitude of mind that has hitherto prevailed in the west, to make the immortality of a soul contingent upon feeling (and tradition), the soul being more or less distinguished from the ego, both by feeling and by virtue of its feminine qualities. It would be wholly logical if, by an intensification of the hitherto neglected introverted culture, we should bring about a transformation more akin to the eastern attitude of mind, whereby the quality of immortality would be translated from the equivocal figure of the soul (anima) to the self. Essentially it is the overvaluation of the external, material object that constellates a spiritual and immortal figure within. (Obviously for the purpose of compensation and self-regulation.) Fundamentally, the historical factor belongs not only to the feminine archetype, but to every archetype whatsoever, *i.e.* to every inherited unit, mental as well as physical. For indeed our life is the same as it ever was. At all events, in our sense of the word it is not transitory; for the same physiological and psychological processes as have belonged to man for hundreds of thousands of years still endure and give to the inner feeling this profound intuition of the eternal continuity of the living process. But the self, as an inclusive term embracing our whole living system, contains not only the deposit and the totality of all past life, but it is also a point of departure, the fertile soil from which all future life must spring. A certain premonition of this fact is as clearly sensed by the inner feeling as is the historical aspect. From these psychological foundations the idea of immortality is legitimately derived. The concept of the anima, as we have here stated it, is lacking in the eastern conception, and, logically enough, the concept of the persona is also absent. Assuredly this cannot be accidental, since, as I showed earlier, a compensatory relation exists between the persona and the anima. The persona is a complicated system of relations between the individual consciousness and society. It is a relatively suitable kind of mask which, on the one hand, is calculated

to make a definite impression upon others, while, on the other, it cloaks the true nature of the individual. That the latter function is superfluous could be maintained only by the man who is so identified with his persona that he no longer knows himself ; while the former could be regarded as unnecessary only by the man who is almost wholly unconscious of the real nature of his fellowmen. Society expects, and indeed must expect, that every individual should play the rôle assigned to him as completely as possible. Accordingly, a man who is also a pastor must not only carry out his professional functions objectively, but at all times and seasons he must play the rôle of pastor in a flawless manner. Society demands this as a kind of security. Every one must be at his post, this one as shoemaker, that one as poet. It is not expected that he should be both. It is, moreover, not quite wholesome to be both, that would be 'singular' and 'rather odd.' Such a person would be 'different' from others, not quite reliable. In the academic world he would be a 'dilettante,' as a politician he would be an 'incalculable' quantity, in religion a 'free thinker,' in short, the reproach of unreliability and inadequacy would invariably be levelled at him. For society is convinced that only the shoemaker who is no poet can provide workmanlike shoes. That one should present an unequivocal appearance is a matter of practical importance; since the average man, the only kind society knows anything about, must have his mind centred on one thing if he is to achieve anything worth while. To have his mind on two things would be too much. Without a doubt our society is adapted to an ideal of this kind. It is therefore not surprising that every one who wants to be successful has to take these expectations into account. Naturally, as an individuality, no one could possibly meet these expectations unreservedly ; hence the construction of an artificial personality becomes an unavoidable necessity. The demands of propriety and good morals add their quota to the production

of a suitable mask. Naturally something goes on behind the mask ; it is called ' private life.' This all too familiar division of consciousness into two different people, who are often laughably opposed, is an important psychological operation that cannot remain without consequences for the unconscious.

The construction of a collectively suitable persona, means a very great concession to the outer world. It is a real self-sacrifice, which directly forces the ego into an identification with the persona, so that there are people who actually believe themselves to be what they present to the public view. The ' soullessness ' of such an attitude is, however, only apparent, because under no circumstances will the unconscious endure this artificial shifting of the centre of gravity. When we submit these cases to a critical examination, we discover that the excellent mask has an inner compensation in the character of the ' private life.' The pious Drummond once lamented the fact that " bad temper is the vice of the virtuous." Obviously whoever builds up too good a persona has to pay for it in irritability. Bismarck had hysterical weeping fits, Wagner a correspondence about the belt of a silk dressing-gown, Nietzsche wrote letters to a ' dear Lama,' Goethe indulged in conversations with Eckermann, etc. But there are also much subtler things than the banal ' lapses ' of heroes. I once made the acquaintance of a very fine and honourable man, in fact one might almost have called him a saint. I studied him for three whole days, and never a mortal shortcoming did I find in him. My feeling of inferiority grew ominous, and I began seriously to think of how I might better myself. But on the fourth day his wife consulted me. . . . Well—nothing of the sort has ever happened to me since. But I learned this from it : that every man who becomes one with his persona can allow every disturbing element to be manifested by his wife, without her noticing the fact. But she pays for her self-sacrifice with a bad neurosis.

These identifications with the social rôle are a very fruitful

source of neuroses. A man cannot get rid of himself in favour of an artificial personality without punishment. The mere attempt to do so releases, in all the ordinary cases, unconscious reactions in the form of moods, affects, fears, compulsive ideas, feelings, vices, etc. In his private life, the 'strong man' socially is often a mere child in relation to his own feeling, and his public discipline (which he often demands unquestioningly from others) goes to pieces entirely in private. His 'joy in his work' assumes a melancholy or hypochondriacal face at home. Behind the mask, his 'spotless' public morality begins to look rather remarkable—we will not mention deeds, only phantasies; but women, too, could say something about such men. And his children may have definite views about his 'selfless altruism.'

In the same degree as a man is lured by the world to identify his individuality with the persona-mask is he delivered over to effects from within. 'High rests upon low' says Laotze. An opposite is forced up from within; it is exactly as though the unconscious suppressed the ego with a force equal to that which drew the ego into the persona. The absence of resistance outwardly against the lure of the persona, means a similar weakness inwardly against the influence of the unconscious. Outwardly an effective and powerful rôle is played, while inwardly an effeminate weakness develops that submits to every influence from the unconscious. Moods, vagaries, fearfulness, even a 'womanized' sexuality (culminating in impotence) gradually gain the upper hand.

The persona, the ideal picture of the man as he should be, is inwardly compensated by feminine weakness, and as the individual plays the strong man in his outer rôle, he becomes inwardly a woman, the anima,¹ because the anima is the

¹ For the definition of this concept I must refer the reader to the chapter on definitions in my book: *Psychological Types*. Kegan, Paul & Co.

opposite function to the persona. But because the inner world is dark and invisible to the extraverted consciousness, and because, in addition to this, a man is just so much less capable of reflecting on his weaknesses the more he is identified with the persona, the counterpole to the persona, namely, the anima, remains completely in the dark, and hence is immediately projected, whereby the hero is brought under the slippered heel of his wife. Even though her increase of power be considerable she may suffer it none too well. She becomes inferior, thus providing the husband with the welcome proof, that it is not he, the hero, who is inferior in 'private life,' but his wife. In return the wife may cherish the illusion, so attractive to many, that at least she is married to a hero; accordingly she remains unperturbed by her own useless life. This play of illusion is often made to serve for the real content of life.

Just as in respect to the goal of individuation, or self-realization, it is indispensable for a man to know how to distinguish between how he appears to himself and how others see him, so it is also necessary for the same goal, that he become aware of his invisible system of relations to the unconscious, namely, the anima, in order to be able to distinguish himself from her. One cannot distinguish himself from something unconscious. In the matter of the persona, it is naturally easy to make it clear to a man that he and his profession are two different things. But it is very difficult for a man to distinguish between himself and the anima, and the main difficulty lies in the fact that she is invisible. Indeed, there is a very insistent prejudice, that everything coming from within springs from the most characteristic and fundamental root of one's being. The 'strong man' will perhaps concede that actually in 'private life' his discipline is somewhat precarious, but that is just his 'weakness' with which he admits a kind of joint liability.

There is in this tendency a cultural inheritance not to

be despised; for when he recognizes that his ideal persona is responsible for the fact that his anima is anything but ideal, his ideals are shattered, the world becomes quite ambiguous, and he himself no less so. Goodness itself becomes doubtful, and what is worse, he distrusts his own good intentions. When we reflect that our most private idea of a good intention is bound up with tremendous historical presuppositions, it will be understood that it is pleasanter, and therefore more in keeping with the view of life hitherto maintained, to deplore a personal weakness than to shatter ideals.

But since the unconscious factors, as determining facts, are exactly equivalent to the elements that regulate social life, and since the former are just as collective as the latter, I can as well learn to distinguish between what I wish and what is forced upon me by the unconscious, as I am able to see what my profession demands of me and what I myself desire. At first the only thing that is at all clear is the incompatibility of the demands coming from without and from within, and the ego seems to stand between them as between the hammer and the anvil. Contrasting with this ego, which in most cases is little more than a shuttlecock between the outer and inner demands, there exists a kind of arbiter that is hard to define. Under no circumstances must it be labelled with the insidious name 'conscience,' although the word itself, taken in its best sense, could very well denote this psychic arbiter. What kind of creature 'conscience' has become in us has been depicted by Spitteler with inimitable humour. Any contagion from this 'Epimethean' meaning is to be avoided as much as possible. We should do far better to realize that the tragic play of opposites between the inner and the outer (represented in Job and Faust as the devil's wager with God) is fundamentally the dynamics of the life-process, the tension between the opposites that is indispensable to self-regulation. However different in appearance and purpose these opposing forces may be,

their fundamental meaning and will is the life of the individual. This is the centre of the balance which determines their every motion. Just because they are inseparably related through opposition, they also unite in a mediating meaning. This resultant is necessarily born out of the individual either willingly or unwillingly, and hence it is also discerned by him. He has a feeling of what should be, and also of what could be. To ignore or deny this intuition means going astray, making mistakes, and eventually neurosis.

It is not a mere accident that our modern notions of 'personal' and 'personality' derive from the word *persona*. I can, for instance, assert that my ego is personal, or is a personality; in exactly the same sense I can also say that my persona is a personality with which I am more or less identified. The fact that I then possess two personalities is not so remarkable, inasmuch as every autonomous, or only relatively autonomous complex has the peculiarity of appearing as a personality, *i.e.* of being personified. This can be observed most readily in the so-called spiritistic manifestations of automatic writing and the like. These productions are always personal statements, and are always expressed in a personal ego-form, as though behind every fragment produced a definite personality were standing. Accordingly a naïve intelligence must always immediately think of spirits. Similar things, of course, can also be observed in the hallucinations of the insane, although usually the latter can be more clearly recognized as mere thoughts or ideational fragments, and their connection with the conscious personality is perfectly plain to every one.

This immediate tendency towards personification that characterizes the relatively autonomous complex, also explains the fact that the persona has such an effect of 'personality' that the ego can only too easily be deceived as to which is the 'true' personality.

This character, which applies to the persona and to all

autonomous complexes in general, holds true also of the anima. She likewise is a personality, and this is why she is so easily projected on a woman. So long as the anima is unconscious she is always projected, since everything unconscious is projected. The first bearer of the soul-image is always the mother ; afterwards it is borne by those women who arouse the man's feeling, whether in a positive or a negative sense. Because the mother is the first bearer of the soul-image, the severance from her becomes a delicate and an important matter of the greatest educational significance. Accordingly among the primitives we find a great number of rites which are intended to organize this separation. Merely becoming adult and the marking of an external severance do not suffice ; it requires something absolutely decisive. Elaborate initiations into the ' man's house ' together with ceremonies of rebirth are necessary in order to achieve a satisfactory separation from the mother (and from childhood).

In the same way that the father effects a protection against the dangers of the outer world, and in this way provides for the son a pattern of the persona, so the mother is a protection against the dangers that threaten him from the depths of his soul. Therefore with the puberty-rites the initiate also receives instruction about ' invisible ' things, so that henceforth he is able to dispense with the protection of the mother.

The modern civilized man has to forego this means of education, which notwithstanding its primitivity is at bottom a most excellent system. As a consequence the anima, in the form of the mother-imago, is transferred to the wife, with the result that as soon as the man marries he becomes childish, sentimental, dependent, and subservient, or else truculent, tyrannical, and hyper-sensitive, always thinking about the prestige of his superior masculinity. Clearly the latter style is merely the reverse of the former. The protection against the unconscious, which the mother meant to him, finds no

substitute in the educational equipment of the modern man, and therefore he unconsciously arranges his ideal of marriage in such a way, that whenever possible his wife is forced to take over the magical mother-rôle. Under cover of the ideal, exclusive marriage he is actually seeking protection in the mother, and thus he offers an almost irresistible temptation to the possessive instinct of the woman. His fear of the dark, incalculable realm of the unconscious lends the woman an illegitimate power, and forges such a close union, that the marriage is constantly threatened with explosion from inner tension, or else out of protest he flies to the other extreme, with the same results.

I have come to the conclusion that for certain modern men, there is a profound necessity for this twofold differentiation. It is not enough for a man to realize his essential distinction from the persona, for he must also distinguish himself from the anima. Since, in the main, our consciousness has an outward orientation (in accordance with the western style) the things of the inner world are relatively obscure to us. But this difficulty can easily be overcome, when once the effort is made to give to the psychic material yielded by the 'private life' (not by outer events) the same concentration and criticism that has hitherto been accorded to the outer world. It is, of course, customary to keep a shame-faced silence with respect to this other side (perhaps one trembles before one's own wife; even she might betray one!) and in the event of some 'discovery' there is only a remorseful acknowledgment of 'weaknesses.' Hence there would seem to be only one educational method, namely, to attack or to repress one's weaknesses as much as possible, or at least to cloak them from the public eye. Nothing, however, is gained by this method.

What we really have to do I can explain best with the example of the persona. There everything is visible and clear, whereas with the anima (for our western minds) everything is dark. When the anima crosses the good intentions

of the conscious personality, in such a way as to make the private life contrast ill with the brilliant persona, it is much the same as when a naïve man, who has no notion of a persona, stumbles upon the most painful difficulties in his outer adaptation. There are people who have never developed a persona—"Canadians who know not the sham politeness of the Old World"—and who stumble from one social blunder into another. Such men are harmless, innocent, 'soulful' bores, or else appealing children. Women of this kind, however, may become dreaded Cassandras because of their tactlessness; they give the impression of eternally misunderstood beings who never know what they are doing, and must therefore be always assuming forgiveness. They do not see the world; they only dream it. These cases show us the effects of a neglected persona, and also what must be done to cure it. For these people there is no escape from all sorts of troubles and disappointments, scenes, and social catastrophes except by realizing how one behaves in the world. They must learn to understand what society expects from them. They have to realize that there are factors and persons in the world that are far above them, and to know in full the meaning and effect of their behaviour on other people. Naturally, to a man who has developed his persona properly, all this must read like a primer for children at a kindergarten. But if we now reverse the situation, and confront the man who has the brilliant persona with the anima, and, for the sake of comparison, set him beside the man who lacks a persona, we shall see that the latter is just as well informed about the anima and her transactions, as is the other man concerning the world. The use which either makes of his knowledge can, of course, just as well be abuse, and it is also extremely probable it will be.

Naturally for the man with the persona, the point of view that is based upon the existence of inner realities has absolutely no meaning; as little in fact as the reality of the world

for the other type, with whom the world is merely an amusing or fantastic playground. But the fact of the inner realities and of their unconditioned recognition, is obviously the *conditio sine qua non* for a serious acceptance of the anima-problem. If the outer world is only a phantasm to me, how can I go to any serious trouble in order to form a complicated system of relations and adaptations to it? In the same way, the standpoint that reiterates 'nothing but phantasy' can never persuade me to take the manifestations of the anima for anything more than foolish weaknesses. Whereas if I adopt the position that the world is an outer as well as an inner condition, and that reality belongs equally to both, I must necessarily accept the disturbances and annoyances that come to me from within as symptoms of my inadequate adaptation to the conditions of the inner world. Since the blows received by an 'innocent' at the hands of the world are never healed by moral repression, it cannot conceivably avail him just to note his weaknesses with resignation. Here we have to deal with causes, aims, and results which can be met by the will and a reasonable intelligence. Let us take, for instance, the 'spotless' citizen and public benefactor, whose sudden bursts of anger and explosive moodiness terrorize his wife and children. What is the anima doing in this case? We can see at a glance what will happen if things are allowed to take their natural course; the wife and children will become estranged, and a vacuum will be developed around him. At first he will lament the unkindness of his family, and will behave if possible even worse than before. This will make the estrangement absolute. If he is not forsaken now by all the good spirits, he will after a certain length of time notice his isolation, and in his loneliness he will begin to understand how the separation came about. Perhaps he will ask himself in astonishment, "What sort of a demon got into me?" without of course perceiving the meaning of this metaphor. Then follow remorse, forgiveness, forgetting,

repression, and eventually—a new explosion. Clearly, the anima is trying to force a separation, and it is a tendency that serves nobody's interests. The anima tries to force herself into the situation, like a jealous lover who seeks to alienate a man from his family. An official position, or any method of obtaining social prestige can have the same effect, but in that case we understand the force of the allure. But whence does the anima obtain the power to wield such enchantment? According to the analogy with the persona, it must be based upon values, or some other psychic factors that command a powerful influence, such as seductive promises. We must be careful not to make easy rationalizations when we try to explain these effects. It might easily occur to us that the 'model citizen' was merely on the look-out for another woman. That might be so; it can even be arranged by the anima as the most effective means to the desired end. Such an arrangement, however, should not be misconstrued as an individual objective, for the blameless gentleman who is legally and correctly married can be just as legally and correctly divorced, whereby his fundamental attitude is not changed one iota. The old picture has only been put into a new frame.

Actually this arrangement is a very frequent event; it seems to be a method of bringing about separation, and of making satisfactory solutions difficult. Hence it is more reasonable not to assume that this possibility (of the other woman), which lies so temptingly to our hand, is the final purpose of the separation. It would seem more advisable to investigate what is behind the anima tendencies. The first step brings us to the necessity of making the anima objective, namely, there must be a definite refusal to accept the tendency towards separation as springing from one's own weakness. Only under this condition can the anima be faced, as it were, with the question: "Why do you want this separation?" Putting the question in this very personal way has a great

advantage, because the personality of the anima is thus recognized, and a relation to her becomes possible. The more personally she is taken the better.

To any one accustomed to proceed along purely intellectual and rationalistic lines, this may seem altogether too ridiculous. It would indeed be more than absurd for a man to have a conversation with his persona, which he recognizes as a mere psychological system of relations. It is absurd, however, only to the man who has a persona. But the man who has none is in this respect no better than a primitive, who, as we know, has only one foot in what we commonly call reality. With the other he stands in the world of the spirits, which is just as real to him. Our model case is a modern European living in the contemporary world, but in the world of the spirits he is the child of a paleolithic man. He must therefore submit to a kind of pre-historic, kindergarten schooling, until he has won to a right conception of the powers and factors of another world than the visible. Hence he would be singularly right to treat the anima as an autonomous personality, and to put direct personal questions to her.

I mean this as an actual technique. Every one practically has not only the idiosyncrasy, but also the conscious ability of holding dialogues with himself. Whenever we are in a fearful dilemma, we put to ourselves (or to whom else?) the question, either aloud or under our breath, "What shall I do?" and we (or who else?) even give the answer to it. In the strength of our resolve to learn what there is to be known of the foundations of our own being, it cannot really disturb us if we decide to accept a metaphor, so to speak, into our life. We have simply to accept it as a symbol of our primitive backwardness (or of the naturalness that still, thank Heaven, survives in us) that we, like the negro, can hold personal converse with our 'snake.' Since the psyche is not by any means a unity, but a contradictory plurality of

complexes, the dissociation that is required for coming to terms with the anima is not too difficult for us. The art of it consists in allowing the invisible opponent to become vocal, putting at his or her disposal for the moment the mechanism of expression, without being overcome, either by the aversion one might naturally feel at playing such an apparently absurd game with oneself, or by doubts as to the 'genuineness' of the voice of one's interlocutor. The latter point is technically of great importance, for we are so in the habit of identifying ourselves with the thoughts that come to us, that we are always liable to assume that we made them. And it is a remarkable fact, that often it is just the most impossible thoughts for which we feel the greatest subjective responsibility. If we were more conscious of those inflexible and universal laws which govern even the wildest and most arbitrary phantasy we might perhaps learn to regard such thoughts as objective occurrences, just as we view dreams, which no one assumes to be intentional and voluntary discoveries. It certainly requires the greatest objectivity and absence of prejudice to give to the 'other side' the opportunity for perceptible psychic activity. As a result of the repressive conscious attitude, the 'other side' was forced into mere symptomatic manifestations, mostly of an emotional and indirect kind, and only in moments of overwhelming affect could fragmentary ideational or figurative contents of the unconscious come to the surface. And always this was accompanied by the same irresistible phenomenon, namely, the momentary identification of the ego with these unconscious expressions, in order at once to revoke them. What one can actually say under the sway of a powerful affect sometimes appears most strange and venturesome. But, as we know, it is easily forgotten, or wholly denied. This mechanism of depreciation and denial must obviously be reckoned with when one decides to take an objective attitude towards oneself. The habit of jumping in to correct and criticize is

already strong enough in our tradition, and it is, as a rule, further reinforced by fear. A fear that cannot be confessed either to another or to oneself, a fear of truths that can undermine, of dangerous knowledge, of disagreeable verifications, in a word, a fear of all those things that cause so many people to flee from being alone with their own thoughts as from the plague. It is considered egoistic or 'unhealthy' to be occupied with oneself—'one's own society is the worst'—'it makes one quite melancholy'—such are the splendid testimonials that are subscribed to our human make-up. But they are deeply ingrained in the western attitude. Does the man who thinks in this way ever clearly present to himself what sort of delight other people must take in the company of such dirty-souled cowards? Proceeding from the fact, that in a state of affect one is often literally at the mercy of the truths of the other side, it is often advisable to make use of an affect in order to give the other side an opportunity to speak. It would therefore be just as true to say that one should cultivate the art of speaking to oneself from an affect, and in the frame of an affect, as though the affect itself were speaking without regard for our rational criticism. So long as the affect is speaking criticism must be withheld. But when it has presented its case, then it must be conscientiously criticized, exactly as though a real man closely connected with us were the interlocutor. Nor must the matter rest there, but speech and reply must follow one another until a peaceful end to the discussion is found. Whether the result is satisfactory or not, only subjective feeling can decide. It is of course quite useless to plan anything ahead. Scrupulous honesty towards oneself, and the renunciation of every hasty assumption as to what the other side might conceivably say are indispensable conditions of this technique for educating the anima.

Although this fear of the other side is peculiar to us western peoples there is nevertheless something in it. For this fear

is not wholly unjustified, quite apart from the fact that it is real. We understand at once the fear that children and primitives have of the great, unknown world. We have the same fear of our childish inner side, where we likewise touch a wide, unknown world. The affect, however, is all we have to go upon ; we do not recognize it as a cosmic or world fear, because that world is invisible. Either we have purely theoretical prejudices about it, or superstitious ideas. There are actually numbers of educated people in whose presence one cannot even speak of the unconscious without being charged with mysticism. The fear is justified inasmuch as our rational *Weltanschauung*, with its scientific and moral certainties so hotly believed in (because so deeply dubious), is convulsed by the data from the other side. If one could escape it, the emphatic '*quieta non movere*' of the Philistine would be the only truth worth advocating. And here I would like to point out quite emphatically, that I do not recommend the technique described above as either necessary, or even useful, to any person not driven to it by necessity. The stages, as I said, are many, and there are greybeards who die as innocent as sucklings, and here, in the year of our Lord 1927, troglodytes are still being born. There are truths that are only true the day after to-morrow, truths that were still true yesterday—and truths that are never true.

But I can imagine some one using such a technique out of a kind of holy curiosity, so to speak, a youth, perhaps, who would like to set wings to his feet, not because of his lameness, but because he yearns for the sun. But a grown man, for whom too many illusions are dead, will submit to this inner humiliation and surrender only if he is forced to it. For why should he, a man, once again let the fears of childhood have their way with him ? It is no light matter to stand between a day-world of exploded ideals and of values no longer believed in, and a night-world of apparently senseless

phantasms. The weirdness of this standpoint is actually so great, that there is almost nobody who does not reach out for some kind of security, even though it be a 'backward grasp' to the mother, for example, who shielded one's childhood from the terrors of the night. Whoever is afraid must needs be dependent, just as a weak thing needs support. Therefore the primitive mind, from a deep psychological necessity, embodied religious instruction in the powerful magician and the priest. *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus* is to-day still a valid truth—for those who can go back to it. For the few who cannot, there is only dependency on a human being—a humbler and a prouder dependency, a weaker and a stronger support than any other, so it seems to me. But what can we say of the Protestant? He has neither church nor priest, but only God—and even God becomes doubtful.

The reader will certainly ask himself in amazement: "But what then does the anima produce, if such fundamental guarantees are required before one can come thoroughly to terms with her?" I would recommend my reader to study a comparative history of religions in a new way. He needs to bring these apparently dead chronicles to life again, and to fill them with the emotional life which those men felt who lived these religions. Thus will he gain some conception of what lives on the other side. For the old religions with their sublime and their ridiculous, their noble and horrible symbols, are not born out of the blue, but out of this very human soul that lives in us at this moment. All those things live in us in their primordial forms, and at any time they may break in upon us with destructive force, in the form of mass-suggestion, for example, against which the individual is defenceless. Our frightful gods have only changed their names—now they rhyme with *-ism*. Or is there any one bold enough to claim the world-war or Bolshevism as an ingenious discovery? Just as our outer lives, therefore, are conditioned by a world in which at any time a continent may be submerged, or a

pole be shifted, or a new pestilence break out ; so our inner lives are determined by a world in which at any moment something similar may happen, albeit in the form of an idea, but no whit less dangerous and uncertain on that account. Failure to adapt to this inner world is an omission fraught with just as serious results as is ignorance and incapacity in the outer world. Moreover, consider this small fraction of humanity that is located chiefly in that thickly populated peninsula of Asia which juts out into the Atlantic Ocean ! It is only this so-called ' educated ' fraction which, because of a defective contact with nature, has hit upon the idea that religion is only a peculiar kind of mental disturbance of undiscoverable purport. Viewed from a relatively safe distance, say from Central Africa or Thibet, it would almost seem as though this fragment had projected upon peoples still sound in their instincts an unconscious ' mental derangement.'

Because the things of the inner world influence us subjectively all the more powerfully the more we are unconscious of them, the man who intends to deepen fundamentally his own culture (and does not a culture always begin in the individual ?) must learn to objectify the anima-effects, and then try to understand what those contents are which underlie these effects. Thus only can he gain his adaptation to, and his defence against the invisible. This adaptation can naturally not succeed without concessions to the conditions of both worlds. It is through considering the demands of both worlds, the inner as well as the outer—or more accurately—through the conflict between these demands, that the possible and the necessary can be found. Unfortunately our western mind, from a profound lack of culture in this relation to the soul, has never found a concept, not to mention a name, to represent that most fundamental main-spring of inner experience, namely, the union of the opposites in a middle way, which could in any way compare with the

Chinese Tao. This conception is at the same time the most individual fact, and the most universal and immutable significance of the living creature.

In the foregoing presentation, I have kept exclusively to masculine psychology. As a femininity, the anima is exclusively a compensating figure to masculine consciousness. In a woman, however, the compensating figure is masculine in character, and therefore can be appropriately termed the animus. Although it is certainly no light task to describe what is comprised by the term anima, the difficulties become almost insuperable when we approach the task of presenting the psychology of the animus.

The fact that a man naïvely takes his anima reactions to himself, without perceiving that it is impossible to identify oneself with an autonomous complex, is equally evident in feminine psychology, though if possible in a still more conspicuous manner. The existence of this state of identification with an autonomous complex is the essential reason of the difficulty in understanding and presenting a psychological condition, quite apart from the unavoidable obscurity and strangeness of the problem. We always proceed on the naïve assumption that we are masters in our own house. The first thing we have to do is to accustom ourselves to the idea that, even in our most intimate psychic life, we live in a kind of house through the doors and windows of which we look out upon a world, and that the objects or contents of this world, although profoundly affecting us, do not belong to us. For many, this hypothesis is by no means easy to conceive. Just as they cannot readily recognize and accept the fact that their neighbour's psychology is not necessarily identical with their own. Perhaps my readers will think that the last remark is somewhat exaggerated, since in general one is aware of individual differences. But it must be remembered that our individual conscious psychology develops out of an original state of unconsciousness, or in

is lacking (which not infrequently happens) is immediately drawn upon for an opinion. Sometimes these opinions appear in the form of so-called healthy common sense, sometimes as narrow-minded prejudices, or again, as principles that resemble an educational travesty : " One always does it so," or " But every one says it is thus and thus."

It goes without saying that the animus is just as often projected as the anima. The men who especially invite the projections are either living imitations of god, who always know just the right decision, or they are some kind of misunderstood neologist with a vast and windy vocabulary at their command, in which the 'all too human' appears translated into the terminology of 'fruitful experience.' For the animus would be inadequately characterized if he were represented merely as a conservative, collective conscience. He is also a neologist who, in complete contrast to his correct opinions, has an unusual weakness for unintelligible and unfamiliar words which transpose the odious reflection in the most agreeable way.

The animus also, like the anima, is a kind of jealous lover or husband who so manœuvres the situation as to put an opinion in the place of the real man. It is usually an assumption about the man that is highly contestable, and yet the grounds on which it rests are never submitted to criticism. Animus opinions are invariably collective in character, and they override individuals and individual judgments much in the same way as the anima, with her feeling anticipations and projections, overrides the relationship between man and wife. If the woman happens to be pretty, these animus opinions have a rather touching, childlike character for the man, which prompts him to a benevolent, fatherly, educational attitude. But in so far as the woman does not stir his sentimental side, and consequently is expected to produce competence instead of an appealing helplessness and stupidity, her animus opinions have a rather irritating effect upon the

man. This is mainly due to their quite inadequate or false foundations—too often it is an opinion for opinion's sake, or because 'one cannot afford to be without one,' etc. At this point men are apt to become poisonous, for it is an inescapable fact that the animus always entices the anima; which means, that all further discussion is fruitless. Obviously the converse is equally true.

In intellectual women the animus predisposes to intellectual argumentativeness and critical rationalizations, the essence of which consists in emphasizing a secondary weak point against all reason, as though it were the main theme. Or a discussion, perfectly clear in itself, is incurably distracted by the introduction of a quite different and, if possible, perverse viewpoint. These women, without knowing it, are solely intent upon annoying the man, and are, in consequence, all the more completely delivered over to the animus. "Unfortunately I am always right," once confessed to me just such a woman.

All these phenomena, however, familiar as they are unprepossessing, arise solely from the extraversion of the animus. The animus does not belong to the conscious function of relationship, but he can and should make possible the relation to the unconscious. Instead of allowing these opinions to break into external situations—which after all are entitled to command conscious reflection—the animus should become an initiating function toward the inner world, where his intuitive capacity can bring unconscious contents to light. The technique of coming to terms with the animus is the same in principle as in the case of the anima. The only difference is that the animus is concerned with opinions which the woman must learn to hold at a distance and criticize, not in order to repress them, but for the purpose of investigation, in order to fathom their origin in her own obscure background, where she will discover those same primordial images which the anima reveals to a man. The animus is a sort of deposit

of the experiences of man won by the whole female ancestry—and not only that, for he is also a generative, creative nature ; not, however, in the form of masculine creation, but as bringing forth something that could be called λόγος σπερματικός, a generating word. Just as a man produces his work as a complete creation out of his inner feminine nature, so the inner masculine side of a woman produces creative seeds that can fertilize the feminine element in the man. This would be the '*femme inspiratrice*' who, when falsely cultivated, can also be the worst kind of dogmatist and high-handed pedagogue, an 'animus hound' as one of my patients aptly expressed it.

A woman who is possessed by the animus is always in danger of losing her adapted feminine persona, just as a man in similar circumstances risks becoming effeminate. These psychic transpositions of sex depend entirely upon the fact, that a function that belongs inwardly has been given an outward direction. The reason for this perversion is clearly the absence of an adequate realization of an autonomous inner world that is not only opposed to the outer world, but also makes just as serious demands upon the individual capacity for adaptation.

With regard to the plurality of the animus in contrast to the unity of the anima, this peculiar fact seems to be a correlate of the conscious attitude. The conscious attitude of woman is far more personally exclusive than that of man. Her world is made up of fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, husbands, and children. The rest of the world consists of similar families, who make the customary signs to one another, but apart from this are concerned essentially with themselves. The man's world consists of the nation, the state, various interests, business concerns, etc. The family is for him merely a means to an end, one of the foundations of the state, and his wife is not necessarily *the* wife (at least not in the same sense as when the woman says 'my husband'). The general means more to him than the personal ; hence

his world consists of a plurality of co-ordinated factors. Whereas, outside the husband, the woman's world soon terminates in a kind of cosmic mist. Thus in man's psychology a passionate exclusiveness pertains to the anima, while in woman's the contrary is the case, the animus being characterized by an indefinite multiplicity. Hovering, as it were, before the man is a significant Circe or Calypso, sketched in clear and living lines, whereas the animus tends to be expressed as a "Flying Dutchman," or some similar unknown visitor from the sea, never quite definitely seizable—a protean figure, and inclined to persistent or violent motion. These expressions appear specifically in dreams, but in concrete reality they can take the form of tenor heroes, champion prize-fighters, or great men in far-away, unknown cities.

These two twilight figures of the dark hinterland of the psyche (they are the true, half-grotesque 'Guardians of the Threshold,' to use the pompous theosophical jargon) can assume an almost inexhaustible number of aspects, and whole volumes could be written about them. Their complications and intricate transformations are as manifold as the world, just as comprehensive in fact as the limitless multiplicity of their conscious correlate, the persona. There they stand in the sphere of twilight, and it is just this fact which shows us that fundamentally the autonomous complex of the anima (and the animus) is a psychological function which has only usurped personality—and till now maintained it—by virtue of its autonomy and lack of development. But already we can see a possibility of breaking up the personification of these complexes, since by making them conscious we create a bridge that leads across into the unconscious. It is because we are not using them purposefully as functions that they remain personified complexes. But so long as they remain in this condition they must be recognized as relatively independent personalities. They cannot be integrated into

consciousness so long as their contents are unknown. By discussing them, and by coming, as it were, to an understanding with them, their contents are brought into the light ; only when this task is completed, and we have gained an adequate conscious awareness of the unconscious processes as reflected by the anima, will the anima be felt as merely a function.

Naturally I do not expect that every reader will immediately grasp what is meant by animus and anima. I trust, however, that he will at least have gained the impression that there is nothing 'metaphysical' about it, but that, on the contrary, it is a question of empirical facts which could just as well be expressed in rational as in abstract terms. I have purposely avoided language that is abstract, because in things of this nature which have hitherto been so inaccessible to our experience, it is useless to present the reader with a merely intellectual formulation. It is more needful, in my opinion, to give some conception of the possibilities actually to be experienced. No one can really understand these things unless he has experienced them himself. I am therefore more interested in indicating the ways and means by which the experiences can be obtained, than in presenting intellectual formulæ which must necessarily remain, while the experience is lacking, an empty web of words. There are, unfortunately, all too many who are content to learn words by heart, and to put these words in the place of experience, thereby becoming more or less addicted, according to temperament, either to faith or to criticism. What we are concerned with here is a new interrogation, and a new (and yet how old !) field of psychological experience. We shall be able to arrive at conclusions that have a relative theoretical validity, only when the corresponding psychic phenomena are sufficiently familiar to many people. It is facts that are always discovered first, and not theories. The hammering out of theories belongs to the field of discussion in which many minds participate.

CHAPTER III

THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE FIGURES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

I OWE it to the reader to give detailed examples of the specific activity of the animus and the anima. Unfortunately this material is so extensive and, moreover, demands so much explanation of the symbols involved, that I cannot include a presentation of that kind within the scope of this essay. I have published some of these products of the unconscious with all their symbolical associations as a separate work,¹ and to this I must refer the reader. In that book I said nothing about the animus, because at that time this function was unknown to me. At all events, in practice, whenever I advise a patient to allow the contents of the unconscious to come freely into her conscious field, she will regularly produce similar phantasies. The masculine hero-figure, which is practically never missing from these phantasies, is the animus. And the sequence of phantastic experiences will usually demonstrate the gradual transformation and dissolution of the autonomous complex.

This transformation is the aim of the analysis of the unconscious. If the transformation does not succeed the unconscious has an undiminished determining influence. In some cases the unconscious persists in maintaining and asserting certain neurotic symptoms in spite of all analysis and the most thorough-going understanding, or it will cling to a compulsive transference which is just as bad as a neurosis.

¹ *Psychology of the Unconscious*. Kegan Paul, London.

In such cases there is apparently no suggestion, no good-will, and no purely reductive understanding that can avail to break the power of the unconscious. In saying this—once again I wish to emphasize this point—I do not mean to imply that psychotherapeutic methods one and all are of no value. I only want to make it perfectly clear, that there are not a few cases in which the physician has to make up his mind to a thorough-going handling of the unconscious, namely, a real understanding and a fundamental analysis of the unconscious contents. Obviously this is something quite different from interpretation. In the latter case it must be assumed that the physician knows beforehand, otherwise he could not interpret. But in the former case, where it is a question of coming to terms with the unconscious, something else besides interpretation is required. There must first be a liberation of the unconscious processes, which now appear in consciousness in the form of phantasies. We may attempt to interpret these phantasies. In many cases it may even be quite essential that the patient gets some idea of the meaning of the phantasies thus produced. But it is of vital importance that the patient unreservedly accepts the phantasies as an individual experience, and in so far as an intellectual assimilation belongs to the totality of experience, also understands them. But I would not say that the understanding should be given priority. Obviously the physician must be able to assist the patient in understanding the phantasies, but, since he will not and indeed cannot understand everything, he should take every possible precaution to guard against clever feats of interpretation. The most essential thing is not the interpretation and the understanding of the phantasies, but always the experiencing of them. Alfred Kubin, in his book *Die andere Seite*, has given a very good picture of the unconscious, that is, he has described what the artist in him went through on 'the other side.' It is an artistic experience,

and therefore, in the deeper meaning of human experience, it is incomplete. I would like to recommend this book to everybody who is interested in this question. The reader will certainly discover the incompleteness I speak of ; it is seen and experienced artistically, but not humanly. By experiencing a thing humanly, I mean that the author's person is not merely framed in the vision, as it were passively, but that he actually encounters the figures of the vision, reacting to them and dealing with them in full consciousness. I would make the same criticism with regard to the authoress of the phantasies that I treated in my book above referred to. She, too, only perceives, or at best passively endures the phantasy structures arising from the unconscious. But if we are to achieve a real reconciliation with the unconscious, a conscious standpoint is needed that can stand firm against the unconscious.

I will try to explain what I mean by an example. One of my patients had the following phantasy : ' He sees his fiancée running down the road towards the river. It is winter and the river is frozen. She runs out upon the ice, he following her. She goes a long way, and then the ice breaks and a dark fissure appears, into which he fears she may plunge. Then she actually falls into the opening and he looks at her sadly.

This fragment, taken from a connected phantasy-sequence, clearly shows the attitude of the unconscious. It only perceives and endures, that is to say, the phantasy-image is merely seen and felt. It is as it were only a two-dimensional experience, because he himself is too little involved. Therefore the phantasy remains merely an image, albeit strangely visual and stimulating to the feeling, yet dreamlike and unreal. This unreality rests on the fact that he himself is not effectively in the phantasy. If this phantasy were a reality, he would not be at a loss for some means of preventing his fiancée from committing suicide. He could easily overtake

her, for instance, and withhold her bodily from jumping into the hole. Were he to behave in reality as he did in the phantasy, he would obviously be paralysed, either from horror, or from the unconscious recognition that he really had no objection to her suicide. The fact that he remains passive in the phantasy merely expresses his attitude to the activity of the unconscious in general. He is fascinated and bewildered by it. In reality he suffers from all sorts of depressive ideas and convictions; he believes, for instance, that he is 'no good,' that he is hopelessly tainted by heredity, that his brain is degenerating, etc. These negative feelings are like so many auto-suggestions which he accepts without criticism. Intellectually, of course, he can understand them perfectly and recognize them as untrue, but nevertheless the feelings persist. They cannot be adequately dealt with by the intellect because they have no intellectual or reasonable basis, but are rooted in an unconscious, irrational phantasy-life which is inaccessible to any conscious critique. The unconscious must be given opportunity, in such cases, to produce its phantasies, and the above fragment belongs to just this kind of unconscious phantasy-activity. But since the case we are dealing with here is one of psychogenetic depression, the morbid condition is actually rooted in these phantasies of whose existence he is entirely unconscious. In cases of genuine melancholia, extreme exhaustion, poisoning, etc., the situation would be reversed. The patient would then have the phantasies as symptoms of his depression. But in the case of psychogenetic depression, on the contrary, the feeling of inferiority is secondary to the phantasies. My patient is a very intelligent young man who through a long analysis has become perfectly informed intellectually as to the causality of his neurosis. But the intellectual understanding has made no difference to his depression. In a case of this sort, the physician should not burden himself unnecessarily with the task of boring still deeper into the

causality of the case ; for, when a more or less exhaustive intellectual understanding is of no avail, the discovery of another causal factor will also avail nothing. In this case the unconscious has simply an unassailable preponderance. It commands a power of attraction that can invalidate all conscious values, a power, in other words, that can withdraw libido from the conscious world, thus producing a 'depression,' *i.e.* an '*abaissement du niveau mental*' (Janet). As a result of this, according to the law of energy, we should expect in this case an accumulation of value (=libido) in the unconscious.

Libido can never be apprehended except in a definite form. Hence it follows that it is identical with the phantasy-images, and we can release it again from the unconscious only by bringing up the phantasy-images in which it is invested. Consequently, in treating such a case as this, we must allow the unconscious to bring its phantasy-products to the surface. This was the method by which the foregoing fragment was produced. It is an episode taken from a long series of phantasy-images of very rich quality which corresponds to that quantum of energy that was missing from the conscious and its contents. His conscious world became cold, empty, and grey ; but his unconscious became correspondingly animated, powerful, and rich. It is characteristic of the nature of the unconscious psyche that it is sufficient unto itself and knows no human considerations. What has once fallen into the unconscious is retained, quite regardless of the suffering and deprivation of consciousness. The conscious can hunger and freeze, while the unconscious becomes verdant and blossoms.

At least so it appears at first. If, however, we investigate the matter more closely, we find that this unconcern of the unconscious for the human element has meaning, nay more, it has a goal and a purpose. There are certain psychic aims that transcend conscious intention ; they may even appear

inimical to consciousness. But this hostile or ruthless attitude of the unconscious *vis-à-vis* the conscious is found only when the latter is characterized by a false or pretentious attitude.

The conscious attitude of my patient is so over-balanced on the side of the intellect that nature herself rises against him and brings his whole world of conscious values to naught. But he cannot make himself unintellectual and forthwith depend upon another function, as for instance feeling, for a quite simple reason : he has not got it. The unconscious has it. Therefore, nothing was left for us to do but to hand over the leadership, as it were, to the unconscious, thus giving it the opportunity of becoming a conscious content in the form of phantasies. That same intensity, with which formerly my patient clung to his intellectual world, defending himself with rationalizations against what he regarded as his sickness, he must now employ in devoting himself to the latter. When a mood of depression assails him, he must no longer force himself to some irrelevant task for the sake of forgetting ; but he must accept his depression, and, to a certain extent, give it a hearing.

This method is the exact opposite of the old way, so characteristic of neurosis, of yielding completely to a mood. It is not weakness, not a spineless surrender, but a difficult achievement. For in spite of the temptation of the mood, one has to maintain objectivity and make the mood itself the object, instead of allowing it to become the domineering subject. He must try to get his mood to speak to him. His mood must tell him what its nature is, and in whatever kind of fantastic analogy it chooses to employ.

The fragment I have given was part of a visualized mood. If he had not succeeded in keeping his objectivity in relation to his mood, he would have had, in place of the phantasy-image, only a crippling sense that everything was going to the devil, that he was incurable, etc., etc. But because he

gave his mood the chance of expressing itself in an image, he succeeded in making at least a small sum of libido, *i.e.* organized unconscious energy, into a conscious content in the form of an image, thus withdrawing it from the sphere of the unconscious.

But this attempt is insufficient, since the phantasy demands the value of a complete experience, and this involves active participation, not merely an attitude that perceives and endures. The patient would have met these demands if he had conducted himself in the phantasy as he would doubtless have behaved in reality. He would not remain an idle spectator while his fiancée tried to drown herself, but would of course do his utmost to prevent her. This active participation should also appear in the phantasy. If he succeeds in behaving in the phantasy as he would behave in a similar situation in reality, he would prove that he was taking the phantasy seriously. This would mean that he was assigning to the unconscious an unconditioned reality value. In this way he would have achieved a victory over his one-sided intellectual standpoint, and indirectly he would have asserted the validity of the irrational standpoint of the unconscious.

That would have been the complete experience of the unconscious that was required of him. But we must not underestimate what it actually means when one's whole world is threatened by fantastic unreality. It is almost insuperably difficult to forget, even for a moment, that all this is only a phantasy, an imaginative growth, seemingly quite arbitrary and contrived. How can one assert this kind of product to be 'real' and take it really seriously?

We can hardly be expected to believe in a kind of double life, in which we conduct ourselves on one plane as modest average citizens, while on another we experience unbelievable adventures and perform heroic deeds. It would be quite wrong, in other words, to concretize our phantasies. But

mankind has a strange propensity to do just this, and all the customary aversion to phantasy and the critical depreciation of the unconscious proceed fundamentally from a deep-rooted fear of this tendency. The tendency to concretization, and the fear of it, are both primitive superstitions, but they still survive in the most living form in many so-called enlightened people. Here is a man who in his civic rôle follows the trade of a shoemaker, but in his sect puts on the dignity of an archangel. This other one is a small tradesman in the visible world, but as a freemason he is a mysterious grandee. Another man sits all day in his office, but in his 'circle' he is a reincarnation of Julius Cæsar. As a man most fallible, but in his official capacity, infallible—these are the concretizations that are not intended.

As an offset to this, the scientific credo of our time has developed a superstitious phobia about phantasy. But that is real which works. The phantasies of the unconscious work—this cannot be gainsaid. Even the most brilliant philosopher can be the victim of a thoroughly idiotic agoraphobia. Our famous scientific reality does not protect us in the least from the so-called unreality of the unconscious. Something works behind the veil of fantastic images, whether we give to this something either a good name or a bad. It is something real, and for this reason its vital manifestations must be taken seriously. But first the tendency to concretization must be overcome. In practice, this means that the phantasies should not be taken literally as soon as one approaches the question of interpretation. But while we are involved in the actual experience, the phantasies cannot be taken literally enough. Only when we come to the task of understanding them; then we must never mistake the semblance (*i.e.* the phantasy-image) for the effective process underlying it. The semblance is not the thing itself, but only an expression of it.

Thus my patient does not experience the suicide scene

'on another level' (though otherwise just as concrete as a real suicide), but he experiences something real which has the appearance of a suicide. The two opposing 'realities,' the world of the conscious and the world of the unconscious, do not quarrel for preeminence, but together constitute a reciprocal relativity. That the reality of the unconscious is highly relative will surely excite no vigorous denial, but that the reality of the conscious world could be called into question will be less easily tolerated. And yet both 'realities' are psychic experience, psychic semblances emerging from unknowable, mysterious backgrounds. To a critical reflection nothing is left of an absolute reality.

Of essence and absolute being we know nothing. Our experience consists of various effects, from 'without' by way of the senses, and from 'within' in the form of phantasies. We should never think of asserting, for instance, that green colour had an independent existence; similarly we ought never to take a phantasy experience as something absolute, and therefore to be taken or understood literally. It is an expression, an appearance standing for something unknown but real. The phantasy fragment I have quoted coincided with a wave of depression and doubt, and this event finds expression in the phantasy. The patient actually has a fiancée, and she represents his one emotional connection with the world. Her death would mean the end of his relation to the world. This aspect then would be altogether hopeless. But his fiancée is also a symbol for his anima, that is, his relation to the unconscious. Therefore the phantasy also expresses the fact that, without any hindrance on his part, his anima again disappears into the unconscious. This aspect shows that once again his mood is stronger than he is. It throws everything to the winds, as it were, while he looks on without lifting a hand. Whereas he could step in and hold fast to the anima.

I give the preference to the latter aspect, because the

patient is an introvert whose relation to life is ruled by inner facts. Were he extraverted I would have to give precedence to the first aspect, for with the extraverted type life is primarily governed by his relations to man. He might in the trough of a mood do away with his fiancée, and therewith also himself; whereas the introvert, on the contrary, does harm to himself when he casts aside his relation to the anima, that is, to the inner objects.

This phantasy of my patient, then, plainly shows the negative movement of the unconscious, that is to say, a tendency to withdraw from the conscious world of such a formidable intensity that the libido is entirely sucked away from consciousness, leaving the latter empty. By making the phantasy conscious this withdrawal is not allowed to happen unconsciously. If the patient were himself to participate actively in the way described above, he could possess himself of the libido represented in the phantasy, and with this he would gain a new and stronger influence over the unconscious.

A sustained conscious attitude that not only makes conscious, but also participates actively in the various events of these phantasy constructions (which would otherwise remain quite unconscious) has very definite consequences, and I myself have witnessed these cases not once or twice, but innumerable times. The first effect is that the range of consciousness is increased by the inclusion of a great number and variety of unconscious contents. This is followed by a gradual diminution of the dominating influence of the unconscious. The third and most important effect is a very considerable change in personality.

This change in personality is naturally not an alteration of the original hereditary disposition, but rather a transformation of the general attitude. Those sharp cleavages and antagonisms between the conscious and the unconscious, which are so abundantly evident in the endless conflicts

of neurotic natures, depend almost invariably on a pronounced bias of the conscious attitude, by which absolute precedence is given to one or two functions, while other functions are kept unduly repressed in the background. Through the actual experience of the phantasies and the assimilation of them by consciousness, the unconscious and relatively inferior functions become organized in the conscious hierarchy. Naturally, this is a process which cannot take place without a far-reaching effect on the conscious attitude.

I will for the moment refrain from a discussion of the nature of this change in personality, since at present I only want to emphasize the fact that an essential change does take place. I have called it the transcendent function, and it obtains by virtue of a fundamental coming to terms with the unconscious. This remarkable capacity for transformation existing in the human soul, expressed in the transcendent function, is the principal object of the late mediæval alchemistic symbolism. In his very able book (*Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism* ¹) Silberer has made a detailed study of the psychological connotations of alchemy. It would be an unpardonable depreciation of value if we were to accept the current view, and reduce the spiritual striving of the alchemists to the level of the retort and the smelting furnace. Certainly this aspect belonged to it ; it represented the tentative beginnings of exact chemistry. But it also had a spiritual side which has never yet been given its true value, and which from the psychological standpoint must not be underestimated. There was in fact an alchemical philosophy, the tentative precursor of the most modern psychology. The secret of its vitality lay in the fact that it embraced the transcendent function, namely, the transformation of the personality through the merging and binding together of the noble and the base elements, of the

¹ Translated by Smith Ely Jelliffe. Moffat, Yard & Co., New York, 1917.

differentiated and the inferior functions, of the conscious and the unconscious.

The beginnings of scientific chemistry were notoriously falsified and confused by fantastic ideas and arbitrary points of view. The same applies to alchemical philosophy, which was so hampered by the inevitable concretizations of a mind still somewhat crude and undeveloped that it never forged its way through to a psychological formulation, although a most vivid intuition of profound truths held the passion of mediæval thinkers to the problems of alchemy. No one who has fully accomplished the process of assimilating the unconscious will deny the fact that he has been gripped in his very vitals by the process, and that this has changed him.

I would certainly not blame my reader if he were to shake a dubious head at the idea of this *quantité négligeable* of a mere phantasy (*vide* the foregoing banal example) having even the slightest influence. I must frankly own, having regard to the problem of the transcendent function and the extraordinary effect ascribed to it, that the phantasy fragment in question is not very illuminating. It is very difficult, however—and here I must appeal to the benevolent co-operation of my reader—to cite any telling examples, since every example has the disagreeable characteristic of being impressive and meaningful only in the sphere of the individual subject. Consequently I always advise my patients never to cherish the naïve belief that what is to them personally of the greatest significance has also objective meaning.

The overwhelming majority of mankind are quite incapable of putting themselves individually into the mind of another. It is indeed quite a rare art, and at best cannot reach very far. Even that man, whom we think we know best and who assures us himself that we know him through and through, is at bottom quite foreign to us. He is in fact different, and the most and the best we can do is, at least, to divine this

'otherness,' to respect it, and to guard against the outrageous stupidity of wishing to interpret it.

I can produce nothing, therefore, that is absolutely convincing, nothing, that is, which would convince the reader in the same way that it convinces the man whose actual experience it is. We can believe in a man's experience only by virtue of its analogy with our own. Finally, however—if all else should fail—the end result is still unchallengable, namely, the perceptible alteration of personality. With these reservations in mind, I would like to present to the reader another phantasy fragment, this time from a woman. Between this and the foregoing example there is a difference that immediately springs to the eye, namely, in the totality of the experience. The observer also takes an active part, and she accordingly gains possession of the process. The material from this case was very extensive and it culminated in a profound transformation of personality. This fragment comes from a relatively late stage in the evolution of the personality, and belongs organically to a long, connected series of transformations, the aim of which is the attainment of the central point of the personality.

It may perhaps be not immediately intelligible as to what is meant by this concept of the 'central point of the personality.' I will therefore try to sketch this problem in a few words. If consciousness with the ego as the centre is thought of as being placed opposite the unconscious, and if now the process of assimilating the unconscious be added to the mental picture, this assimilation can be thought of as a sort of approximation of the conscious and the unconscious whereby the centre of the total personality no longer coincides with the ego, but with a point midway between the conscious and the unconscious. This would be the point of new equilibrium, a new centering of the total personality, a virtual centre perhaps which, on account of its central position between the conscious and the unconscious, ensures the

personality a new and more solid foundation. I freely admit that visualizations of this kind are never more than the awkward attempts of a fumbling mind to give some kind of form to inexpressible, and well-nigh indescribable, psychological facts. I could even express the same thing in the words of Paul : " Not I who live, but Christ who liveth in me." Or I might invoke Laotze and appropriate his concept of Tao, the Middle Way and the creative centre of all things. Behind all these sayings the same meaning lies. Speaking now as a psychologist with a scientific conscience I have to declare that these facts are psychic factors of indisputable effect. They are not the discoveries of an idle mind, but definite psychic events. They obey absolutely definite laws, and have their own law-determined causes and effects, which accounts for the fact that they can be demonstrated just as well among the most varied peoples and races living to-day as among those of thousands of years ago. As to what these processes consist in I have no theory to offer. One would first have to know what the psyche is. I am content merely to state the facts.

Coming now to our example : it has to do with a phantasy of an intensely visual character, something which, in the language of the ancients, would be called an 'apparition.' It was not, however, a 'dream-apparition,' but a 'vision' which by intense concentration was perceived on the background of consciousness, a technique that is perfected only after long practice. Told in her own words, this is what the patient saw : " I climbed the mountain and came to a place where I saw seven red stones in front of me, seven on either side, and seven behind me. I stood in the middle of this quadrangle. The stones were flat like steps. I tried to lift the four stones that were nearest to me. In doing so I discovered that these stones were the pedestals of four statues of gods which were buried upside down in the earth. I dug them up and so arranged them around me that I stood in the

middle of them. Suddenly they leaned towards one another so that their heads touched, forming something like a tent over me. I myself fell to the earth, and said, 'Fall upon me if you must, for I am tired.' Then I saw that beyond, encircling the four gods, a ring of flame had formed. After a time I arose from the ground and overthrew the statues of the gods. Where they fell to the earth four trees began to grow. And now from the circle of fire blue flames shot up which began to burn the foliage of the trees. Seeing this I said, 'This must stop. I must go into the fire myself so that the leaves may not be burned.' Then I stepped into the fire. The trees disappeared and the ring of fire contracted to one immense blue flame that carried me up from the earth."

Here the vision ended. Unfortunately I know of no method by which I can give to the reader a convincing demonstration of the extraordinarily interesting meaning of this vision. The fragment is taken from a long sequence, and the whole context would have to be explained, what happened before and what came after, for him to grasp the meaning of this image. In any case, the unprejudiced reader will recognize at once the idea of the 'middle point' that is reached by a kind of climb (the exertion of mountain climbing, effort, struggle, etc.). He will also easily recognize the famous mediæval problem of the squaring of the circle which belongs to the sphere of alchemy. Here it stands in its rightful place as a symbolical expression of individuation. The total personality is indicated by the four cardinal points of the horizon, the four gods, *i.e.* the four functions which give orientation in psychic space,¹ and by the circle enclosing the whole. The overcoming of the four gods who threaten to smother the individual signifies the moment of liberation from the state of identity with the four functions, a four-fold '*nirvāṇa*' ('freedom from the opposites'), and this moment

¹ Compare *Psychological Types*.

is followed by an approximation to the circle, namely, to the undivided totality, which means a further raising, or a new being.

I must content myself with these suggestions. Whoever cares to reflect upon it can form an approximate conception of the way in which the transformation of personality will go. Through her active participation the patient becomes merged, as it were, with the unconscious processes, and finally gains possession of them by allowing them also to possess her. Thus she joins the conscious to the unconscious. The result is the upward movement in the flame, the transformation in the alchemical heat, the genesis of 'pure spirit.' This is the transcendent function which is yielded from the union of the pairs of opposites.

At this point I am reminded of an essential misunderstanding that not infrequently overtakes my readers, and physicians almost regularly. It is assumed, on what grounds I know not, that I write about nothing else besides my method of treatment. This simply does not coincide with the facts. I write about psychology. It must therefore be expressly and clearly stated, that my method of treatment does not consist in any kind of instigation on my part which causes my patients to indulge in strange phantasies, whereby their personalities may be changed, and other nonsense of the same kind. I merely state the fact that there are certain cases in which that kind of development takes place, and I say this, not because I want to force any one to accept it, but because it proceeds from its own inner necessity. For more than a few of my patients these things are and must remain Greek. Indeed, if ever they should have the possibility of traversing such a way, it would be for them a lamentable mistake, and I would be the first to restrain them from taking it. The way of the transcendent function is an individual fate. Under no circumstances should this way be regarded as identical with the life of a psychic hermit. In no sense does it mean an

alienation from life and from the world. Quite the contrary, in fact, for such a way is possible and successful only when the particular worldly tasks, undertaken by these same individuals, are also carried out effectively in reality. Phantasies are not a substitute for living things, but fruits of the mind that fall to him who pays his tribute to life. The shirker experiences nothing but his own morbid fear, and this brings him no meaning. Moreover, this way will never be known to the man who has found the backward way to Mother Church. Without a doubt the *mysterium magnum* is included in her forms, and he can live within them in a meaningful way. Finally, the normal man will never be oppressed by this kind of knowledge, for since eternity he has contented himself with the little that fills his horizon. I beg my reader to understand, therefore, that I am writing about events, and not discussing methods of treatment.

Both the phantasy examples I have given demonstrate the positive activity of the anima and the animus. In so far as the patient takes an active part, the personified figure of the animus or the anima tends to disappear. It becomes the conscious function of relation with the unconscious. But if the unconscious contents (these very phantasies) are not 'realized,' a negative activity and a personification of the unconscious take place which represent a renewed autonomy of the animus, or anima. Psychic abnormalities develop, possessive conditions of every degree from ordinary moods and 'ideas' to psychotic states. All these conditions are characterized by one and the same fact, namely, an unknown something has taken possession of a smaller or greater part of the psyche and maintains its perverse and noxious existence undisturbed by insight, reason, and energy. It demonstrates therewith the power of the unconscious *vis-à-vis* consciousness, the power, in fact, of possession. In this condition the possessed part of the psyche usually develops an animus or an anima-psychology. The incubus of the woman consists

of a host of masculine demons ; the succubus of the man is a woman.

As every one can see, this particular concept of a soul which, in accordance with the conscious attitude, either exists independently or disappears into a function, has not even the remotest connection with the Christian concept of the soul.

My patient's phantasy is a typical example of the kind of content produced by the collective unconscious. Although the form is thoroughly subjective and individual, the content is none the less collective, that is, it consists of universal images and ideas that occur in many men, parts therefore by which the individual is assimilated to other men. When such contents remain unconscious, the individual through them becomes unconsciously merged with others—in other words, he is not differentiated, not individuated.

The question might here be raised : Why is it desirable that a man should be individuated ? It is not only desirable but indispensable even, since through the amalgamation or merged condition the individual falls into situations and commits actions which bring him into disharmony with himself. For, from every unconscious amalgamation and identification, a compulsion is engendered both to be and to behave contrary to one's own nature. Accordingly a man can neither be at one with it, nor can he accept responsibility for it. He feels himself to be in a degraded, unfree, and unethical condition. But the disharmony with himself is precisely the neurotic and intolerable condition from which he seeks to be freed, and a release from this condition is to be gained only when a man can just be and act as he feels and is. A feeling for this actuality soon develops, at first vague and uncertain perhaps, but becoming ever stronger and clearer with progressive development. If a man can say of his states and actions, ' That is what I am like, and that is how I act,' he can agree with it even though it be difficult,

and responsibility can be undertaken even though it be distasteful. We must indeed acknowledge that there is nothing more difficult to bear with than oneself. ("Thou soughtest the heaviest burden, thou didst find thyself," Nietzsche.) But even this most difficult achievement becomes possible if a man can differentiate himself from the unconscious contents. The introverted man discovers these contents within himself, but the extraverted sees them as projections in the human object. In both cases the unconscious contents cause blinding illusions which falsify ourselves and our relations to our fellowmen, making both unreal. For these reasons individuation is indispensable for certain people, not only as a therapeutic necessity, but also as a high ideal, an idea of the best that one can do. I must not forbear to observe that it is also the original Christian idea of 'the Kingdom of Heaven that is within you.' The idea at the basis of this ideal is that the right way of acting comes from the right way of thinking, and that there is no cure and no means of improving the world that does not begin with the individual himself.- To put the matter drastically, the man who is either a pauper or a parasite will never solve the social question.

CHAPTER IV

THE MANA PERSONALITY

My material for the discussion that now follows is taken from those cases in which the condition that was presented in the previous chapter as the most immediate goal has been achieved, namely, the overcoming of the anima as an autonomous complex, and her transformation into a function of relation between the conscious and the unconscious. With the achievement of this goal it is possible to free the ego from all of its entanglements with collectivity and with the collective unconscious. Through this process the anima loses the dæmonic power of the autonomous complex, that is, she can no longer exercise the power of possession, since she is depotentiated. She is no longer the guardian of unknown treasures ; no longer is she Kundry the dæmonic messenger of the Grail, half-divine and half-animal ; no more the ' soul-mistress.' Instead she has become a psychological function of an intuitive nature, a function that is akin to what the primitives mean when they say : ' he is going into the forest to talk with the spirits ' or ' my snake said to me ' or, as in our mythological baby language, ' my little finger told me.'

Those of my readers who know Rider Haggard's description of ' She-who-must-be-obeyed ' will surely recall the magical power of this personality. ' She ' is a *mana* personality, which means, a being full of an occult, miraculous quality (*mana*), and endowed with magical knowledge and power. All these attributes originate of course from the naïve projections of an unconscious self-recognition which,

expressed in less poetical terms, would run somewhat as follows, ' I recognize that a psychic factor is active in me that can free itself of my conscious will in the most incredible way. It can put extraordinary ideas into my head, can provoke unwished-for, unwelcome moods and affects, can lead me into astonishing behaviour for which I can take no responsibility, and can disturb my relations to other people in an irritating way. I feel myself to be helpless in the face of this fact and, what is worse, I am in love with this thing, so that I can only wonder at it. (Poets often call this the artistic temperament ; unpoetical people excuse themselves in other ways.)

Now when this ' anima ' factor loses its *mana*, what becomes of it ? Clearly the man who has mastered the anima has gained her *mana*, according to the primitive idea that when a man kills the *mana*-person he assimilates his *mana*.

Who is it that has come to terms with the anima ? Manifestly it is the conscious ego, and therefore the ego has taken the *mana*. Thus the conscious ego becomes a *mana* personality. But the *mana* personality is a dominant of the collective unconscious, the recognized archetype of the powerful man in the form of hero, chief, magician, medicine man, and saint, the lord of men and spirits, the friend of gods.

This, then, is a masculine collective figure rising out of a mysterious background and taking possession of the conscious personality. This psychic danger is of a subtle nature and can, through inflation of the conscious, negate everything that has been won by coming to terms with the anima. It is therefore of no little importance practically to know that in the hierarchy of the unconscious the anima is only the lowest rank, one of many possible figures, and that her subjection constellates another collective figure which now takes over her *mana*. Actually it is the figure of the magician—as I will briefly call it—that draws the *mana* to itself, *i.e.* the autonomous value of the anima. Only in so far as I am unconsciously identical with this figure can I conceive myself

taking possession of the *mana* of the anima. Whereas under these conditions I cannot conceivably fail to do so.

The figure of the magician has a less dangerous equivalent in women, a maternal, superior figure, the great mother, the all-merciful, who understands and forgives everything, who always wishes the best, living only for others and never seeking her own interests. She is the discoverer of the great love, just as he is the prophet of the final truth. And just as the great love is never properly valued, so great wisdom is never understood. And, moreover, neither is inclined to tolerate a reciprocal relation.

The possibility of a serious misunderstanding is at hand, for without a doubt it is a question of inflation. The ego has appropriated something that does not belong to it. But how has this *mana* been acquired? If the ego had really subjected the anima, then her *mana* would belong to it; the conclusion is therefore correct, and the person has become important. But why does not this importance, this *mana*, affect others? That would surely be an essential criterion! It has no effect because the person has not really become important; he has merely become fused with an archetype, another unconscious figure. We must conclude then that the ego has never conquered the anima at all, and hence has not acquired the *mana*. Only a new fusion has happened, this time with a figure of the same sex corresponding to the father-*imago*, a still more powerful figure.

"Freed from the power that bindeth all creatures,
Standeth the man who is lord of himself";

and thus he becomes a superman, superior to all powers, a demi-god, perhaps even more. . . . "I and the Father are one." This mighty avowal in all its fearful ambiguity comes from just this psychological event.

In the presence of this superiority our pitifully limited ego, if possessed of only a spark of self-knowledge, can only draw back and at once relinquish every illusion of power and

importance. It was a mistake. The ego did not subdue the anima, and therefore has not won her *mana*. The conscious has not become master of the unconscious, but the anima has sufficiently relinquished her lordly assumption of power to enable the ego to come to terms with the unconscious. This new basis of understanding, however, was not a victory of the conscious over the unconscious, but rather the restoring of equilibrium between the two worlds.

Hence the 'magician' could only take possession of the ego because the ego dreamed of a victory over the anima. That was an encroachment, and every encroachment on the part of the ego is followed by an encroachment from the unconscious :

" In altered form,
New power I wield."

If, therefore, the ego relinquishes its claim to victory, the possession by the magician stops automatically. But what happens to the *mana*? Who or what does the *mana* become when even the magician can no longer work magic? We only know this much, that neither the conscious nor the unconscious has *mana*; for it is certain that when the ego makes no claim to power there is no possession, that is to say, the unconscious also loses its predominance. In this situation, then, the *mana* must rest with something that is both conscious and unconscious, or else neither. This something is the desired 'middle point' of the personality, that indescribable something between the opposites, the reconciliation of the opposites, the result of the conflict, the 'achieved product' of the energetic tension, the coming to birth of personality, a most individual forward step, the next stage.

I do not expect the reader to have followed the foregoing rapid review of the whole problem in all its implications. He may regard it as a kind of preliminary statement leading up to the more closely reasoned analysis which now follows.

We may take as the starting-point of our problem that condition which ensues when the unconscious contents, activated by the anima- and animus-phenomena, are sufficiently presented to consciousness. This can best be represented in the following way: In the first instance the unconscious contents are things of the personal atmosphere, similar perhaps to the material in the above-mentioned phantasy of the man patient. Subsequently, phantasies of the impersonal unconscious develop, and these contain the essential collective symbolism, as in the vision of my woman patient. These phantasies are not wild and unregulated as a naïve intelligence might think, but they follow definite, unconscious lines of direction which converge upon a definite goal. Therefore this later phantasy activity could best be described as an initiation process, since this seems to be the closest analogy to it. All primitive groups and tribes that are relatively organized have their initiations often very highly developed, and these play an extraordinarily significant rôle¹ in their social and religious life. Through these ceremonies boys become men, and girls, women. The Kavirondos stigmatise those who do not undergo circumcision or excision as 'animals.' This shows that the initiation ceremonies are the magical means by which man has been led over from the animal into the human state. Manifestly, primitive initiations are transformation mysteries of the greatest psychic significance. Very often the initiates are subjected to excruciating treatment, while at the same time they are instructed in the tribal mysteries, on the one hand, the tribal hierarchy and its laws, and on the other, cosmogonic and other mythical lore. Initiations have survived among all cultural peoples. In Greece the very ancient Eleusinian mysteries survived apparently until the seventh century A.D. Rome was flooded with mystery religions. Christianity is one of these, which, even in its present faded and degenerate

¹ Compare Webster : *Primitive Secret Societies*.

form, still maintains the old initiation ceremonies of baptism, confirmation, and communion. No one, therefore, can deny the enormous historical importance of initiations.

Modern peoples have nothing at all that can compare with this historical importance of initiations. (Compare the testimony of the ancients with respect to the Eleusinian mysteries!) Freemasonry, *L'Eglise Gnostique de la France*, the Rosicrucian legend, theosophy, etc., are sickly substitutes for something that had better be written up in red letters on the historical casualty-list. It is a fact that the whole symbolism of initiation emerges vividly and unmistakably from the unconscious contents. The reproach that this is ancient superstition and altogether unscientific is just as intelligent as though some one were to remark in the presence of a cholera epidemic, that it was merely an infectious disease and, moreover, unhygienic. We are not concerned with the question—I cannot be too emphatic about this—as to whether the initiation symbols are objective truths or not. What we have to decide is : are these unconscious contents the equivalents of initiation practices or not, and do they or do they not exercise influence over the human psyche? The question as to whether they are desirable is entirely irrelevant. It is enough that they exist and are effective.

Since it is not possible in the space available to lay before the reader in detail a somewhat lengthy series of images, the few examples already given must suffice ; and for the rest I must trust the reader to accept my statement, that they are logically constructed, purposive sequences. I must own that I write the word 'purposive' with a certain hesitation. This word needs to be used cautiously and with certain reservations. For we can observe, both in the mentally diseased and in neurotics, dream- and phantasy-sequences that apparently spend themselves without showing any trace of a goal. The young patient, whose suicide phantasy I mentioned above, is in a fair way to produce purposeless

phantasies if he cannot learn to take an active part and grasp the material consciously. A direction towards a goal can arise in no other way. From one point of view the unconscious is a pure nature-process without purpose, but from another it has that potentiality for directedness which is characteristic of every energetic process. But when the conscious takes an active part, experiencing every stage of the process and understanding it, at least intuitively, then it may happen that the next image is set on this higher level that has been won by the cooperative attitude, and thus the purposive process develops.

We can say, then, that the first goal of the analysis of the unconscious is to achieve a condition in which the unconscious contents no longer remain unconscious, and are no longer expressed indirectly as anima and animus-phenomena, a condition, namely, in which anima (and animus) become a function of relation to the unconscious. So long as they are not this, they are autonomous complexes, that is, disturbing factors that break through conscious control and thus behave like true mischief-makers. Because this is such a generally recognized fact my term 'complex,' used in this sense, has actually gained currency in ordinary speech. The more 'complexes' a man has the more he is possessed, and when we try to form an image of this personality which expresses itself through its complexes, we are almost forced to conclude that it resembles nothing else but an hysterical woman—hence the anima! When, however, he undertakes to make conscious his unconscious contents, he can get to the roots of his complexes, first in the form of factual contents of his personal subconscious, and then in the form of phantasies of the collective unconscious. In this way he obtains release from his possession, and the anima-phenomenon comes to an end.

And yet that superior power which caused the possession—what I cannot shake off must be in some way superior to me—should, logically, disappear with the anima. One ought to

become 'complex free,' psychologically clean, so to speak. Nothing more should happen that is not permitted by the ego, and when the ego wills something, nothing should intervene to disturb it. Thus an impregnable position would be assured to the ego, the immutability of purpose of a superman, or the superiority of the complete sage. Both of these figures are ideal images, Napoleon on the one hand, and Laotze on the other. Both figures correspond to the idea of 'extraordinary effectiveness,' the expression used by Lehmann in his well-known monograph as embracing the meaning of *mana*.

On these grounds I call such a personality a *mana* personality. It corresponds to a dominant of the collective unconscious, an archetype which, by virtue of psychic response to experience, has been developing in the human psyche through immemorial time. The primitive does not analyse, and gives no account to himself of why another man is superior to him. If the other is cleverer and stronger than himself, then he has *mana*, that is, he is possessed of a stronger power. This power can be lost by its owner; perhaps some one walked over him while he was asleep, or some one may have stepped on his shadow.

The *mana* personality has developed historically into the hero-figure and the divine man,¹ whose earthly figure is the priest. How much the physician too is identified with *mana* could be told by analysts! In so far as the ego apparently acquires the power belonging to the anima, the ego also becomes a *mana* personality. This evolution is an almost regular phenomenon. I have never seen a more or less advanced development of this kind, without at least a transitory identification with the archetype of the *mana* personality taking place. And it is the most natural thing in the world that this should happen, since not only does the

¹ According to popular belief, the most Christian king could heal epilepsy with his *mana* by the laying-on of hands.

person himself expect it, but every one else expects it too. One can scarcely help admiring oneself a little for having seen more deeply into things than others. Others also have such a need to find somewhere a tangible hero, a superior wise man, a leader and father, or some undisputed authority, that they too with the greatest readiness build temples to little human gods and burn incense upon their altars. This is not merely the lamentable foolishness of the imitator without judgment of his own, because it is also a psychological natural law that what has happened before will always be so again. And thus will it always be, so long as consciousness does not put an end to the naïve concretizations of the primordial images. I know not whether it be desirable that consciousness should alter the eternal laws; I only know that from time to time it does alter them, and that this measure is for certain people a vital necessity, which does not prevent these same people, however, from themselves mounting the throne of the father and therewith once again making the old rule come true. It is indeed hard to conceive how the superior power of the primordial images can be escaped.

I do not believe that this superior power can be escaped. Only one's attitude to it can be changed. This alone can save one from naïvely falling into an archetype, and from having to play a rôle at the expense of one's humanity. Being possessed by an archetype converts one into a mere collective figure, a kind of mask behind which the human element can no longer develop, but is increasingly stunted and crippled. The danger, therefore, must be constantly kept in mind of falling victim to the dominant of the *mana* personality. Not only does the danger lie in becoming oneself a father-mask, but also in the possibility of coming under the power of this mask when worn by another. Master and pupil are in this sense the same.

The dissolution of the anima means that insight has been

won into the driving forces of the unconscious, but not that we have made these powers ineffective. At any time they can attack us again in a new form. And they will do so without fail if the conscious attitude has a flaw in it. Power stands against power. If the ego arrogates to itself power over the unconscious, the unconscious responds with a subtle attack, in this case with the *mana* personality dominant, the enormous prestige of which casts a spell over the ego. The only protection against this is the fullest confession of one's own weakness over against the powers of the unconscious. We set up no power in opposition to the unconscious, and consequently we do not provoke it to attack.

It may perhaps sound comical to the reader, when I speak of the unconscious in this rather personal way. I trust I shall not thereby excite the prejudice that I regard the unconscious as something personal. The unconscious consists of natural processes that lie outside the sphere of the humanly personal. Only our conscious is personal. Therefore when I speak of 'provoking' the unconscious, I do not mean that it is offended, and—like the ancient gods—rises up to smite the offender in jealous anger or revenge. What I mean resembles rather a psychic error of diet which upsets the equilibrium of my digestion. The unconscious reacts automatically like my stomach which, figuratively, takes its revenge upon me. If I presume to have power over the unconscious, this is a psychic error in diet, an unsuitable attitude which in the interests of general well-being would be better avoided.

My unpoetic comparison is, to be sure, somewhat too mild in view of the far-reaching and devastating moral effects of a disturbed unconscious. From this point of view I would prefer to speak of the wrath of the injured gods.

By differentiating the ego from the archetype of the *mana* personality, one is now forced to make conscious, exactly as in the case of the anima, those unconscious contents that are

specific to the *mana* personality. Historically, the *mana* personality is always in possession of the secret name, or some special knowledge, or has the prerogative of a particular way of acting (*quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi*)—in a word, he has individual distinction. Bringing to consciousness those contents which build up the *mana* personality archetype means, for a man, the second and real liberation from the father, and, for the woman, freedom from the mother, and therewith the first real sense of her own individuality. This part of the process once again exactly corresponds to the aim of the concretistic primitive initiations, including the Christian baptism, namely, the severance from the 'carnal' (or animal) parents and the rebirth, '*in novam infantiam*,' into the condition of immortality and spiritual childhood. This at least was the way it was formulated by certain ancient mystery-religions, including Christianity.

There now exists the possibility that the *mana* personality is not identified with, but on the contrary is concretized as an extra-mundane 'Father in Heaven,' having the attribute of absoluteness (a character that seems to lie very near to the hearts of many). The result of this would be that the unconscious would be given a preponderance just as absolute (if the efforts at belief succeeded!) whereby all value would flow over into it.¹ And it would logically follow that all that

¹ 'Absolute' means 'released' or 'detached' (*losgelöst*). To explain god as absolute is as good as placing him outside all connection with mankind. Man cannot affect him, nor he man. Such a god could have no real significance. Thus with fairness we can speak only of a god who is relative to man, as he is to god. The Christian idea of god as a 'Father in Heaven' expresses the relativity of god in an exquisite way. Quite apart from the fact that we can discover less about god than an ant can know about the contents of the British Museum, the urge to explain god as 'absolute' comes only from the fear that god could become 'psychological.' This would naturally be dangerous. An absolute god is no concern of ours whatsoever, while a psychological god would be real. This god could touch men. The church seems to be a magical instrument for the purpose of protecting man from this eventuality, for it is written: 'it is terrible to fall into the hands of the living god.'

is left behind must be only a miserable, inferior, inefficient and sin-laden heap of humanity. This solution, as we know, has become an historical *Weltanschauung*. As I am here limiting myself to psychological territory, and am conscious of no inclination to dictate my eternal truths to the universe, I must add the following criticism of this solution : if I shift all the highest values over to the side of the unconscious, thus converting it into a *summum bonum*, I am then placed in the unfortunate position of having to discover a devil of equal weight and dimensions that could hold the psychological balance against my *summum bonum*. But under no circumstances will my modesty allow me to identify myself with the devil. That would be too presumptuous, and would bring me, moreover, into unbearable conflict with my highest values. But this, with my moral deficit, would be quite beyond my powers.

On psychological grounds, therefore, I would recommend that no god be constructed out of the *mana* personality archetype. This means that god must not be concretized, for only thus can I avoid projecting my values and their negatives into God and Devil, and only thus can I preserve my human virtue, my own specific gravity, which alone secures me from becoming the unresisting shuttlecock of unconscious forces. In his intercourse with the visible world, a man would certainly be mad if he were to conceive himself the master of this world. Here one follows perfectly naturally the principle of 'non-resistance' in the face of every superior factor, up to a certain individual limit ; at which point the most peaceful citizen becomes a bloody revolutionary. Our reverence for the law and the state is a commendable example of our general attitude to the collective unconscious. ('Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's.') Thus far our reverence would not be too difficult. But there are also other factors in the world to which our conscience does not yield an unconditional assent,

and yet we bow to them. Why? In practice it is found to be more tolerable than not doing so. Likewise there are factors in the unconscious where it behoves us to move with caution. ('Resist not evil.' 'Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness.' 'The children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light,' therefore 'Be wise as a serpent and gentle as a dove.')

The *mana* personality is on the one side a superior man of wisdom, and on the other a superior will. By making conscious the contents that lie at the root of this personality, we are forced to reconcile ourselves with the fact that on the one hand we have learned something more than other people, and on the other hand we will more than others. This unpleasant relationship to the gods gripped the unfortunate Angelus Silesius, as we know, so deeply in the vitals, that it knocked him head over heels out of his super-Protestantism, right through the possible, though precarious, halfway house of Lutheranism, back into the deepest womb of the black mother—greatly to the detriment, unfortunately, of his lyrical talents and the health of his nerves.

And yet Christ, and after him Paul, struggled with these very problems, a fact for which the evidence is clear and by no means inconsiderable. Meister Eckehart, Goethe in *Faust*, and Nietzsche in his *Zarathustra* have again brought this problem vividly before us. Goethe and Nietzsche try to solve it by the idea of mastery, the former through the figure of the magician, the embodiment of ruthless human will who makes a pact with the devil, the latter through the master-man, the superior wise one without a devil and without a god. With Nietzsche man stands alone, like himself, neurotic, financially dependent, without god and without the world also. This is not an ideal possibility for a real man who has a family to support and taxes to pay. Nothing can disprove to us the reality of the world; there is no miraculous way round it. Or can the neurotic philosopher

prove to us that he has not a neurosis? He cannot even prove it to himself. We stand, therefore, alone with our soul between the undesirable effects coming from within and from without, and in some way or other we have to do justice to both. We can do this only in the measure of our individual capacities. Accordingly, what we have to consider is not so much what we 'ought to do,' but what we can and must do.

Thus the dissolution of the *mana* personality naturally leads us, through the assimilation of its contents, back to ourselves as an existing, living something, stretched as it were between two worlds of images, from which forces proceed that are only dimly discerned but are all the more clearly felt. This something, though strange to us, is yet so near; it is altogether ourselves, and yet unrecognizable, a virtual middle-point of such a mysterious constitution that it can demand anything, relationship with animals and with gods, with crystals and with stars, without causing us to wonder, without even exciting our disapproval. This something demands all that and more, and therefore, with nothing in our hands which could fairly be opposed to these claims, it is surely wiser to listen to this voice.

I have called this middle-point the self. Intellectually the self is nothing but a psychological concept, a construction that serves to express an undiscernible essence, and which in itself we cannot grasp, since, as its definition implies, it transcends our powers of comprehension. It might just as well be called 'the god in us.' The beginnings of our whole psychic life seem to be inextricably rooted in this point, and all our highest and deepest purposes seem to be striving towards it. This paradox is unavoidable, for we always come to it when we try to describe something which lies beyond our power of comprehension.

It has, I trust, long since become apparent to the attentive reader that the self has as much to do with the ego, as the

sun with the earth. They are not interchangeable factors. This idea is as little concerned with the deification of man, as with the dethronement of god. What lies beyond our human understanding is out of our reach. If, therefore, we use the concept of a god, we are using it to formulate a definite psychological fact, namely, the independence and superiority of certain psychic contents which become manifest in their capacity to thwart the will, to obsess consciousness, and to influence moods and actions. There will surely be indignant protest at the idea of regarding an inexplicable mood, a nervous disorder, or even an uncontrollable vice, as, in a certain sense, a manifestation of god. But it would actually be an irreparable loss for religious experience if such things, perhaps even evil things, were artificially separated from the number of the autonomous psychic contents. It is an apotropäic euphemism¹ when such things are disposed of with a 'nothing but' explanation. By so doing they are merely repressed, and, as a rule, only an apparent advantage is gained by it. Illusion only changes her face a little. The personality is not thereby enriched; on the contrary, it is impoverished and smothered. What to contemporary experience and knowledge seems evil, or at least meaningless and without value, might appear to a higher level of experience and knowledge as the source of everything good. Naturally everything depends on the use one makes of one's 'seven devils.' To explain them as meaningless robs the personality of its corresponding shadow, and with this it also loses form. The 'living form' needs deep shadows in order to appear plastic. Without shadows it remains a two-dimensional phantom or—a more or less well brought-up child.

In saying this, I am alluding to a problem that is far more significant than those few simple words would seem to

¹ Giving a bad thing a good name in order to mitigate its undesirability.

suggest. Briefly it is this : mankind in respect to the most essential things is psychologically in a state of childhood—a stage that cannot be skipped. The great majority of people need authority, guidance, and laws. This fact cannot be overlooked. The Pauline overcoming of the law is possible only for the man who knows how to set his soul in the place of conscience. Only a very few are capable of doing this. ('Many are called, but few are chosen.') And these few tread this way only from inner necessity, not to say compulsion, for the way is narrow as a knife-edge.

The conception of god as an autonomous, psychic content, makes god a moral problem—and that is admittedly very uncomfortable. But if this problem does not exist, god is not real, for nowhere does he touch our lives. He is then either an historical bogey-concept, or a philosophical sentimentality.

But supposing we leave the idea of a divinity entirely out of the discussion and speak only of autonomous contents ; we then remain intellectually and empirically correct, but at the same time we suppress a note which, psychologically, we should miss. For the concept of a 'divinity' gives us the most appropriate expression for the peculiar way in which we experience the effects of the autonomous contents. We might also make the expression 'daemonic' serve our purpose, so long as it did not imply that we were still somewhere reserving to ourselves a concretized god who would correspond absolutely to our wishes and ideas. But our intellectual conjuring tricks can never succeed in placing this being who accords with our desires in reality, any more than the world agrees to accommodate itself to our expectations. Accordingly, when we ascribe the attribute 'divine' to the effects of the autonomous contents, we recognize thereby their relatively superior power. And it is this superior power that has constrained men of every age to ponder the unimaginable, and even to undertake the greatest

sufferings in order to give these effects their true value. This power is really like hunger or the fear of death.

The self could be represented as a kind of compensation for the conflict between the inner and the outer worlds. This formulation would not be at all unsuitable, since the self has somewhat the character of a result or an achieved goal, something that has come into being only very gradually, and has become a part of our experience at the cost of great effort. Thus the self is also the goal of life, because it is the most complete expression of that fateful combination we call individuality. And not only is it the goal for the single man, but also for a whole group, in which one is needed to complete the picture for the other.

When we have sensed or experienced the self as something irrational, as an indefinable state of being to which the ego is neither opposed nor subjected, but in a relation of dependence, and around which it revolves, very much as the earth rotates about the sun—then the goal of individuation has been reached. I use the word 'sensed' in order to indicate the apperceptive character of the relation between the ego and the self. In this relation there is nothing knowable in the intellectual sense, because we can say nothing of the contents of the self. The ego is the only content of the self that we know. The individuated ego experiences the fact that it is the object of an unknown and superordinated subject. It seems to me that psychological statement can go no further, for the idea of a self is in itself a transcendental postulate which, although justifiable psychologically, does not allow of scientific proof. Thus the step beyond science became an absolute necessity for the psychological development I have tried here to depict, because, without this postulate, I could give no adequate formulation of the psychic processes that were empirically presented. At the very least, therefore, the self claims the value of an hypothesis corresponding to that of the structure of the atom. And

even though we should again be enclosed in an image, it is none the less powerfully alive, and its interpretation, at all events, quite exceeds my powers. I have no doubt at all that it is an image, but it is one in which we are still contained.

I am deeply aware that I have made in this essay no ordinary demands upon the understanding of my readers. Though I have done my utmost to smooth the path of understanding, there is one great difficulty that I am powerless to remove, the fact, namely, that the experiences which form the basis of my discussion are unknown to most people and, therefore, are bound to seem strange. Accordingly I can scarcely expect that my readers will follow all my conclusions. Although every author naturally prefers to be understood by his public, yet the interpretation of my observations is of less moment with me than the more human objective of paving the way to a wide field of experience that only now begins to open before us. It is to make this way accessible to many that is the object of this book. For in this field, hitherto so dark, we can begin to discern the answers to many riddles which the psychology of consciousness never even approached. I make no kind of pretension to finality with respect to the answers I have here formulated. I shall, therefore, be well satisfied if my essay should prove of value as a groping attempt at an answer.

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